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Introduction
The paradigm on which structural reforms have been built has been the 
object of increasing scrutiny since the Asian crisis. The idea that liberal­
ization would lead to rapid economic growth and improvements in liv­
ing standards in developing countries has come into question. Contrary 
to the expectations on which market reforms were based, in many parts 
of the developing world, liberalized economies have been characterized 
by variable mixes of macroeconomic vulnerability, low  investment ra­
tios, increasing international and domestic technological gaps, and dis­
tributive tensions. M ost Latin American countries are examples of the 
economic and social frustrations that structural reforms have generated.
These results have enriched the debate on development. Indeed, even 
the term development economics, which had been declared defunct some 
time ago by orthodox economists, has come back into use. Mainstream 
analysts have embraced ideas that just a decade or two ago were em­
phasized only by alternative schools of economic thought—ideas such as 
the critical role of institutions, the need to correct the macroeconomic 
instability that tends to characterize liberalized financial systems, the 
need to focus attention on innovation systems, and the role of more ac­
tive social policies, just to mention a few.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) has been a very active participant in this debate 
and has emphasized that the assumptions on which economic reforms 
have been built are fragile. It has offered, in turn, new ideas that can help 
to bring the economic development of Latin America back on track.
This book should be seen in this light. It presents the contributions of 
some ECLAC analysts as well as research articles prepared for the 
Commission and, in particular, for a special seminar to celebrate the
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centenary of the birth of Raul Prebisch, the intellectual father of the in­
stitution.
The book is organized in two parts. The first part looks at issues of 
long-term growth and development patterns, and the second part fo­
cuses on issues of macroeconomic vulnerability and its social effects. The 
eight chapters offer theoretical and methodological contributions from 
different schools of economic thought but share a common focus: how  
to improve upon the frustratingly poor economic performance observed 
in Latin America, as well as in some other parts of the developing world, 
during the recent phase of economic liberalization. The title of the book, 
Beyond Reforms, captures the major theme of the essays: the importance 
of going beyond the debate regarding the need for a “first” and a “sec­
ond” generation of reforms in order to understand other forces that have 
been generally overlooked in the debate on market reforms. Taking such 
forces into account is thus crucial in order to overcome the disappoint­
ing economic performance that has characterized many countries in the 
context of economic liberalization.
The theme of the first chapter is the determinants of “dynamic effi­
ciency” in developing countries, which is seen as the result of two basic 
processes. The first process is the ability of a given system to innovate, 
which, in the broad Schumpeterian sense, is defined as the capacity to 
generate new economic activities or new ways of doing previous activi­
ties; under this definition, the major form of “innovation” in developing 
countries is the transfer of production sectors previously developed in the 
industrial world. The second process is the capacity of the innovation to 
generate complementarities, linkages, or networks resulting in an inte­
grated production fabric. These two forces are closely interlinked with a 
third, which is the capacity to reduce the dualism or structural hetero­
geneity that characterizes production structures in developing coun­
tries—that is, the coexistence of high-productivity and low-productivity 
economic activities. A simple macroeconomic model shows how these 
forces interact with the macroeconomic balance, generating a dual link 
between gross domestic product (GDP) growth and productivity growth. 
The main policy implication of the chapter is the need to concentrate on 
a strategy for the transformation of production structures that involves 
three major sets of policy interventions: inducing innovation (in the 
broad sense of the term), promoting linkages, and reducing structural 
heterogeneity. The absence of such a strategy, together with the weak do­
mestic linkages that characterize the new production activities generated 
during the liberalization process, can be seen, in this light, as essential ex­
planations for weak growth in Latin America during the reform period.
The second chapter, by Mario Cimoli and Nelson Correa, looks at the 
same issue from a slightly different angle: the combined effect of the tech­
nological gap relative to developed countries and the propensity to import,
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which jointly determine the trade multiplier in an open economy—that is, 
the capacity of a given rate of export expansion to generate a pattern of 
overall economic (GDP) growth. This relationship is the result of long-run 
balance of payments equilibrium conditions. Using this framework, the 
authors claim that Latin America has slowly narrowed the productivity 
gap, but that this has been insufficient to offset the extraordinary increase 
in the elasticity of demand for imports generated by trade liberalization. 
The result has been a decline of the trade multiplier between the pre- and 
postreform periods, thus generating a “low-growth trap.” Cimoli and 
Correa argue that the major reason for this has been the existence of a dual 
economic structure in which productivity improves in very small enclaves 
that have few linkages with the rest of the system, thereby leading to an in­
creasing dualism between high- and low-productivity sectors within coun­
tries. The major policy implication is the need to narrow the productivity 
gap, which, given the links between the pattern of specialization and the 
process of endogenous knowledge generation and diffusion, is necessarily 
tied to changes in the pattern of specialization.
Chapter 3, by Gabriel Palma, takes as its starting point the inverted-U 
pattern followed by the share of manufacturing in total employment as a 
result of the process of structural change generated by increases in per 
capita income. The author finds that, worldwide, this relationship has be­
come more adverse in recent decades, thereby generating a widespread 
process of “de-industrialization”; he also contends that it is more adverse, 
at any given level of per capita income, for countries that generate a trade 
surplus in primary commodities or services than it is for those with a trade 
surplus in manufacturing. However, Palma argues that a country’s posi­
tion within these patterns is not independent of economic policy. Thus, 
several Scandinavian and Southeast Asian countries rich in natural re­
sources have been able to swim against the de-industrialization tide, indi­
cating that there is no inevitable “curse of natural resources.” During the 
import-substitution era, Latin America was also able to generate levels of 
industrialization typical of countries with a trade surplus in manufactur­
ing. Trade liberalization has induced diverging patterns in the region. At 
one extreme, Brazil and the Southern Cone countries underwent a change 
of reference group as they shifted toward a pattern typical of primary ex­
porters and, in the process, generated a strong de-industrialization. The 
additional de-industrialization generated by changes in the reference 
group is, according to the author, the best definition of Dutch disease—  
although, in these Latin American countries, this effect was generated by 
liberalization policies rather than by a discovery of new natural resources. 
In the opposite pattern, manufacturing exporters in Central America and, 
to a lesser extent, Mexico have been able to maintain higher levels of in­
dustrialization but, relative to the Asian countries, have been character­
ized by very low export-income multipliers.
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The theme of the fourth chapter, by Rob Vos, is the social effects of 
structural reforms. The author tries to explain why, contrary to the ini­
tial assumptions of reformers, labor inequality has tended to increase in 
Latin America during the 1990s, thus weakening the links between eco­
nomic growth and poverty reduction. In this regard, the author explores 
the effects of trade liberalization, as well as the real exchange rate and 
the demand effects of capital account liberalization. The major conclu­
sion is that, although there is evidence of skill biases in several countries, 
rising labor inequality was associated much more closely with the ex­
change rate appreciation generated by capital inflows. The latter led to 
the incapacity of tradable sectors to absorb labor, as many firms in these 
sectors were forced to downsize in order to cope with international com­
petition. Labor was then absorbed into low-productivity agriculture and 
informal urban services. Rising productivity and income dualism be­
tween high-productivity and low-productivity sectors are thus seen as 
more important determinants of rising income inequality than are the 
skill bias of technical change and liberalization. This conclusion ties in 
nicely with the analyses presented in the first two chapters of the book, 
which give a central role to such dualism. It also means that structural 
reforms have interacted poorly with short-term macroeconomic adjust­
ment mechanisms associated with capital account liberalization, lead­
ing, in Vos’ words, to “export-led growth on a slippery path.”
The emphasis on macroeconomic effects in chapter 4 serves as a 
bridge to the second part of the book, in which issues of macroeconomic 
vulnerability are analyzed. Chapter 5, by Lance Taylor, looks at the de­
terminants of business cycles. Business cycles may be thought of as the 
result of two opposite forces: one that tends to generate a potential in­
stability, and a stabilizing force that counteracts it, with the net effect 
being a stable or unstable cycle, depending on which force prevails. In 
the first of the three models presented in the chapter, this potential in­
stability is generated by real exchange rate dynamics that, in the short 
term, generate contractionary demand effects, whereas the lagged re­
sponse of exports to real exchange rate competitiveness provides the 
stabilizing force. In the second model, of a developing-country debt cy­
cle, the destabilizing factor is the dynamics of the country risk premium, 
which feeds back into itself, thereby generating waves of optimism and 
pessimism. The ways the economy adjusts to changes in the availability 
of finance through variations in the trade balance provide the stabiliz­
ing force. In the third model, the potential destabilizing forces are self­
reinforcing waves of investor optimism or pessimism, coupled with the 
tendency of corporate debt to follow investors’ “animal spirits,” 
whereas the financial prudence of corporations provides the stabilizing 
force. As Taylor argues, the first two cycles have been clearly present in 
the dynamics of developing countries, whereas the third cycle, which is
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more typical of the developed world, has also become relevant to some 
developing countries.
An interesting case of destabilization is explored by Manuel Marfan in 
chapter 6: that of “successful” developing countries in which the private 
sector experiences a wave of exuberant behavior. The author develops a 
very conventional model in which prices are determined by cost-push (ex­
change rate) and demand pressures, and sustainable growth is deter­
mined by both domestic capacity and sustainable balance of payments 
conditions. In this context, faced with exuberant private sector behavior, 
the central bank can always meet its inflation target, but only through a 
real exchange rate appreciation and an unsustainable increase in the cur­
rent account deficit. This means, in turn, that the inflation rate is not a 
suitable indicator of economic overheating in an open economy. Whereas 
monetary policy is ineffective in achieving the real targets—in this case, a 
sustainable current account—fiscal policy can fill the gap by generating a 
fiscal surplus to compensate for overheating that originates in the private 
sector. However, Marfan argues correctly that it is not the public sector’s 
institutional role to compensate for excess private spending, a fact that 
imposes a policy dilemma with no conventional solution. The author 
then suggests two unconventional solutions: a flexible countercyclical sales 
tax, and a tax on financial flows, which has the nice political-economy 
advantage of taxing the true source of the problem.
The seventh chapter, by Roberto Frenkel, analyzes debt sustainabil­
ity issues. The author considers, in particular, under what conditions ad­
verse financial shocks affecting a country’s risk premium lead to desta­
bilizing debt dynamics. Such adverse shocks lead directly to an increase 
in the debt service and the demand for external funding, but also to 
higher domestic interest rates that adversely affect domestic economic 
activity. Both are reflected, in the short run, in a rising debt-GDP ratio, 
which will be mitigated by the improvement in the trade balance gener­
ated by the contraction of economic activity. A sustainable debt trajec­
tory is then defined as one in which the debt-GDP ratio peaks some time 
after the initial shock and then falls. The major conclusion is that vul­
nerability to external shocks basically depends on the initial debt-export 
ratio: the lower this ratio is, the larger the rise in the risk premium that 
a country will be able to withstand without its debt-GDP ratio entering 
into an explosive trajectory. If sustainability is guaranteed, then faster 
export growth will accelerate the transition to lower debt ratios. More 
restrictive conditions are found when political conditions require that 
debt servicing be consistent with a positive growth rate or when politi­
cal constraints set a limit on the maximum proportion of GDP that may 
be transferred abroad. When the risk premium is endogenously deter­
mined, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises, which paves the way 
for self-fulfilling prophesies.
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The last chapter, by Jaime Ros, deals with divergence and growth col­
lapses, and serves to tie together the issues analyzed in both parts of the 
book. The author argues, first of all, that classical development theory 
provides the only consistent framework for understanding the major 
patterns of economic growth observed in the world since the 1950s— 
that is, the coincidence of poverty traps at low income levels and accel­
erations of growth at middle income levels, a result, in the latter case, of 
increasing returns to capital in the context of the reallocation of labor 
from low-productivity to high-productivity activities. Whereas the first 
case induces divergence in per capita income, the second case tends to 
generate convergence. At the same time, however, the classical approach 
does not explain another stylized fact: the tendency of accelerations of 
growth to be accompanied by growth slowdowns or even negative 
growth at intermediate levels of per capita income. Basing his findings 
on empirical evidence, Ros contends that vulnerability to growth col­
lapses is associated with income inequality and with the pattern of spe­
cialization, as determined by the abundance of natural resources and 
economic size. In relation to the latter, a mineral/oil specialization seems 
to generate a higher probability of collapse relative to an agricultural 
specialization because of a mix of low linkages, high capital intensity, 
and concentration of ownership, whereas small economies are much 
more vulnerable because of their high levels of specialization.
Viewed as a whole, this collection presents a more precise view of the 
difficult risks and challenges that characterize the new economic era, 
and advances a set of alternative economic policies to manage the open 
developing-country economies of the early 21st century. Ideas that have 
been absent from the reform agenda over the past two decades, particu­
larly interventions that affect the pattern of specialization and capital ac­
count regulations that mediate between capital flows and domestic 
macroeconomic performance, are seen as being critical in bringing about 
the improved economic and social performance that liberalization has so 
far failed to produce.
We think that this collection sheds new light on issues that were 
largely overlooked during the reform period and that must be faced 
squarely in order to overcome the shortcomings that have affected Latin 
America and many other parts of the developing world during their re­
cent phase of liberalization.
José Antonio Ocampo
Under-Secretary-General o f the United Nations fo r Economic 
and Social Affairs, former Executive Secretary o f  E C L A C
I




The Quest for Dynamic 
Efficiency: Structural Dynamics 
and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries
José Antonio Ocampo
D e b a te s  o n  e c o n o m ic  g r o w t h  s in c e  t h e  mid-1980s have left a legacy 
of analytical innovations and rich empirical contributions. The explicit 
recognition of the role of scale economies in economic growth (as well 
as in international and regional analysis), the related revival of ideas ex­
pounded by classical development economics, and the contribution of 
neo-Schumpeterian and evolutionary theories, as well as of institutional 
economics, are among the most important analytical innovations.1 On 
the empirical side, extensive analyses have been made of the relative 
weight of institutional, policy, and geographical factors in explaining 
the divergence in income levels and growth experiences in the world 
economy.2
The richness and diversity of analytical paradigms contrast with 
trends in policy design, where the triumph of liberal economics is the 
dominant rule. After an era marked by strong State intervention and
The author is United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs. 
This chapter draws from previous works by the author, particularly from Ocampo and 
Taylor (1998) and from (Ocampo 2002). I am grateful to Oscar Altimir, Alice Amsden, 
Alicia Barcena, Ricardo Bielschowsky, Mario Cimoli, Joao Carlos Ferraz, Valpy Fitzgerald, 
Jorge Katz, Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Maria Angela Parra, Codrina Rada, Dani Rodrik, 
Jaime Ros, Lance Taylor, Daniel Titelman, Andras Uthoff, and Rob Vos for very useful 
comments on previous drafts of this chapter.
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protectionism, it was expected that less interventionist, open economies 
would provide the basis for rapid growth in the developing world. These 
expectations have been largely frustrated so far. Latin America repre­
sents, in this regard, an outstanding example of a region where the 
record of economic liberalization has not only been disappointing, but 
indeed has been considerably poorer than that of State-led (or import- 
substitution) industrialization.3
Recent controversies shed light on the frustrations that trends in pol­
icy making have generated. Nonetheless, this involves going beyond the 
aggregate dynamics that has been the focus of the recent literature and 
delving into the analysis of the dynamics of heterogeneous production 
structures. In this regard, recent contributions should be complemented 
by old ideas that have received little attention in contemporary debates, 
including the growth-productivity connections associated, in particular, 
with the Kaldorian tradition (Kaldor 1978) and the linkages among 
firms and sectors emphasized by Hirschman (1958).
This chapter argues that economic growth in developing countries is 
intrinsically tied to the dynamics of production structures and to the 
specific policies and institutions created to support it. These policies 
and institutions include, in particular, those that facilitate the diffusion 
of innovations generated in the industrialized world (including new  
technologies and the development of new production sectors), encour­
age the creation of linkages among domestic firms and sectors, and seek 
to reduce the dualism or structural heterogeneity that characterizes 
production-sector structures in developing countries—that is, the co­
existence of a high-productivity (modern) and a low-productivity (in­
formal) sector. Avoiding macroeconomic instability is also essential, if 
instability is understood in a broad sense that includes not only high in­
flation and unsustainable fiscal imbalances, but also sharp business 
cycles, volatile relative prices, unsustainable current account disequilib- 
ria, and risky private sector balance sheets. However, macroeconomic 
stability is not a sufficient condition for growth. The broader institu­
tional context and the adequate provision of education and infrastruc­
ture are essential “framework conditions,” but generally do not play a 
direct role in bringing about changes in the momentum of economic 
growth.
The chapter makes extensive use of concepts elaborated by the old 
and the new development and growth literature. The elements on which 
the analysis is built are well known. The particular emphasis and the 
way the elements are put together have a number of novel aspects. The 
chapter is divided into four sections. The first section takes a look at 
some methodological issues and growth regularities. The second section 
focuses on the dynamics of production structures. The third provides a
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very simple model of the linkages between productive and macroeco­
nomic dynamics. The last section draws policy implications.
Some Methodological Issues and “Stylized Facts”
Time series and cross-section analyses have identified some regularities 
that characterize growth processes. The role of institutions, productivity 
growth, physical and human capital accumulation, economic policies, 
and geography, as well as the changes in gross domestic product (GDP) 
and employment structures that go along with economic growth, are 
among the variables that have been extensively researched.
The analysis of the causal linkages among these variables raises two 
methodological issues. The first relates to the need to differentiate between 
factors that play a direct role in generating changes in the momentum o f 
economic growth versus those that are essential for growth to take place 
but that do not play a direct role in determining such variations. This 
differentiation has been subject to different terminological approaches. 
Maddison (1991, ch. 1) referred to them as a difference between “prox­
imate” and “ultimate” causality, whereas Rodrik (2003) differentiated 
between factors that “ignite” and those that “sustain” growth.
Institutions are the best case in point. Everybody would probably 
agree today that a certain measure of stability in the basic social con­
tract that guarantees smooth business-labor-government relationships 
(including the particular ideologies that serve this purpose), a nondis- 
cretionary legal system and patterns of business behavior that guaran­
tee the security of contracts, and an impartial (and, ideally, efficient) 
State bureaucracy are crucial to facilitate modern, capitalist growth. 
Nonetheless, although in some cases they may become proximate causes 
of growth (or of the lack of it), as in the successful reconstruction (or 
breakdown) of sociopolitical regimes, they generally play the role of 
“framework conditions” for economic growth rather than that of direct 
causes of changes in the momentum of economic growth. Indeed, an 
important empirical observation is that some country characteristics, 
particularly institutional development, are fairly constant over decades, 
whereas growth is not.4 This emphasizes the importance of proximate 
causality or factors that ignite growth. We will thus focus on these 
factors in this chapter.
A second methodological issue relates to the fact that a regular fea­
ture of economic growth is the simultaneous movement of a series of 
economic variables: improved technology, human capital accumulation, 
investment, savings, and systematic changes in production structures.5 
Yet these variables are, to a large extent, results of economic growth.
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Thus, higher investment ratios have usually been regarded as essential 
for the acceleration of economic growth, but they are largely the result 
of the accelerator mechanisms generated by dynamic growth. Through 
the significant externalities it generates, and particularly its complemen­
tarity with technology, human capital accumulation is also an essential 
factor in economic growth, but the accumulation of skills is largely the 
result of production experience and the expansion of education systems, 
facilitated by the additional public sector spending that is generated by 
successful economic growth. The same can be argued with respect to 
productivity growth. In particular, as we will emphasize in this chapter, 
if the causal links emphasized by Kaldor— also referred to as the Kaldor- 
Verdoorn law—are correct, then productivity improvements are largely 
the result of dynamic economic growth, a causal link that is just the 
opposite of that assumed by neoclassical growth theory since Solow  
(1956, 2000). This means that disentangling cause and effect or, in 
empirical analysis, leading and lagging variables, is what growth analy­
sis is all about.6 Thus, many of the regularities mentioned in the growth 
literature may be subject to sharply differing interpretations, depending 
on the causal links involved.
Empirical analysis is obviously the final test of the significance of any 
theory. In this regard, it is useful to present five sets of regularities 
or “stylized facts” that are particularly important for understanding 
growth experiences in the developing world. Some have been seriously 
overlooked in recent growth debates.
The first one is the persistence of large inequalities in the world 
economy that arose quite early in the history of modern capitalism and 
have tended to expand through time (Pritchett 1997). Empirical studies 
indicate that (absolute) convergence in per capita incomes has been the 
exception rather than the rule. Indeed, it seems to be a feature only of 
the more industrial countries in the post-World War II (WWII) period 
and, more specifically, in the “golden age” years, 1950-73. It was not a 
characteristic of industrial countries prior to WWII (Maddison 1991), 
nor has it been a characteristic of the developing world in the post- 
WWII period (Ros 2000, ch. 1).
There have obviously been changes in the world hierarchy, such as 
the rise of Japan in the 20th century, the only “peripheral” economy that 
has really made it to the top. In the developing world, there have also 
been some changes: the rise of the Southern Cone Latin American coun­
tries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the broader rise of Latin 
America in the inter-war period, the rise of Asian newly industrialized 
economies in the post-WWII period, and that of China and India since 
the 1980s. These episodes of convergence are concentrated at middle- 
income levels and are associated with the reallocation of labor from 
low- to high-productivity sectors subject to increasing returns to scale
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(Ros 2000). However, on many occasions, such convergence experi­
ences have not endured, and many have ended up in growth collapses 
(Ros, ch. 8, this volume). The mix of rapid and “truncated convergence” 
and even collapses and, thus, the high variance of growth experiences in 
both low- and middle-income countries is also a major feature of 
international growth patterns.7
In any case, despite changes in the economic landscape, the world 
economic hierarchy is surprisingly stable. This is reflected in the fact 
that slightly more than three fifths of the current variance of per capita 
income levels in the world can be simply explained by the income dif­
ferences that already existed in 1914, according to calculations using 
Maddison’s (2001) data. Even differences in levels of development in the 
developing world are remarkably stable.8 But the world economic hier­
archy goes beyond divergence in per capita incomes. It is associated, in 
particular, with the very high concentration in the generation of core 
technology in those countries and the equally high concentration there 
of world finance and the home headquarters of multinational firms.
The major implications of this fact are that economic opportunities 
are largely determined by the position that a particular country occupies 
in the world hierarchy, which makes climbing the international ladder 
a difficult task. Essential international asymmetries help to explain why 
the international economy is, in fact, an “««level playing field”: (1) pro­
hibitive entry costs into technologically dynamic activities and entry 
costs into mature sectors, which imply that the possibilities open to 
developing countries may be restricted to the attraction of established 
multinationals in those sectors; (2) basic financial asymmetries that are 
reflected in differences in domestic financial development, pro-cyclical 
access to external financing and an inability to borrow abroad in the 
domestic currency; and (3) macroeconomic asymmetries that are reflected 
in the quite different degrees of freedom to adopt countercyclical macro- 
economic policies and even a tendency for developing countries to adopt 
pro-cyclical policies, as a result of their dependence on unstable external 
financing (ECLAC 2003b).9
For these reasons, economic development is not a question of going 
through “stages” within a uniform pattern associated with the rise in 
per capita income that industrial countries have already followed. It is 
about increasing per capita income, about succeeding in carrying out the 
required structural transformations, and about employing the appropri­
ate macroeconomic and financial strategies, within the restrictions that 
each country’s position in the world hierarchy creates and based on the 
internal structures in developing countries that are partly functional to 
that position and partly determined by their own historical develop­
ment. This is the essential insight of the Latin American structuralist 
school (see, for example, Furtado 1961 and Prebisch 1951) and of the
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literature on “late industrialization” since Gerschenkron (see Gerschenkron 
1962, and, for a recent formulation, Amsden 2001).
A second set of regularities is associated with the fact that growth 
comes in spurts rather than as steady flows, and thus entails large ele­
ments of discontinuity. This is a basic lesson of historical analysis, one 
that is stressed by those who view the history of technology as a succes­
sion of technological revolutions or waves of innovation that gradually 
spread through the economic system (Freeman and Soete 1997; Perez 
2002, part I). The view of a growing economy as an “inflating balloon,” 
in which added factors of production and steady flows of technological 
change smoothly increase aggregate GDP, may be a useful metaphor 
for some purposes, but it ends up overlooking some of the most essen­
tial elements of economic development (and technical change). An alter­
native perspective, derived from structuralist economic thinking (broadly 
defined), views growth as a dynamic process in which some sectors and 
firms surge ahead and others fall behind as part of a continual transfor­
mation of production structures. This process involves a repetitive phe­
nomenon of “creative destruction” (Aghion and Howitt 1992, 1998; 
Schumpeter 1962, ch. VIII). N ot all sectors have the same ability to in­
ject dynamism into the economy, to “propagate technical progress” 
(Prebisch 1964). The complementarities (externalities) between enter­
prises and production sectors, together with their macroeconomic and 
distributive effects, can produce sudden jumps in the growth process, or 
can block it (Ros 2000; Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Taylor 1991) and, in 
so doing, may generate successive phases of disequilibria (Hirschman 
1958). These views imply, in short, that the dynamics of production 
structures are an active determinant of economic growth, and thus that 
growth cannot be reduced to the aggregate dynamics described by the 
balloon theories.
The contrast between the balloon and structural dynamics views of 
economic growth10 can be understood in terms of the interpretation 
of one of the regularities identified in the growth literature: the tendency 
of per capita GDP growth to be accompanied by regular changes in the 
sectoral composition of output and in the patterns of international spe­
cialization (see, for example, Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin 1986, and 
Balassa 1989). According to the balloon view, these structural changes 
are simply a by-product of the growth in per capita GDP. In the alter­
native reading, success in structural change is the key to economic 
development. The ability to constantly generate new dynamic activities—  
or, as they will be referred to below, innovations—is, in this sense, the 
essential determinant of rapid economic growth. In this view, structural 
transformations are not automatic or costless. There are always entry costs 
for new activities. The inability to generate new economic activities—  
that is, to cover entry costs—may thus block the development process.
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Moreover, success in generating new sectors of production may also in­
volve “destruction” of previous activities. In Schumpeterian terms, cre­
ation  is generally married with destruction.
The third set of stylized facts stresses the essential role that elastic 
factor supplies play in the development process, particularly in facilitat­
ing a smooth expansion of dynamic activities. This is reflected, at the 
aggregate level, in the most successful economies’ capacity to attract inter­
national capital and, when necessary, labor. The latter feature was more 
typical of the pre-World War I (WWI) world, but it has also been a char­
acteristic of the post-WWII period, as has been the outward mobility of 
labor (particularly skilled labor) from developing countries experiencing 
weak economic performance. Elastic factor supplies at the aggregate 
level also imply that dem and, as well as supply factors, play a role in 
long-run growth. This is a critical element in Keynesian and Kaleckian 
theories of economic growth (Kaldor 1978, chs. 1 and 2; Robinson 1962; 
Taylor 1991) that has typically been ignored in neoclassical growth 
analysis and in the new growth literature.
The internal mobility (that is, reallocation) of capital and labor 
toward dynamic activities is even more important. The ability of inno­
vative activities to attract capital and labor is the pivotal element in their 
capacity to operate as engines of growth. Indeed, the central feature of 
precapitalist economies was the absence of a m obile  labor force (as well 
as some restrictions on changes in land property and land use), and the 
ways by which labor mobility was guaranteed were key to the transition 
to modern capitalist development, as well as an essential determinant of 
institutional development.11
Lewis (1954, 1969) provided the essential insight into the role of 
elastic labor supply in economic development. In a similar fashion, 
Kaldorian growth-productivity links imply that underutilized labor 
plays a role in the growth process (Kaldor 1978, ch. 4). Both views imply 
that economic growth is to a large extent the result of improved effi­
ciency in the use of available resources, through the reallocation of labor 
toward activities subject to economies of scale and scope (specializa­
tion),12 as well as the fuller utilization of underemployed labor in some 
branches of production, particularly agriculture. As Cripps and Tarling 
(1973) have pointed out, these observations fit the growth experience of 
industrial countries even as late as the post-WWII golden years. They are 
even more important in developing countries. Indeed, both classical and 
contemporary development theories make it clear that rapid economic 
growth in developing countries is the result of the reallocation of labor 
toward high-productivity activities subject to increasing returns to scale. 
This implies that rapid development is the result of the interplay between 
labor mobility and economies of scale (Ros 2000; see also Krugman 
1995, ch. 1).
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This has also been the essential insight of regional economic analysis 
ever since its origins more than a century ago. According to this view, 
the interplay between these two factors, and their interaction with trans­
port costs, are what lead to the formation of urban and regional “growth 
poles,” clusters, and urban-rural hierarchies. (For a modern version 
of this interpretation, see Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999). This 
insight can be extended to the analysis of international specialization, as 
Ohlin (1933) made clear in his seminal work on the subject (even though 
it was not this but only another part of his thinking, on the effects of rel­
ative factor supplies on comparative advantage, that made its way into 
mainstream analysis). The role of scale economies in international spe­
cialization, and the divergence factors that are associated with it, were 
brought back to trade theory in the 1980s (see Grossman and Helpman 
1991; Krugman 1990; and in relation to developing countries, Ocampo 
1986). The “vent for surplus” models of international trade, which go 
back to Adam Smith, provide an alternative source of elastic factor 
supplies: the existence of un- or underexploited natural resources (Myint 
1971, ch. 5).
The fourth set of stylized facts stresses the dependence of long-run 
growth patterns on the economy’s trajectory, that is, path dependence 
(Arthur 1994). This is particularly important in economic development 
arising from dynamic economies of scale associated with learning, which 
imply that the opportunities open to economic agents are largely deter­
mined by their production experience. To the extent that economic poli­
cies can affect the structure of production, this means that comparative 
advantages can be created. An interesting historical observation that is rel­
evant in this regard is the evidence that successful experiences of manu­
facturing export growth in the developing world were generally preceded 
by periods of import-substitution industrialization (Chenery, Robinson, 
and Syrquin 1986). This implies, in turn, that the loss of production ex­
perience may have cumulative effects on growth. This issue was brought 
forward in the literature on the Dutch disease (Krugman 1990, ch. 7; van 
Wijnbergen 1984), but it applies equally to the long-term costs of dis­
mantling import-substitution activities during economic liberalization.
In a similar fashion, adverse shocks that affect short-term macroeco­
nomic performance may have cumulative long-term effects in the pres­
ence of economies of scale (Easterly 2001, ch. 10). The lasting effects of 
the debt crises of the 1980s in Africa and Latin America are the most 
telling example in this regard. Similarly, short-term success may breed 
long-term growth. There may thus be multiple long-term growth equi­
libria associated with the macroeconomic trajectories that economies 
follow. The fact that the formation of macroeconomic expectations 
involves a significant learning process, particularly in the presence of 
large macroeconomic shocks, is a basic reason for this (Fleymann 2000).
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The still-controversial role of economic policy in growth leads to a 
fifth set of stylized facts, which can be divided, in turn, into two subsets: 
those that relate to macroeconomic policy and those associated with 
structural reforms. With respect to the first subset, the disturbing, cumu­
lative effects of debt and, more broadly, balance of payments crises on 
growth, as well as of domestic savings and fiscal constraints, have been 
subject to rigorous attention in the literature on macroeconomic “gaps” 
(Taylor 1994). High inflation (for example, above 20 percent) may also 
have adverse effects on growth, as a considerable body of literature has 
argued (see, for example, Barro 1997, ch. 3). The volatility of growth 
and key relative prices (real interest rates and real exchange rates) may 
hurt investment and long-term macroeconomic performance.13 To the 
extent that different forms of macroeconomic instability are not strongly 
correlated, one form of macroeconomic stability may be chosen at the 
cost of instability in another sense, implying that macroeconomic stabil­
ity is not only about low inflation and sustained fiscal deficits, but also 
about smooth business cycles, stability in key relative prices, sustainable 
current account deficits, and healthy financial sectors and private sector 
balance sheets (Ocampo 2003a, 2004a). Insufficient attention to this 
broad view of macroeconomic stability and the tradeoffs involved is 
certainly one of the reasons why the return to stability, in the limited 
sense in which this term is widely used today (low inflation and low fis­
cal deficits), may not generate rapid economic growth, as the recent 
Latin American experience indicates. More generally, the stylized fact 
can be formulated as follows: Macroeconomic instability, in any of its 
different forms, can kill growth; macroeconomic stability, broadly de­
fined, is thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for economic 
growth.
With respect to structural reform policies, a strong focus of the devel­
opment literature has been on the role of the trade policy regime in eco­
nomic growth14 and, more broadly, on the links between economic 
liberalization and growth. In this area, the attempt to derive simplistic 
relationships between trade liberalization and economic growth, and 
even between the trade regime and export growth, has led to misguided 
conclusions (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001).15 In this regard, an addi­
tional stylized fact, derived from comparative analyses of development 
experiences (see, for example, Helleiner 1994) can be advanced: Although 
trade policy, the private sector/public sector mix, and, more broadly, 
policy-induced incentives do matter, there is no single rule that can be 
applied to all countries at any point in time, or to any single country in 
different time periods. Indeed, successful development experiences have 
been associated with variable policy packages involving different mixes 
of orthodox incentives with unorthodox institutional features (“local 
heresies”) (Rodrik 1999, 2001, 2003).
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Thus, protection has been a source of growth in some periods in spe­
cific countries, but has blocked it in others. The same thing can be said 
of freer trade. Mixed strategies have worked well under many circum­
stances. The degree of openness in the world economy has, obviously, 
been a decisive factor in this regard.16 The fact, mentioned earlier, that 
successful experiences of manufacturing export growth in the develop­
ing world were generally preceded by periods of import-substitution 
industrialization indicates that simplistic generalizations are not very 
useful. Bairoch (1993, part I) came to a similar conclusion regarding 
protection and economic growth in “late industrializers” among what 
are now developed countries during the pre-WWI period. He also 
reached the paradoxical conclusion that the fastest periods of growth in 
world trade prior to WWI were not those characterized by the most lib­
eral trade regimes.
The Dynamics of Production Structures
The central theme of this chapter is that the dynamics of production 
structures are the root cause of changes in the momentum of economic 
growth. These dynamics interact with macroeconomic balances, generat­
ing a positive feedback that results in “virtuous” circles of rapid economic 
growth, or, alternatively, growth traps. Some measure of macroeconomic 
stability, broadly defined, is a necessary condition and, obviously, enters 
into the corresponding macroeconomic balances. A facilitating institu­
tional environment, and an adequate supply of human capital and infra­
structure, are framework conditions, but are not active determinants of 
the growth momentum.
The ability to constantly generate new dynamic activities is, in this 
view, the essence of successful development. In this sense, growth is 
essentially a mesoeconomic process, determined by the dynamics of pro­
duction structures, a concept that summarizes the evolution of the sectoral 
composition of production, intra- and intersectoral linkages, market 
structures, the functioning of factor markets, and the institutions that 
support all of them. Dynamic microeconomic changes are the building 
blocks, but the systemwide processes matter most. Moreover, the char­
acteristics of the structural transformation largely determine macroeco­
nomic dynamics, particularly through its effects on investment and trade 
balances.
The dynamics of production structures may be visualized as the in­
teraction between two basic, though multidimensional, forces, namely 
(1) innovations, broadly understood as new activities and new ways of 
doing previous activities, and the learning processes that characterize 
both the full realization of their potentialities and their diffusion
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through the economic system; and (2) the complementarities, linkages, 
or networks among firms and production activities, and the institutions 
required for the full development of such complementarities, whose 
maturation is also subject to learning. Elastic factor supplies are, on the 
other hand, essential to guarantee that these dynamic processes can 
deploy their full potentialities. The combination of these three factors 
determines what we can characterize as the dynamic efficiency of a given 
production system.
These different mechanisms perform complementary functions: Inno­
vations are the basic engine of change; their diffusion and the creation 
of production linkages are the mechanisms that determine their capacity 
to transform and generate integrated production systems; the learning 
that accompanies these processes and the development of complemen­
tarities generate dynamic economies of scale and specialization, which 
are essential to rising productivity; and elastic factor supplies are neces­
sary in order for innovative activities to operate as the driving force of 
economic growth.
In n o va tio n s  a n d  A sso c ia te d  L earn in g  
a n d  D iffu sio n  P rocesses
The best definition of innovations, in the broad sense in which this con­
cept is used here, was provided by Schumpeter (1961, ch. II) almost a 
century ago (“new combinations,” in his terminology): (1) the intro­
duction of new goods and services or of new qualities of goods and 
services; (2) the development of new production methods or new mar­
keting strategies; (3) the opening up of new markets; (4) the discovery of 
new sources of raw materials or the exploitation of previously known re­
sources; and (5) the establishment of new industrial structures in a given 
sector. Thus, this broad concept includes both the more common use of 
the concept of innovations in the economic literature (technological in­
novations), and what Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) have recently called 
“discovery” (of what one is good at producing), as well as other forms 
that are usually disregarded today. Innovations, in this broad sense, may 
arise in established firms and sectors (in a constantly changing world, 
firms that do not innovate will tend to disappear), but they involve many 
times the creation of new companies and the development of new sectors 
of production.
Innovation includes the “creation” of firms, production activities, and 
sectors, but also the “destruction” of others. The particular mix between 
creation and destruction— or, alternatively, between the substitution and 
complementary effects of innovations17—is critical. The term creative 
destruction, coined by Schumpeter (1962), indicates that there tends to be 
net creation. This is, of course, essential in order for innovations to lead
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to growth, but this may not be the actual outcome in any given location 
at a certain point in time. There may be cases in which there is, in fact, 
little destruction, or, on the other hand, large-scale destruction of previ­
ous economic activities, or a mixed negative case of “destructive cre­
ation.” The more localized the effects of a given innovation are, the more 
likely it is that we will actually see the full typology, because some loca­
tions within the world economy may concentrate the creative and others 
the destructive effects of innovations (think, for example, of the discov­
ery of a synthetic substitute that generates new activities in an industrial 
center but puts producers of the natural raw material, which is located 
elsewhere, out of business). Obviously, for growth to take place, net cre­
ative forces must prevail. Accordingly, those are the forces on which we 
will focus here.
A common feature of the first four forms of innovation is that they 
involve the creation of knowledge or, more precisely, of the capacity to 
apply it to production. They thus stress the role of knowledge, mediated 
by a competitive process, as a source of market power. Viewed from this 
perspective, success in economic development can be seen as the ability 
to create enterprises that are capable of learning and appropriating 
knowledge and, in the long run, of generating new knowledge (Amsden 
2001; Lall 2003).
In industrial countries, the major incentive to innovate is provided by 
the extraordinary profits that can be earned by the pioneering firms 
that introduce technical, commercial, or organizational changes, or that 
open new markets or find new sources of raw materials. This incentive 
is necessary to offset the uncertainties and risks involved in the innova­
tors’ decisions, as well as the higher costs that they incur because of 
the cost of developing the new know-how, the incomplete nature of the 
knowledge they initially have, and the absence of the complementarities 
that are characteristic of well-developed activities.
In developing countries, innovations are primarily associated with the 
spread of new products, technologies, and organizational or commercial 
strategies previously developed in the industrial centers. The industrial 
countries’ innovations thus represent the “moving targets” that generate 
the windows of opportunity for developing countries (Pérez 2001). The 
extraordinary profits of innovators are generally absent and, indeed, 
production usually involves entry into mature activities with thin profit 
margins. Thus, in the absence of special incentives, there may be a sub- 
optimal rate of search for new economic activities (Hausmann and Rodrik 
2003). Entry costs are not associated with the development of new  
know-how, but instead with the process of acquiring, mastering, and 
adapting it. Additional entry costs are associated with generating mar­
ket information, building a reputation in new markets, and, in particu­
lar, capitalizing upon opportunities to reduce costs in order to be in a
THE QUEST FOR DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY I S
position to successfully break into established production and market­
ing channels. Entry costs may turn out to be prohibitive for new firms; 
in this case, the possibilities open to developing countries will be limited 
to attracting established multinationals that are searching for new places 
to locate their production activities. When they are not, the initial deci­
sion of the innovator may lead to entry into the new activity by other 
firms; these externalities imply that innovators will be unable to capture 
the full benefits of their innovation, again leading to suboptimal invest­
ments in innovation.
Viewed in this way, “innovations” in developing countries are asso­
ciated much more closely with the transfer of sectors from the industrial 
world than with technological change as such—or, more precisely, the 
latter is largely determined by the former. In this view, climbing up the 
ladder in the world hierarchy entails shortening transfer periods and 
gradually becoming a more active participant in the generation of tech­
nology. Thus, in the past, innovations have included the development of 
new export staples and of new import-substitution sectors, along with 
their reorientation toward export markets. During the recent liberal­
ization period, they have included the development of assembly activi­
ties as the result of the disintegration of value chains in the industrial 
countries, the growing demand for some international services (for 
example, tourism), the increased export orientation of previous import- 
substitution activities, the privatization processes and the associated 
restructuring of privatized firms and sectors, and increased access to raw 
materials (particularly minerals) as the result of strengthened property 
rights over the associated resources. On the other hand, in the past 
the “destruction” of previous production capacities has included the 
decline of export staples as the result of the development of synthetic 
substitutes, reduced production of a primary good in a specific location 
as a consequence of the discovery of new sources of raw materials, and 
the elimination of artisan production unable to compete with mecha­
nization. In recent years, it has included the disintegration of domestic 
production chains as the result of international outsourcing, and the dis­
mantling of import-substitution activities unable to compete in a more 
liberal trade environment.
N o innovative process is passive, because it requires investment and 
learning. Innovations are, indeed, intrinsically tied to investment because 
they require both physical investments and investments in intangibles, 
particularly in technological development and learning, as well as in 
marketing strategies. Moreover, to the extent that innovative activities 
are the fastest-growing sectors of any economy at any given point in 
time, they have high investment requirements.18 These facts, together 
with the falling investment needs that characterize established activities, 
imply that the overall investment rate is directly dependent on the relative
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weight o f  innovative activities (and, obviously, on their capital intensity). 
High investment is thus associated with a high rate o f  innovation and 
structural change.
O n the other hand, innovations involve learning. Technical know ­
how  m ust go through a learning and maturing process that is closely  
linked to the production experience. M ore generally, to reduce the tech­
nology gaps that characterize the international econom ic hierarchy— to  
leapfrog  in the precise sense o f the term19— an encom passing research 
and developm ent strategy, and an accom panying educational strategy, 
are necessary. Essential insights into learning dynamics have been pro­
vided by the “evolutionary” theories of technical change.20 These theories 
emphasize the fact that technology is to a large extent tacit in nature— that 
is, that detailed “blueprints” cannot be plotted out. This has three major 
implications.
The first is that technology is incom pletely available and imperfectly 
tradable. This is associated w ith  the fact that technology is, to a large 
extent, com posed o f intangible human and organizational capital. This 
implies that, in order to benefit from technical knowledge, even firms 
that purchase or imitate it must invest in mastering the acquired or im i­
tated technology. Because this is the general case in developing countries, 
it implies that, although technology is largely transferred from industrial 
countries, there is still an active absorption process that must take place. 
This process involves adaptation and may call for redesigns and other 
secondary innovations, which w ill further build up human and organi­
zational capital. The efficiency w ith  which this absorption process takes 
place will determine, in turn, the productivity o f the relevant firms. This 
explains w hy firms with similar access to “know ledge” w ill generally 
have quite different productivities. Different organizational and market­
ing strategies w ill generate further firm-specific features, which are the 
essential factors behind the selection process that takes place in any sec­
tor through time. Existing firms or new  entrants could challenge any 
equilibrium in the resulting industrial structure. According to our defi­
nition, major breakups in existing industrial structures are themselves 
innovations. The entry o f developing countries into mature activities 
also belongs to this category.
The second im plication o f  “tacitness” is that technology proficiency 
cannot be detached from production experience, that is, it has a strong 
“learning by d oing” com ponent.21 D aily production and engineering 
activities have, in this sense, a “research and developm ent” com ponent. 
This link is the specific m icroeconom ic basis o f  dynamic econom ies of 
scale.
A third feature o f  technical change, unrelated to tacitness, indicates 
that com petition w ill produce pressures that guarantee the generation  
and diffusion o f innovations. As a result o f the latter, innovative firms
T H E  Q U E S T  F O R  D Y N A M IC  E F F IC IE N C Y 17
only imperfectly appropriate the benefits from investments in innova­
tions. Intellectual property rights provide a mechanism for appropriat­
ing those benefits more fully in the case of technical innovations or new  
products and designs, but such a mechanism is not present in other 
forms o f innovations (such as the developm ent o f new  activities or a new  
marketing strategy). Innovations have thus m ixed private/public-good  
attributes. The rate of innovation depends, then, on the particular bal­
ance between costs, risks, benefits, and their appropriability (including 
their legal protection, in cases where this is possible).
It must be emphasized that these three attributes o f technical change—  
imperfect tradability, close association w ith production experience, and 
private/public attributes— are equally characteristic o f other forms of 
knowledge, particularly organizational and commercial know -how  (and, 
as w e w ill see below , institutional development). Because o f its “social 
capital” attributes, imperfect tradability and imperfect appropriability 
are paramount in the case o f organizational knowledge. Commercial 
know -how  plays a crucial role that tends to be overlooked in m ost analy­
ses, and it certainly plays a pivotal role in international trade (Keesing 
and Lall 1992). Indeed, one o f  the m ost im portant determinants o f  the 
expansion o f firms relates to  their ability to develop appropriate chan­
nels o f inform ation and marketing and to build a com m ercial reputa­
tion (goodwill) and a know n trademark. M oreover, familiarity with the 
market enables producers to m odify their products and their marketing 
channels and helps buyers to learn about suppliers, generating clientele 
relationships that are im portant to guarantee the stable growth o f firms. 
The crucial role that these factors play is reflected in the fact that mar­
keting departments in larger firms are usually staffed by high-quality 
personnel. The corresponding capital is organizational in nature and 
cannot be detached from commercial experience. The dynamic economies 
of scale are reflected here in reductions in transaction costs, which are 
associated w ith the firms’ accum ulated reputation and trademark recog­
nition. On the other hand, although the reputation o f a particular firm 
can hardly be copied, its discovery of market opportunities w ill certainly 
be imitated. The public-good attributes are thus important and play a vital 
role in determining the patterns o f specialization. As regional econom ics 
has recognized for a long tim e, the agglomeration o f producers of cer­
tain goods and services in particular locations is largely determined by 
this factor.
C om plem entarities and the 
A ssocia ted  Institu tional D evelopm en t
Complementarities are associated with the developm ent of networks 
o f suppliers o f goods and specialized services, marketing channels, and
18 B E Y O N D  R E F O R M S
organizations and institutions that disseminate inform ation and provide 
coordination  am ong agents. This concept summ arizes n ot on ly the 
role that backward and forward linkages play in econom ic growth  
(Hirschman 1958), but also the role o f (private, public, or mixed) insti­
tutions that are created to reduce information costs (for example, on 
technology and markets) and to solve the coordination failures that char­
acterize interdependent investment decisions (Chang 1994). Together 
they determine h ow  integrated a production system is.
The developm ent o f complementarities has demand as w ell as supply 
effects. The demand effects are part o f the Keynesian multiplier m echa­
nism; their absence implies, in turn, that Keynesian leakages m ay be 
large, as reflected, for exam ple, in high propensities to import from  
abroad (for exam ple, in assembly activities). Thus, the strength or w eak­
ness o f the com plem entarities is a structural determinant o f m acroeco­
nomic multipliers. This, together w ith the association between the rate 
of investment and innovations, which has already been explored in the 
previous section, are tw o o f the essential linkages between econom ic 
structures and m acroeconom ic performance.
The supply effects o f  complementarities are associated w ith the posi­
tive externalities that different econom ic agents generate am ong them ­
selves through cost reductions made possible by econom ies of scale 
in production or lower transport and transaction costs (econom ies o f  
agglomeration), through the induced provision of more specialized inputs 
or services (econom ies o f specialization), or through the externalities 
generated by the sharing o f  knowledge and the developm ent o f human  
capital that can m ove am ong firms (technological or, more broadly, 
knowledge spillovers). These “strategic complementarities” are the basis 
o f the dynamic econom ies o f  scale o f a m esoeconom ic character that 
determine the competitiveness— or lack of competitiveness— of produc­
tion sectors in a given region or country. Under these conditions, com ­
petitiveness involves more than m icroeconom ic efficiency: It is essentially 
a sectoral or even a systemwide feature (ECLAC 1990; Fajnzylber 1990).
In an open econom y, demand linkages may be induced by protection. 
This may facilitate positive supply (agglomeration) effects, but m ay also  
generate costs for other production sectors if it involves the protection  
of interm ediate and capital goods. On the other hand, because they  
cannot be im ported, the efficient provision o f n ontradable  inputs and 
specialized services always plays an essential role in guaranteeing sys­
tem wide com petitiveness.22 Three nontradable activities are particularly 
relevant in this regard. The first category is m ade up o f sectors that pro­
duce specialized inputs and services, including knowledge, logistic, and 
marketing services, for which closeness to producers w ho use the inputs 
or services is a critical factor. The second is the development of special­
ized financial services, particularly those that are important in facilitating
T H E  Q U E S T  F O R  D Y N A M IC  E F F IC IE N C Y 1 9
the innovation process— the supply o f long-term and venture capital. 
Indeed, because of the asymmetric information that characterizes finan­
cial markets, financial services (particularly for small and medium-sized 
firms) are largely nontradable. The third is the provision o f adequate 
infrastructure.
Institution-building shares the first tw o features o f technological 
development— imperfect tradability and close association with experience—  
and, by its very nature, has dom inant public-good attributes. As already 
indicated, the tw o crucial services that institutions provide are the re­
duction o f  information costs and the solution o f the coordination fail­
ures that characterize interdependent investment decisions. M any of the 
relevant institutions may be created directly by the private sector: producer 
organizations that share information that has public-good attributes, de­
velop joint labor training facilities, and create strategic alliances to pene­
trate new  markets or prom otional agencies to encourage complementary 
investments. However, given their strong public-good attribute, their serv­
ices tend to be provided in suboptimal quantities. The com petitive pres­
sure am ong firms is quite com m only a major obstacle to the creation  
and consolidation o f  such institutions, or a source o f com peting organ­
izations o f suboptim al size.
E lastic Factor Supplies
The capacity o f innovations and complementarities to generate strong 
growth effects depends critically on h ow  elastic the supply o f factors of 
production for innovative sectors is. The crucial role played by the abil­
ity o f innovative activities to attract capital and labor, and to gain access 
to the natural resources they need to expand, was m entioned in the first 
section o f this chapter as a relevant stylized fact. The crucial role played 
by venture capital and the availability o f long-term finance for innova­
tive activities, and the fact that these services have a large nontradable 
com ponent, have also been noted.
Schumpeter (1961) em phasized the elastic supply o f capital as essen­
tial to facilitate the effects o f innovations on econom ic growth. M ore 
broadly, elastic factor supplies play a crucial role in Keynesian and 
Kaleckian m odels in which investment— and, thus, aggregate demand—  
drives not only short-term econom ic activity, but also long-term growth  
(Kaldor 1978; Robinson 1962; Taylor 1991). As these models make 
clear, elastic factor supplies can be guaranteed in several ways: (1) by the 
existence o f unem ployed or, m ore typically, underem ployed resources 
(an issue that was also em phasized in the first section); (2) by the 
endogenous financing o f capital accum ulation through a redistribution  
o f incom e toward profits; (3) by interregional and international factor 
mobility; (4) by social reorganization that allow s greater participation in
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the labor force, particularly by women; and (5) by technical change that 
breaks factor supply constraints (for exam ple, increases land productiv­
ity or induces capital-intensive technological change to  accom m odate 
labor shortages).
In the developing world, an elastic supply o f  labor is guaranteed by 
the dualism or structural heterogeneity that characterizes developing  
countries’ production structures, that is, the coexistence o f high- and 
low-productivity activities.23 Low-productivity activities, characterized 
by a considerable element o f  underemployment (or informality), act as a 
residual sector that both supplies the labor required by a surge o f eco­
nom ic growth and absorbs the excess supply o f labor w hen a dynamic 
generation o f  em ploym ent in high-productivity sectors is absent.24 The 
differentiation made in dualistic m odels between “traditional” and 
“m odern” sectors is inappropriate to describe this feature of the devel­
oping w orld, because the corresponding structure is certainly more com ­
plex, and low-productivity activities are constantly being created anew  
to absorb excess labor— a fact that makes the label traditional entirely 
inadequate. Indeed, a typical feature o f low-grow th developing countries 
over the past tw o decades has been the expansion o f low-productivity 
(informal) sectors to absorb excess labor, including the excess labor gen­
erated by restructured sectors. High- and low-productivity sectors are, 
in turn, heterogeneous in their structure. The term structural hetero­
gen eity , coined by Latin American structuralists (Pinto 1970) to describe 
this phenom enon, is more appropriate and w ill thus be used in the rest 
o f this chapter.
As education standards rise, underem ploym ent may increasingly 
threaten skilled labor. International labor migration provides an addi­
tional adjustment mechanism  that is probably more important in this 
case than in that o f unskilled labor.25 This is a reason w hy, although  
rising educational standards are crucial for successful econom ic devel­
opm ent, they may play a passive role in generating variations in the 
m om entum  o f econom ic growth.
As discussed by Ros (2000, ch. 3), three features are essential to guar­
antee an elastic supply o f labor for high-productivity activities: (1) low  
capital requirements in low-productivity activities, which guarantee that 
they w ill be largely made up o f self-employed workers, w hose incom e is 
thus determined by average rather than marginal productivities; (2) 
com petition between these activities and high-productivity sectors in the 
provision o f certain goods and services (for exam ple, in the production  
or marketing o f som e consumer goods and in the provision of simple 
services in general); and (3) a wage premium in high-productivity activ­
ities, associated, for exam ple, w ith “efficiency w ages” in these sectors.
Structural heterogeneity implies that the dynamism generated by inno­
vative activities and the strength o f the linkages they generate determine
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the efficiency with which the aggregate labor force is used— that is, the 
extent of labor underem ploym ent (as well as the underem ploym ent of 
other factors o f production, particularly land). At the aggregate level, 
this process gives rise to Kaldorian growth-productivity links o f similar 
characteristics, but additional to the m icroeconom ic and m esoeconom ic 
dynamic econom ies o f scale associated with learning and the develop­
m ent of strategic complementarities.
This link is crucial to understanding the dynamics o f aggregate pro­
ductivity growth in developing countries, and indicates w hy it is largely 
a result of dynamic econom ic growth rather than its cause. M oreover, it 
im plies that there m ay be a divergence between m icro and aggregate 
productivity trends. Indeed, the fact that som e econom ic agents may be 
experiencing rapid productivity growth at the firm level, as a result o f 
the incentives generated by a com petitive environm ent or o f  their own  
learning efforts, does not necessarily mean that aggregate productivity  
will show  the same degree o f progress. The process itself may generate a 
reduction o f em ploym ent in innovative activities that, if not counterbal­
anced by em ploym ent grow th in other high-productivity sectors, w ill 
be reflected in increasing underem ploym ent, thereby adversely affect­
ing aggregate productivity grow th. Increased underem ploym ent (and, 
eventually, unem ploym ent) m ay thus swam p the m icroeconom ic gains 
in efficiency, generating the paradox of a group o f highly competitive 
firms being accompanied by frustrating rates of overall productivity growth. 
This has been, in fact, a feature of the Latin American panorama in the 
1990s (ECLAC 2000, ch. 1; 2003a).
The concept o f elastic factor supplies can be applied equally to natu­
ral resources and infrastructure. The “vent for surplus” m odels provide 
a similar adjustment m echanism , in w hich the increased productivity  
accompanying econom ic growth is the result o f the exploitation of previ­
ously idle or underutilized natural resources. Because o f the large indi­
visibilities characteristic o f infrastructure, particularly of transportation  
networks, major infrastructure projects m ay spread their benefits over 
long periods. An interesting im plication o f this is that the positive effects 
o f infrastructure— as well as investments in education— may not only re­
flect the externalities they generate, as emphasized in the endogenous 
growth literature, but also their “fixed” or “quasi-fixed” character, which  
is reflected in variable degrees o f  utilization, even over long periods of  
time. Periods o f low  productivity growth associated w ith a “big push” 
in infrastructure (for exam ple, during periods of rapid urbanization) 
m ay thus be fo llow ed  by high productivity grow th in later periods. 
Similarly, a big push in education m ay not directly lead to faster eco ­
nom ic grow th, but the rapid absorption o f  a pool o f educated labor 
into dynamic activities, as the result o f an innovation drive, will be reflected 
in faster productivity growth.
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In terplay o f  Innovations, C om plem entarities, 
an d  E lastic Factor Supplies
The interplay of these factors provides the essential driving force for 
structural transformation and the degree o f dynamic efficiency that char­
acterizes it. Innovations, if accompanied by strong complementarities, will 
be reflected in the absorption of an increasing number o f workers into dy­
namic activities. The result will be a virtuous circle o f high investment and 
accelerated technological learning and institutional development. On the 
other hand, destructive forces may predominate, giving rise to a vicious 
circle o f slow down in productivity and econom ic growth, decline in in­
vestment, increased structural heterogeneity as surplus manpower is ab­
sorbed into low-productivity activities, and a loss o f production experience 
that widens the technology gap relative to industrial countries. As w e will 
see in the third section of this chapter, the positive feedbacks between 
these structural and m acroeconom ic factors reinforce each other.
On the basis o f previous analysis, table 1.1 provides a typology of 
processes of structural change. W e distinguish first between tw o polar 
cases, which w e w ill call “deep” and “shallow ” structural transforma­
tions. The first are characterized by strong learning (including induced  
technological innovations) and complementarities (economies of agglom­
eration and specialization and knowledge spillovers) and, thus, by strong 
micro- and m esoeconom ic dynamic econom ies of scale, and by the 
additional productivity effects generated by the reduction in underem­
ploym ent. This tends to be the case o f  periods o f rapid growth in the 
developing world. Shallow structural transformations, on the other hand, 
can be characterized by the weakness of both learning and com plem en­
tarities. A classic shallow  structural transformation is the developm ent o f  
enclave export activities.
The typology also provides tw o m ixed cases. One com bines strong 
learning with w eak linkages (for exam ple, as a result o f high import 
requirements). This type o f process may generate high productivity 
growth at the firm level in dynamic sectors but also strong structural het­
erogeneity. Some im port-substitution investments o f  the past were o f  
that sort. This w ill be called the “short-breath” case, because the initial
Table 1.1 Typology of Processes of Structural Change
Complementarities
Learning process Strong Weak
Strong Deep Short-breath
Weak Labor-absorbing Shallow
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innovative effect is soon exhausted as a result o f its limited sectoral or 
systemic effects. Strong linkages but w eak learning processes, resulting 
from the simplicity of the technology involved, characterize the second  
m ixed case. This type o f structural transform ation w ill have slow  pro­
ductivity growth at the firm level but w ill generate significant aggregate 
productivity effects associated w ith strategic com plem entarities and 
reductions in underem ployment. The developm ent o f labor-intensive 
exports is a case in point. This kind o f situation w ill be referred to  as a 
“labor-absorbing” case.
This classification is extremely useful in understanding the sources 
and strength o f international com petitiveness. Complementarities play 
the crucial role in this regard. In shallow  structural transformation  
processes, com petitiveness does not have any sectoral or systemic fea­
tures. Indeed, unless the corresponding activities are associated with the 
exploitation of natural resources, they are essentially footloose. Even in 
the case o f  natural resource developm ent, w e can argue that they are 
footloose, in the sense that once the resource base is exhausted, the ac­
tivity w ill decline, leaving little behind in the w ay of developm ent. In the 
short-breath case, where learning is strong but complementarities are 
weak, com petitiveness will be based on firm-specific advantages, which  
may also generate unstable com petitive advantages, because firms can  
shift their location. H ow ever, in the case o f deep innovations and, to a 
lesser extent, labor-absorbing transformations, the essential source of 
com petitiveness is systemic. This gives more stability to the correspon­
ding patterns o f specialization. Even when challenged, the technological 
and broader developm ent capabilities that have been built up may gen­
erate endogenous adaptive innovations.
By leading to the large-scale use of an international network o f sup­
pliers and centralized research and developm ent efforts, globalization  
reduces entry costs into new  activities and may facilitate higher produc­
tivity growth in a particular m ultinational firm or sector at the global 
level. H owever, it also generates processes o f structural change that, 
from the point of view  of each location, are increasingly shallow  or, at 
best, are o f a short-breath character.26 Thus, rapid productivity growth  
in dynamic firms m ay not be accom panied by rapid GDP growth in a 
specific country or location. The corresponding rise in underem ploy­
ment will lead to low  aggregate productivity growth. It m ust be empha­
sized that the problem does not lie, in this case, in low  productivity 
growth at the firm level or in a lack o f m icroeconom ic efficiency. The 
problem really lies in the adverse features o f the structural transforma­
tion process that generates w eak links between export and GDP growth.
This interplay between factors also explains another feature o f  
developm ent processes m entioned in the first section: path dependence. 
As already indicated, dynam ic scale econom ies engender patterns of
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specialization that are largely self-reinforcing. H ow ever, to the extent 
that acquired capabilities are intangible, strong structural shocks (“big 
bangs” as they were called a decade ago) may have permanent adverse 
effects, as intangible capital in activities that undergo destruction is lost, 
and it takes time (learning) to develop intangible capital in new  activities. 
This includes institutional processes: Old institutions are destroyed, and 
new  ones take time to develop. Defensive restructuring of firms (ration­
alization o f  production activities that minimize fixed capital invest­
ments) will predominate under these conditions.27
N egative m acroeconom ic shocks could also lead to a significant loss 
o f intangible capital in bankrupt firms, which also generates deadweight 
losses. In addition, this leads to debt overhangs that w eigh upon growth  
possibilities for a long time. Finally, in periods o f  rapid structural 
change and m acroeconom ic upheaval, uncertainty increases because old  
patterns are no guide for the form ation o f expectations as to w hat the 
future will look  like. M acroeconom ic expectations thus becom e subject 
to  learning, to trial and error, generating strong links between the short- 
and long-term growth paths (Heymann 2000). This further encourages 
defensive restructuring, as w ell as speculative behavior on the part o f  
firms. It m ust be em phasized, however, that this effect is additional to  
the links discussed in the previous paragraph, w hich relate to responses 
to the structural shock per se. Thus, defensive responses may predom i­
nate even if m acroeconom ic instability does not accom pany the shock, 
particularly by firms that see few  possibilities o f success in the new struc­
tural context.
Finally, the classification provided in table 1.1 is useful in under­
standing som e of the social effects o f structural transformations. T w o  
particular issues are relevant in this regard: the effects o f these transfor­
m ations on living standards and on the evolution o f structural hetero­
geneity, which w ill influence, in turn, incom e distribution. In this regard, 
deep transformations are characterized by a rapid rise in standards o f  
living, whereas the opposite is true of shallow  transformations. The evo­
lution o f structural heterogeneity w ill depend, in the first case, on the 
nature o f the innovation, particularly its labor demand features. Thus, 
deep transformations characterized by a skilled-labor bias (which seems 
to be a typical feature of technical change today worldwide) may gener­
ate a rapid increase in living standards, though accom panied by rising 
structural heterogeneity and incom e inequality. On the other hand, the 
basic differences between short-breath and labor-absorbing structural 
transformations are their radically different effects on structural hetero­
geneity: The first leads to increased heterogeneity, whereas the second  
w ill clearly have the opposite effect. In this sense, labor-absorbing trans­
form ations are the m ost attractive for low -incom e countries because 
they are based on simple technology, but may have strong convergence
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effects (through the absorption o f labor into higher-productivity sectors) 
as w ell as positive effects on equity. Because of their low  entry costs, 
these activities tend to have thin profit margins and may be subject to  a 
deterioration o f the terms o f  trade if international demand fails to  
expand rapidly (resulting from , am ong other reasons, protectionism  in 
the industrialized world, which slows dow n the transfer o f these branches 
o f production to developing countries).28
Simple F orm alization  o f the  Links Between 
S tructural and  M acroeconom ic D ynam ics
The interrelationships between structural dynamics and m acroeconom ic 
performance can be formalized in terms o f a dual link between econom ic 
growth and productivity.29 O n the one hand, econom ic growth has 
positive effects on productivity through three channels that have been 
explored in previous sections: (1) dynam ic econom ies o f  scale o f  a 
m icroeconom ic character, associated w ith  learning and induced in no­
vations30; (2) those associated w ith  the exploitation  o f  intra- and 
intersectoral external econom ies (econom ies o f  agglom eration and spe­
cialization and knowledge spillovers); and (3) the positive links gener­
ated by variations in underemployment (the attraction o f  underem­
ployed workers by the expansion of high-productivity activities or, 
alternatively, the absorption o f  excess labor by low-productivity activi­
ties). Variations in the use o f the pool o f skilled labor and infrastructure 
w ill also generate links o f this sort. Using the term em ployed by Kaldor 
(1978, chs. 1 and 2), this link between productivity and production  
growth w ill be referred to as the technical progress function; it m ay also 
be called the K aldor-V erdoorn  function.
This relationship is show n as TT in figure 1.2. The position o f the 
curve depends on  additional determinants o f productivity growth. Some 
o f them have been explored in previous sections: (1) the opportunity set 
associated w ith the position in the international hierarchy and acquired 
production and technological capabilities; (2) the reaction o f entrepre­
neurs to these opportunities (which may be called their degree o f “inno­
vativeness” ); (3) the incentives that firms face (those associated w ith the 
com petitive environment w ill be the focus o f our attention below); and 
(4) the quality of relevant institutions.
The second relationship focuses on the reverse causality link: Produc­
tivity growth increases econom ic growth. This relationship, shown as 
GG in figure 1.2, captures the traditional m acroeconom ic links em pha­
sized in the literature on econom ic growth. Different schools o f eco­
nom ic thought have identified at least four channels. First, technical 
change increases aggregate supply. Second, it generates new  investment
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opportunities and, through this mechanism, drives aggregate demand. 
The availability o f finance plays a crucial role in facilitating this process. 
Third, if domestic savings or external financing are not fully endoge­
nous, savings or balance o f  payments gaps will becom e effective con­
straints on aggregate dem and and w ill thus determ ine the shape of 
the curve.31 F inally, techn ical change enhances in ternational com ­
petitiveness, affecting the trade balance and, thus, aggregate demand; 
if the econom y is foreign-exchange-constrained, the reduction in the 
trade balance relaxes this constraint and thus also has aggregate supply 
effects.
It must be emphasized that TT is not an aggregate production function  
in the traditional neoclassical sense. Rather, its positive slope implies that 
there is some underutilization o f resources at any point in time, and thus 
growth induces a better allocation o f resources (and the lack o f growth, 
a m isallocation, particularly through the underemployment of labor). 
Thus, through the virtuous-circle effects that it generates, growth has 
aggregate su pply  effects: the induced productivity improvements that 
are expressed in the TT curve. The aggregate demand effects typical of 
Keynesian growth m odels are captured, on the other hand, in the GG 
function. Similarly, it should be underlined that complementarities have 
supply (econom ies o f agglomeration and specialization and knowledge 
spillovers) as w ell as demand (variations in the Keynesian multiplier 
generated by changes in the propensity to import) effects. W hereas the 
former are captured in the TT function, the latter affect the GG curve. If 
the econom y is foreign-exchange-constrained, the corresponding changes 
in import dependence will also have aggregate supply effects that, in this 
case, w ill affect the GG function.
Because both curves have positive slopes, the effects that they capture 
reinforce each other, generating alternating positive feedbacks but also 
possible negative feedbacks. A stable equilibrium exists when TT is flat­
ter than GG, as shown in figure 1.1a. In Keynesian and foreign-exchange 
gap m odels— the tw o m acroeconom ic closures w e w ill consider here—  
the slope of GG w ill depend on the elasticity o f investm ent, exports, and 
im ports to productivity; if  they are relatively inelastic, the correspon­
ding schedule w ill be steep; if elasticities are high, it w ill be flatter. 
Given the determinants o f the technical progress function, TT will be 
flatter if the follow ing conditions prevail: (1) both micro- and mesoeco- 
nom ic dynamic econom ies of scale are not too  strong; (2) labor under­
em ployment is moderate; and (3) fixed factors are not very important in 
the long run.
H ow ever, under significant initial (unskilled and/or skilled) labor un­
deremployment or significant underutilization of infrastructure (that is, 
when these factors operate as fixed factors), the slope o f  TT m ay be high. 
Figure 1.1b thus presents a case in which the slope of TT is initially steep
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Figure 1.1 Productivity and GDP Dynamics
a.
but falls at higher rates o f econom ic growth. In this case, there w ill be a 
stable equilibrium at B, similar to that shown in figure 1.1a, and an un­
stable equilibrium at A. Any displacement from saddle point A w ill lead 
the econom y to a new, higher stable equilibrium at B or, alternatively, 
to a low -grow th trap. Obviously, depending on the position o f the 
curves, other possibilities m ay exist that can generate explosive virtuous
28 B E Y O N D  R E F O R M S
or vicious circles. A lso, nothing guarantees that equilibrium will always 
arise at a positive rate of growth.
It is im portant to emphasize that the relationships shown here are 
taken to be medium- or long-term in character.32 H ow ever, because 
many of the processes w e are analyzing are tim e-bound, the steady-state 
properties of the m odel are actually uninteresting. Indeed, innovations 
may be seen as “spurts” that shift the technical progress function, but 
tend to w eaken through time as innovations spread. Thus, a new wave 
o f innovation shifts the TT function upward and turns it steeper, to 
T ’T ’ in figure 1.2, accelerating both productivity and incom e growth. 
H owever, as this particular wave o f innovations com e to be fully ex ­
ploited and their structural effects fully transmitted, the function will 
shift down and becom e flatter, to TT in figure 1.2. Productivity and 
GDP growth w ill then slow  dow n.33 If the GG function also shifts left­
ward (because o f weakened “animal spirits”), the slow dow n will become 
even sharper.
A  favorable m acroeconom ic shock— improved access to external 
financing in a foreign-exchange-constrained econom y and improved 
long-term expectations or long-term investment financing that have 
a positive effect on investment in a Keynesian m odel— will shift the 
GG function rightward to G’G ’. The m icro/m eso/m acroeconom ic links 
summarized in the technical progress function now  amplify the favorable
Figure 1.2 Effects of a New Wave of Innovations
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Figure 1 .3  E ffects o f  Favorab le M acro eco n o m ic  Shock
m acro effects. A negative m acroeconom ic shock w ill have the opposite  
effect. This could include any factor that increases m acroeconom ic 
instability. In line with the considerations discussed in the first section  
o f this chapter, any  form o f instability matters, including instability in 
the price level or in major relative prices, an increase in the intensity of 
the business cycle, or any factor that adversely affects public or private 
sector debt sustainability, am ong others. A particularly severe case w ould  
be present if a leftward shift in GG in figure 1.3 were to leave no equi­
librium point, leading to a downward spiral o f GDP and productivity 
growth.
This simple framework may be used to analyze the effects of trade 
reforms— and, more broadly, o f econom ic liberalization processes— on  
growth. For that purpose, w e have to assume a specific relationship  
between com petition and the rate of innovation. In this regard, a tradi­
tion o f econom ic thought, which can be traced to Schumpeter, has 
emphasized the ability o f large firms to internalize the benefits from  
innovation, a fact that may generate positive links between market con ­
centration and innovations. Contrary to that tradition, the neoclassical 
defense o f liberalization views the lack o f com petitive pressure as a fac­
tor that has adverse effects on productivity. This view  highlights the fact 
that managers o f large firms may be inclined to appropriate part o f the
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m onopoly power they hold in the form o f “leisure” (reduced efforts to  
minimize costs). Increased com petition has, in this case, positive effects 
on productivity. It should be emphasized, however, that this assumption  
implies that firms were n o t initially profit-m axim izers (Rodrik 1992).
Another link between reforms and productivity that was mentioned  
earlier has to do with the fact that the uncertainties that characterize 
structural shocks m ay lead firms to adopt defensive attitudes. Thus, the 
initial response to a shock may be rationalization rather than a new  
wave o f innovation and investment. The latter may only com e w ith a 
lag, w hen uncertainties are reduced. If this is so, the TT curve m ay not 
be affected, or indeed m ay be adversely affected, and the effects o f 
increased com petition on productivity w ill be only transitional.
If the neoclassical assum ption about the links between com petition  
and innovation is correct, then opening the econom y to com petition  
displaces the TT function upward. Liberalization unleashes, in this 
case, a degree o f innovativeness that the more protected and State- 
interventionist environm ents o f  the past repressed. D om estic firms w ill 
also have better access to im ported inputs and capital goods. H ow ever, 
this is not all that matters. The destruction o f dom estic linkages and 
previous technological capabilities w ould  have the opposite effect. Spe­
cialization in activities with weaker dynam ic econom ies o f  scale w ould  
tend to make the TT function flatter. If firms shrink, their capacity to 
cover the fixed costs associated w ith innovative activities w ill also de­
cline. O ne w ay to  express these opposite effects is to say that, although  
the m icroeconom ic effects o f  com petition on productivity growth may  
be positive, specialization may have negative m icroeconom ic effects 
and the m esoeconom ic (structural) factors, in particular, m ay be ad­
verse. The net effects o f  reform s on TT are thus unclear. O n the other  
hand, through either Keynesian m echanism s or the supply effects char­
acteristic o f a foreign-exchange-constrained econom y, the increase in 
the propensity to import generated by trade reform will lead to a left­
ward shift in the GG function.
Figure 1.4 provides three possible outcom es (there may be others). In 
case A, the neoclassical effects on TT are strong and prevail over weaker 
adverse m ovem ents o f  the GG function. Both GDP and productivity  
growth speed up. In case B, neoclassical effects on TT continue to  pre­
vail but are weaker, whereas GG effects are strong. Productivity  
grow th speeds up but overall econom ic grow th slow s dow n. An im pli­
cation o f this is that labor under- and unem ploym ent increase. In case 
C, adverse structural effects on TT prevail over the positive effects o f  
com petition, generating a reduction in both GDP and productivity  
growth. Under- and unem ploym ent increase sharply. This im plies that 
there is no general presum ption that liberalization w ill accelerate 
grow th, and that the m icroeconom ic links em phasized by defenders of
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Figure 1 .4  Three P ossib le O u tcom es
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liberalization m ay be swam ped by adverse structural and m acroeco­
nom ic effects.
Policy Im plications
The previous analysis indicates that institutions that guarantee stability 
in the basic social contract, the protection o f business contracts, and an 
efficient State bureaucracy, as well as the form ation o f human capital 
and the developm ent o f infrastructure, are certainly im portant to eco­
nom ic growth, but play the role o f framework conditions that, by them ­
selves, are unlikely to affect the growth m omentum.
The key to  rapid grow th in the developing w orld  is thus a com bina­
tion  o f  strategies a im ed a t the dynam ic transform ation  o f  produ ction  
structures  w ith  appropriate m acroeconom ic conditions and stab ility , 
in the broad sense o f the latter term; to im prove the distributive effects 
of grow th, such a strategy should be supplem ented w ith  policies aimed  
at reducing the structural heterogeneity o f  produ ction  structures.34 Be­
cause, according to the views presented here, innovations and invest­
m ent are deeply tied, this view  coincides w ith  R odrik’s (1999 , 2003)  
call for a dom estic capital accum ulation strategy to kick-start grow th, 
in conjunction w ith  an appropriate m acroeconom ic environm ent. This 
m ay be seen as the com bination that explains the rapid growth o f the 
Asian econom ies. The vigorous grow th that took  place in Latin Am er­
ica during the period o f State-led industrialization was also the prod­
uct o f a structural change strategy that w as initially based on im port 
substitution, but then began to  rely increasingly on  “m ixed ” m odels 
com bining im port substitution w ith export prom otion (Cárdenas, 
O cam po, and Thorp 2000b , ch. 1). Unlike w hat happened in the Asian  
countries, the lack o f suitable m acroeconom ic conditions in the region  
bred the debt crisis o f the 1980s that led to a sharp break in the growth  
pattern.
The focus on structural dynamics helps to identify the specific policy  
areas authorities should target to accelerate econom ic growth. Accord­
ingly, efforts should be made to (1) encourage innovation, in the broad 
sense o f the term, and the associated learning processes in the areas of 
technologies, productive organization, and marketing; to the extent that 
innovations in developing countries are largely associated w ith the trans­
fer o f sectors o f production from the industrialized world, a strategy of 
diversification o f  the production  structure  is the key to increased innova­
tions; (2) encourage the developm ent o f  com plem entarities that generate 
positive demand and, above all, supply effects that result in the develop­
m ent o f sectoral and system wide com petitiveness; in the latter case, 
nontradable  inputs and specialized services should be a special focus of
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attention, particularly in terms o f the developm ent o f sectors that pro­
duce specialized inputs and services (knowledge, logistics, and market­
ing services), a strong and deep domestic financial system, and adequate 
infrastructure; and (3) encourage the developm ent o f  sm all firm s through  
training, technological diffusion, appropriate financing channels, and the 
prom otion o f different forms o f associations am ong small entrepreneurs 
and o f productive technological and commercial links between large and 
small firms.
Under current conditions, w e can identify five essential characteristics 
of the strategies that should serve as the framework for these policies. In 
the first place, the emphasis should be on integrating the developing 
countries into the world econom y. Second, there must be a proper bal­
ance between individual entrepreneurial initiative, w hich is decisive for 
a dynamic process o f innovation, and the establishm ent o f institutions 
aimed at increasing information and coordination am ong agents. Am ong 
the latter, different m ixes o f public and private institutions should be 
considered, according to the tradition o f each country. M oreover, dif­
ferent m ixes o f  supranational (for exam ple, w ithin the fram ework of 
integration processes), national, and local (decentralized) institutions 
should also be designed. Third, there should be a m ix o f horizontal and 
selective policies. Indeed, insofar as policies are intended to strengthen 
com petitiveness, a degree of selectivity aimed at reinforcing successful 
patterns o f specialization and helping to breed new  sectors (creating 
comparative advantages) is essential. Furthermore, under budget con­
straints, any horizontal policy must be detailed and, hence, necessarily 
becomes selective. Clear cases of these sorts are the allocation of resources 
from funds for technological developm ent and export prom otion. Rec­
ognizing that there is an implicit selectivity in horizontal policies w ill lead 
to a better allocation o f scarce resources than the alternative neutral 
stance. Fourth, all incentives should be granted on the basis o f perform­
ance, generating reciprocal con trol mechanisms, to borrow Am sden’s 
(2001) term (see also Hausm ann and Rodrik 2003). Indeed, the institu­
tional structure itself should be subject to periodic evaluation, within  
its ow n learning path. Finally, special attention should be given to the 
opportunities that small firms provide both for growth and for im prov­
ing the social outcom es of structural transformations.
A com plex issue relates to the framework o f international rules, espe­
cially those o f the W orld Trade Organization. In this regard, although  
priority should certainly be given to taking advantage of the m aneuver­
ing room  provided under existing agreements, there is a strong sense that 
a larger po licy  space (to borrow the term extensively used at the 11th  
session o f the United N ations Conference on Trade and Developm ent 
that took  place in Sâo Paulo in 2004) should be m ade available to  the 
authorities o f developing countries, w ho were restricted too narrowly in
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the Uruguay Round o f trade negotiations. In particular, according to  
the analysis presented in this chapter, they should be allowed to apply se­
lective policies and perform ance criteria to encourage innovation  and 
create the complementarities that are essential to development.
The assumption that dynamic productive development, and the partic­
ular institutions that support it, are automatic results o f market mecha­
nisms has been demonstrated by the facts to be wrong. In Latin America, 
the w eakening o f the public and private sector institutions that had been 
established to support productive and technological developm ent during 
the period o f State-led industrialization was a central feature o f the “lost 
decade” of the 1980s. In the 1990s they were further weakened as a re­
sult o f explicit policy decisions. Some institutions have since been devel­
oped around production clusters, free trade zones, the prom otion of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, or the developm ent o f  demand sub­
sidies to allocate technology funds. The suboptimal developm ent of in­
stitutions related to the production sector has thus becom e a direct 
institutional deficiency affecting econom ic growth, which is generally 
ignored in the call to strengthen institutional developm ent. This institu­
tional deficiency is probably not very important if growth is to remain 
at current levels. It is crucial, however, if the region is seeking to achieve 
the rapid rates o f structural change (including penetration into dynamic 
technology-intensive sectors) that are essential to gradually bridge the 
gap separating it from the industrialized world.
In the past, developm ent banks played a crucial role in the develop­
ing world in guaranteeing the availability o f capital for new  activities, 
and in many areas they continue to do so. It is unclear whether priva­
tized financial sectors w ill provide an adequate substitute for them. 
Private investment banking and venture capital are the best alternatives, 
but past and recent experience indicates that their expansion in develop­
ing countries on an optimal scale is not automatic; indeed, these activities 
are highly concentrated in a few  industrial countries. Access to inter­
national services o f this sort m ay thus be o f  param ount im portance in 
order to guarantee finance for innovative activities, but this may gener­
ate a strong bias in favor of m ultinational and large national firms and 
against small and medium-sized enterprises. It should be m entioned, in 
this regard, that som e o f the m ost important innovations in financial 
developm ent in the developing world in recent decades— the pension  
fund revolution in Latin America, for exam ple— have an explicit bias 
against risk taking.
Finally, I w ould  like to emphasize tw o im plications o f  the previous 
analysis. The first is that structural transformation is not a “once and 
for a ll” process, a belief that is implicit in current views o f structural re­
forms. It is rather an ongoing task, as the structural transformation  
process is continuous and may face obstacles at any stage that may block
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developm ent. To the extent that, in developing countries, innovative ac­
tivities are largely the result o f the spread o f new sectors and technolo­
gies previously created in the industrial center, these activities may, at 
any given point in time, be considered as the new  set o f  “infant sectors” 
to  be prom oted (more as infant ex p o r t than as im port-substitution ac­
tivities, today). Thus, the essential counterpart o f intellectual property  
right protection, the essential tools for fostering innovations in the de­
veloped countries, are instruments to prom ote the transfer o f these sec­
tors to the developing world through the design o f trade rules that facili­
tate and even encourage such transfers, together w ith appropriate 
incentives and institutions to further the growth o f these infant sectors 
in developing countries. The instruments developed to prom ote innova­
tive activities in earlier stages m ay serve this purpose, but they may have 
to be readapted or new  institutions m ay have to be created to solve the 
specific issues involved in guaranteeing the successful developm ent of 
new  sectors in a more interdependent world econom y. If leapfrogging is 
the desired objective o f econom ic policy, then the corresponding strat­
egy will certainly be broader in scope.
The final im plication is that the process o f transformation is not by 
any means sm ooth. Destruction is a constant com panion of creation, 
and structural heterogeneity is a persistent feature that can increase at 
different phases o f the developm ent process. Distributive tensions are 
presumably associated w ith both factors. There is, in this regard, no  
unique Kuznets trajectory, because there may be periods o f increased 
structural heterogeneity in the middle stages o f the developm ent process 
as a result o f structural transformations or m acroeconom ic imbalances. 
Facilitating the transfer o f resources from less dynamic to more dynamic 
activities, avoiding transformation processes that increase structural 
heterogeneity, and working to upgrade low-productivity activities and 
generate positive linkages w ith high-productivity activities w ould, in this 
context, be critical elements in achieving a m ore equitable developm ent 
process.
Endnotes
1. The recent literature is extensive. Among the most useful contributions 
are Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Lucas 
(1988), Nelson (1996), Rodrik (1999, 2003), Romer (1986), Ros (2000), and 
Taylor (1991).
2. See, for example, Easterly (2001) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 
(2002 ).
3. On Latin America’s recent growth frustrations, see Cimoli and Correa (ch. 2, 
this volume), ECLAC (2003a), Ocampo (2004b), and Stallings and Peres (2000). 
On the record of State-led industrialization, see Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp 
(2000b).
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4. See, for example, Easterly et al. (1993), Kenny and Williams (2001), and 
Pritchett (2000).
5. Nonetheless, it has also been argued that there is much less association 
between some of these variables and economic growth than was traditionally as­
sumed. This has been claimed, in particular, in relation to physical and human 
capital. See Easterly (2001, part II).
6. There may also be intermediate alternatives: Some factors may not “cause” 
growth in the sense of accelerating the growth momentum, but can block it. Indeed, 
this is the case of macroeconomic stability, as has already been pointed out.
7. The divergence of experience is brought about in a novel and forceful way 
in Pritchett (2000).
8. For example, some of the important differences in per capita income within 
Latin America were established in the early 20th century and have been remark­
ably stable since then (Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp 2000a, ch. 1).
9. This chapter will concentrate on asymmetries associated with the produc­
tive sector, and only peripherally with macroeconomic and financial asymmetries. 
For a more extensive analysis of these, see Ocampo (2003b).
10. The contrast made here has some elements in common with the contrast 
between “yeast” and “mushrooms” views of economic growth (Harberger 1998).
11. Relative to the economic history of Latin America, see Cárdenas, Ocampo, 
and Thorp (2000a, ch. 1).
12. We will refer below to the phenomenon of increased specialization at the 
firm level (economies of scope) as “economies of specialization,” because it will 
be assumed (following, indeed, the line of inquiry pursued by Adam Smith) that 
the opportunities for such specialization are determined by the size of the market 
and are thus part of the mesoeconomic effects to which we will refer below as 
“ complementarities. ”
13. See, for example, the empirical evidence provided by Loayza, Fajnzylber, 
and Calderón (2002).
14. See the survey on the literature of the 1980s by Edwards (1993) and the 
critical survey of the literature of the 1990s by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). 
My own contributions to this debate were included in UNCTAD (1992, part III, 
ch. 1).
15. Evidence on this matter has come in different forms. Empirical research has 
provided evidence that policy regimes (as well as geographical factors) have no 
significant effect on growth when institutional factors are taken into account 
(Easterly and Levine 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2002). It has also 
shown that there is little evidence that market reforms are associated with acceler­
ations of economic growth, though they may play a limited role in sustaining them 
(Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik 2004).
16. This is generally forgotten when the period of State-led industrialization in 
Latin America is analyzed. Import substitution obviously made more sense in the 
closed world economy of the 1930s to 1950s (and in the midst of the protectionist 
wave that characterized the industrial world in the late 19th and early 20th cen­
turies) than in the period of gradual but incomplete opening of the industrial world 
to the exports of developing countries that started in the mid-1960s (Cárdenas, 
Ocampo, and Thorp 2000b, ch. 1).
17. This is the way Easterly (2001, ch. 9) posed the issue.
18. Outsourcing of technology and some features of information and commu­
nications technology may have reduced the need for technological followers to 
invest in learning and adapting technology. However, they have not eliminated the 
general link between the development of new activities and the investments associ­
ated with them.
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19. Leapfrogging is generally used to refer to the adoption of the latest (for 
example, modern information and telecommunications) technologies, even when 
previous technologies were not used in a given location. However, this is just a nec­
essary condition for the successful development of a specific activity at a particular 
moment in time. It does not necessarily involve rising up through the international 
economic hierarchy, which is the appropriate sense in which the term leapfrogging 
should be used.
20. See, in particular, Dosi et al. (1988), Nelson (1996), Nelson and Winter 
(1982), and, with respect to developing countries, Katz (1987), Katz and Kosacoff 
(2000), and Lall (1990,2003). Similar concepts have been developed in some versions 
of the new growth theory in which “knowledge capital” is a form of “human capital” 
having three specific attributes: It is “embodied” in particular persons, it is capable of 
generating significant externalities, and it is costly to acquire (Lucas 1988). However, 
these theories do not capture a basic corollary of these attributes: firm specificity and 
the corresponding coexistence of heterogeneous producers in any given sector of pro­
duction. This fact turns the concept of “representative producer” into an abstraction 
that eliminates elements that play an essential role in determining the nature of com­
petition and the divergence in the growth of firms, regions, and nations through time.
21. This may also apply to technology creation. In this sense, the probability of 
major innovations, even when they are the result of explicit research and develop­
ment efforts, depends on the accumulated technological knowledge and production 
experience of firms.
22. This also applies to the provision of foodstuffs, particularly perishables, if 
they affect nominal wages and thus production costs. Indeed, in the early stages of 
development of modern activities in the developing world, guaranteeing the 
availability of an elastic supply of foodstuffs was essential and, as such, became 
an important determinant of the development of new export activities.
23. As we have pointed out, this factor has not been entirely absent in the 
industrial world either, even as late as the post-World War II “golden age” (see 
Cripps and Tarling 1973).
24. Obviously, mobility is not perfect or costless, particularly when it involves 
different skills.
25. This does not mean that the skilled workers who migrate will necessarily be 
absorbed in high-productivity activities in the receiving countries. There may be, in 
effect, a net loss of human capital.
26. A particular case of a shallow innovation is the takeover of domestic firms 
by multinationals, if it weakens domestic demand linkages (by the change in the 
network of suppliers) and concentrates research and development abroad. Maquila 
exports may have a similar character, although they can reduce underemployment 
and may serve as a mechanism for transmitting some organizational and marketing 
innovations. They may also deepen through time and gradually create domestic 
linkages, thus becoming a labor-absorbing innovation.
27. This is a central conclusion of the ECLAC project on structural reforms 
in Latin America, which developed a typology of phases of response to structural 
reforms. According to this typology, an “offensive” attitude only comes with a 
lag, particularly when the new institutional environment settles down. See Katz 
(2000), Moguillansky and Bielschowsky (2000), and Stallings and Peres (2000).
28. These issues hark back to the traditional controversies on the terms of 
trade, including the fallacy of composition effects. For recent reviews of these con­
troversies, see Ocampo and Parra (2003) and Sapsford and Singer (1998).
29. For prior versions of this model, see Ocampo (2002) and Ocampo and 
Taylor (1998). A recent mathematical formulation is provided by Rada and Taylor 
(2004).
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30. To the extent that new technology is embodied in new equipment, a higher 
rate of investment induced by faster growth will also increase productivity growth, 
and should thus be added to the list.
31. For a full analysis of gaps in macroeconomic adjustment, see Taylor 
(1994). As is well known, saving adjusts through variations in economic activity 
(the Keynesian mechanism), income redistribution between sectors with high and 
low propensities to save, particularly between capital owners and workers (the 
Kaleckian mechanism), and variations in the trade balance (external savings). 
Depending on the source of the rigidity of the mechanism, inflationary gaps, dis­
tributive struggles, or external gaps may arise. For a full treatment of these issues, 
see Taylor (1991).
32. There are also short-run relationships between productivity and economic 
growth associated with short-term changes in capacity utilization. However, those 
effects must be seen as deviations from GG.
33. Of course, there is no presumption that TT will return to its original posi­
tion. This is the case that, for the sake of simplicity, is shown in figure 1.2.
34. In this regard, see also the agenda laid out in ECLAC (2004).
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Trade Openness and Technology 
Gaps in Latin America: 
A “Low-Growth Trap”
Mario Cimoli and Nelson Correa
For  the  past quarter-century , the Latin American countries have been 
undergoing a structural adjustment that has included, am ong other 
actions, the elim ination o f  trade barriers, the privatization o f  large 
dom estic firms, and the deregulation o f labor and financial markets. 
W ith respect to trade, the view  held by m ost policy makers and the more 
orthodox academics has been that openness will enhance opportunities 
for growth in developing countries (Krueger 1 9 8 0 ,1 9 9 7 ; Srinivasan and 
Bhagwati 1999).
Several years into this process, it may be acknowledged that the link 
between trade liberalization and growth is not w orking the w ay it 
should. The poor results o f liberalization as a strategy for supporting a 
dynamic growth path are now  evident, and it has becom e clear that the 
weakness of this link is not merely a pathology specific to certain coun­
tries and/or historical situations. O n the contrary, it is a widespread pat­
tern in the region (ECLAC 2000; O cam po 2004; Rodriguez and Rodrik 
1999). In a general sense, developm ent econom ists such as Prebisch,
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Nurkse, and Kuznets anticipated this outcom e. They asserted that trade 
liberalization w ould  not necessarily sustain faster rates of growth and 
that trade could not be a sustainable engine o f growth unless the do­
mestic market were sufficiently developed. M oreover, they stated that 
heavy dependence on demand from developed econom ies could be a trap 
for less developed countries if  they were unable to develop their en­
dogenous technological capabilities or to capture the benefits o f tech­
nological change domestically (Kuznets 1980; Nurkse 1953; Prebisch 
1950).
International obstacles to growth are also identified in orthodox  
views regarding gains from trade. For exam ple, the theory o f  com para­
tive advantage states that nations with differing endowm ents of capital, 
labor, and natural resources w ill gain by specializing in those areas 
where their relative costs o f production are low  and by importing in 
those areas where their relative costs are high. Furthermore, the greater 
the differences in endowm ents am ong countries (and the differences be­
tween rich and poor countries are indeed great), the bigger the gains 
from trade are likely to be. H ow ever, in order to  specialize in products 
w ith high value added rather than simply to serve as a source of low- 
w age labor and production for econom ically advanced nations, a coun­
try must have the capacity to absorb and retain talent, to produce new  
knowledge, and, finally, to  reduce the gap separating it from the tech­
nological frontier (Dosi, Pavitt, and Soete 1990), thereby increasing its 
participation in international trade in a “virtuous” manner.
Latin America’s poor growth performance in the wake o f its liberal­
ization strategies encapsulates a com plex set of issues related to the role 
played by the trade balance, the specialization pattern, and the process 
o f accumulating technology. Latin America’s balance o f  payments can 
act as a serious constraint on the attainment o f faster growth. The ac­
celeration o f growth to rates closer to  those of other countries has 
caused imports to grow m ore rapidly than exports and has weakened the 
mechanisms that link exports to domestic growth. Thus, as the region  
becomes m ore dependent on exogenous demand for its exports, bottle­
necks have emerged, because the aggregate level o f im ports continues to  
exceed the capacity to export. At a more micro level, this situation raises 
major questions concerning the accum ulation of dom estic technological 
capacity in Latin America and the gap that these countries exhibit w ith  
respect to the international productivity frontier (Cimoli and Katz 2001; 
ECLAC 2004). N ew  patterns o f  production specialization and trade 
have arisen, w ith knowledge-intensive industries losing ground in terms 
o f their share of gross dom estic product (GDP) while nontradable activ­
ities, natural-resource processing industries, and maquila-type assembly 
operations (catering m ostly to  U.S. markets) increase their share. The 
sources o f technological change and productivity growth have shifted
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significantly, w ith a rapidly increasing share o f external sources emerg­
ing at the expense o f dom estic ones. Thus, the developm ent of new ways 
of linking sectors and firms w ith foreign sources o f know -how — and 
with the rapid diffusion o f inform ation technologies— has affected the 
pattern o f accum ulation o f technological capacity in terms o f structure 
and performance. As a result o f these factors, the gap in technology rel­
ative to the w orld’s “best practice” frontiers has become narrower only  
in selected enclaves.
Building on these ideas, this chapter presents an analysis of growth  
patterns in Latin America. The analysis characterizes long-term growth  
as being determined by the joint effect o f tw o types of factors: balance 
o f payments conditions and the characteristics o f international special­
ization on the one hand, and differences in technology and in the capac­
ity to capture the benefits o f technical change on the other. Differences 
in technology will be introduced as one o f the main variables that deter­
m ine growth potential through the effect o f w hat will be referred to here 
as the technology gap  (Cimoli, D osi, and Soete 1986; D osi, Pavitt, and 
Soete 1990). In line with this approach, the analysis will also demonstrate 
that the incentives created by trade liberalization do not necessarily lead 
to a virtuous path and that the growth rate must be reduced if trade equi­
librium is to be preserved. Higher growth rates are possible only if there 
is an increasing trade deficit. The analysis will also show  that a virtuous 
link between exports and growth requires an increasingly robust capac­
ity to reduce the technology gap in relation to more advanced econom ies.
The first section presents a simple m odel that incorporates the tech­
nology gap into a traditional framework in which the Harrod multiplier 
plays the central role in the determination of the long-run grow th  p o ­
tential. The second introduces evidence on the functioning o f liberaliza­
tion strategies and their effect on  growth performance. The third section  
discusses the dependency between exports and domestic growth and 
identifies the difficulty o f reducing the technology gap as the main rea­
son w hy the region finds itself in a low -grow th trap today. The fourth 
section of the chapter presents, at a more micro level, a description o f the 
variables that explain the current gap in technological capacity, and o f­
fers an overview of how  the region has increasingly com e to specialize in 
knowledge-poor activities. The final section summarizes the findings 
and presents conclusions.
O penness, T echnology, and  G row th: A Simple M odel
The m odel presented here is a long-run m odel o f  growth in which trade 
patterns, dom estic technological capabilities, and production special­
ization patterns operate as the main determinants o f  output growth; as
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a result, long-term incom e and productivity effects overshadow  the im ­
pact o f  relative prices. The m odel is based on Cimoli, D osi, and Soete 
(1986) and Cim oli (1988, 1994). Its main characteristics can be viewed  
not only in terms o f m odeling m ethodologies, but also in terms of how  
som e properties o f  trading patterns and the asymmetries between them  
are considered. The first characteristic relates to national consumption  
patterns and trade specialization, which are approxim ated by the in­
com e elasticity of imports. The second stresses the importance of tech­
nology gaps, which are approximated by differences in productivity  
growth. The third characteristic is the balance of trade, which deter­
mines the growth rate differential between trading econom ies, as indi­
cated by the Harrod trade multiplier and the w ell-know n Kaldorian 
export-based m odels. From this perspective, in the short run a develop­
ing econom y can receive foreign capital inflows and temporarily increase 
or maintain its rate o f growth, but this situation is unsustainable in the 
long run unless the econom y’s production specialization is restructured 
so as to increase its participation in international markets or lead to  
com petitive import substitution1 (Dutt 2001; Harrod 1933; Kaldor 
1966, 1975; Lawson, Palma, and Sender 1989; M cCom bie and Thirl- 
w all 1994; Thirlwall 1979 , 1997).
Recalling the original expression o f the Harrod trade multiplier and 
including in it the technology gap (see annex A), our trade multiplier 
may be expressed as
=  77/7 7 *, and e  =  m ly ,
where y  is the incom e growth rate, T  is the technological gap, if is the 
growth rate of labor productivity in the hom e country, -rr* is the y  
growth rate o f labor productivity at the technological frontier, e  is the 
incom e elasticity of imports, th is  the import growth rate, ’T/e is the trade 
multiplier, and x  is the export growth rate attributable to the growth of  
w orld demand and the incom e elasticity of demand for exports.
The above equation tells us that the rate of growth o f domestic incom e 
that w ill ensure the balance of trade in an open econom y is a function o f  
exports and the parameters reflecting the technology gap and import 
elasticity. In this sense, this equation can be taken as a formalization of  
H arrod’s foreign trade multiplier, as reformulated by Kaldor and by 
Thirlwall. Our approach differs from the one taken by the latter authors, 
however, because it includes a proxy for the technology gap. That is, 
changes in dom estic incom e are not only a function o f foreign incom e 
and demand for imports, but are also dependent on the productivity gap
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and on the domestic capacity to upgrade technology and diffuse it m as­
sively throughout the production system. W hen ’f r =  1, the productivity 
growth rate is the same in the dom estic and foreign econom ies. Thus, if 
’P >  1, the domestic econom y is reducing the gap with respect to the for­
eign one. Conversely, when IP <  1, the gap between the dom estic and 
foreign econom ies is increasing.2
This idea concerning the technology gap reflects contributions made 
in the 1960s in the field o f  technology and trade (Freeman 1963; 
H irsch 1965; Hufbauer 1966; Posner 1961; V ernon 1966). This ap­
proach has stressed international asym m etries in tech nology  as the 
m ain determinant of trade flow s and patterns of specialization. Technol­
ogy is characterized as a good that is not free and that gives an important 
advantage to the first innovator country. M oreover, in a dynamic con­
text, asymmetries in levels o f technology and innovation capacity largely 
account for the evolution of each country’s pattern of specialization and 
growth capacity. In Posner (1961), the pattern of trade is explained by 
countries’ initially asymmetric access to technological knowledge in a 
world characterized by similar demand patterns. In this context, trade 
between countries will continue if differences in their respective abilities 
to innovate and imitate persist. After a certain interval, m ost countries 
w ill be able to im itate the new  com m odity and restore technological 
parity, thereby elim inating the basis for trade. Freeman (1963) and  
Hufbauer (1966) have stressed the differences between the factors that 
determine specialization before and after im itation takes place. Thus, 
during the innovation process, the effects o f patents, commercial secrecy, 
and static and dynamic econom ies of scale are the main determinants. 
However, once imitation occurs, the traditional process o f adjustment in 
production cost and com petitiveness w ill determine the specialization. 
In Hirsch (1965) and Vernon (1966), technological asymmetries are as­
sociated w ith distinct phases in a technology’s evolution and a specific 
international distribution o f innovation capacity in the production of 
new  com m odities. In the initial phase, innovative advantage is the 
main factor driving the production of new  com m odities in the ad­
vanced countries. Over time, the technology evolves into a mature 
phase characterized by the standardization o f  products and processes. 
In this latter phase, international com petition is based on the technol­
ogy being transferred, productivity im provements, and production-cost 
advantages.
M any o f these studies have undoubtedly scored points with policy  
makers, w ho have increasingly com e to recognize the significance of  
technology for international competitiveness. The recent “structuralist- 
evolutionary” approach devotes increasing attention to uneven interna­
tional technological change as an engine o f  growth, w ith  emphasis on  
the dynamics o f specialization, as in Amable (1992 , 1993), M etcalfe
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(1989), and Soete and Verspagen (1992), and on the dynamics of catch­
ing up, as analyzed in Verspagen (1990, 1991) and D osi and Freeman 
(1992).
Equation (2.1) highlights the multiplier effects o f the differences in 
technology between the tw o countries and the income elasticity of im­
ports. Dom estic growth is weighted by the technology gap, which ac­
counts for the distance between the tw o countries’ productivity growth  
rates. The extent to which exports can generate sustainable growth rates 
is thus limited when the existing technology gap is widening. Conversely, 
w hen the technology gap narrows, the dom estic growth rate will be very 
sensitive to  changes in exports. This rate is also inversely related to  
im port elasticity, w hich m easures the proportional change in dem and  
for imports w ith respect to  a proportional change in dom estic income. 
The growth rate is affected by an increase in imports as measured by e, 
the incom e elasticity of demand for imports. The higher the value of e, the 
lower the growth rate consistent with equilibrium on the current ac­
count. In sum, the potential for dom estic grow th is based on  the 
growth rate’s sensitivity to  both the technology gap m ultiplier and the 
incom e elasticity o f  im ports. Thus, a virtu ous g ro w th  pa th  can emerge 
w hen the reduction o f  the technology gap m ore than offsets the in ­
crease in im port elasticity. Conversely, a vicious g ro w th  pa th  emerges 
w hen the increase in im port elasticity is greater than the reduction o f  
the technology gap.
This analysis also implicitly points to the influence of international 
specialization on each econom y’s potential growth rate. The simple 
analysis that fo llow s describes the role played by the specialization pat­
tern in determining the trade multiplier P /s .  The P M  curves in the top  
left quadrant o f figure 2.1 indicate the various com binations of the tech­
nology gap multiplier and the elasticity o f  imports that guarantee equi­
librium on the trade balance. The M e  curves in the lower left quadrant 
depict the hom e country’s specialization pattern; their positive slant re­
flects the positive association between an increase in demand for imports 
and an increase in the incom e elasticity o f  goods consum ed domestically  
(com m only know n as Engel’s law). A m ovem ent from M e i to M e2 indi­
cates that the hom e country has improved its specialization and reduced 
the incom e elasticity of imports. That is, the hom e country has improved  
its capacity to narrow the gap separating it from countries that produce 
goods with higher knowledge content and higher incom e elasticity. The 
top right quadrant shows the trade multiplier (P /e).
For a given P  and a specialization pattern indicated by M e, (which 
implicitly define a dom estic market that demands imports with high in ­
com e elasticity), the multiplier obtained w ill be less than 1. In this case, 
an increase in exports w ill result in a worsening o f the multiplier. That 
is, when the P M  curve m oves left toward P M x  and imports m ove from
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A ’ to B ’ along the M s\  curve, the multiplier schedule in the top right 
quadrant w ill turn clockwise. Conversely, for a given iB, the multiplier 
w ill improve only w hen the specialization improves. This is the case 
w hen the M s  curve m oves to M s 2 , the com bination between M and s  
m oves to point B”, and the multiplier m oves to an angle above 45 degrees. 
To sum up, the trade multiplier ty /s  improves and starts to m ove along  
a virtuous path when the productivity gap narrows and/or the special­
ization pattern improves. On the other hand, if the productivity gap does 
not change and the specialization pattern is stable, an increase in exports 
w ill not produce an improvement in the multiplier.3
The assum ption o f equilibrium on the trade balance does not rule out 
the possibility that the actual growth rate may be higher or lower than 
the balance o f paym ents-constrained growth rate. If it is lower, a trade 
surplus w ill emerge; conversely, if the actual growth rate is higher than 
the constrained one, then the trade balance will deteriorate. From a 
m onetary standpoint, the current account deficit may create financing 
problems and exchange rate volatility, and it m ust be financed by either 
long-term or short-term capital inflows. As is w ell know n, given its high
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volatility, the latter type o f financing can cause a country to becom e a 
hostage to international speculation.
L iberalization Strategies and  Perform ance
One w ay to determine h ow  policies aimed at liberalization and the adop­
tion o f  an outward orientation have influenced growth is to describe 
som e o f the main stylized patterns and constraints that have character­
ized the Latin American econom ies following econom ic reform (Ocampo 
2004). The empirical analysis that follow s is based on tw o sets of data 
corresponding to different times in the reforms’ im plem entation. The pe­
riods indicated in table 2.1 are discussed here, and a different period that 
excludes part o f the 1980s is shown in annex B. H ow ever, both sets o f  
data confirm the analysis presented in the follow ing sections.
At a general level, the orthodox view suggests that the model o f export- 
led growth relates to the possibility that export growth may set up a vir­
tuous circle o f growth if a country maintains its competitive position in 
world trade. However, a first glance at the actual situation reveals the dif­
ficulty of achieving the average growth rate that characterized the import- 
substitution period (Ocam po 2004).
As the region has opened up, it has witnessed a large increase in both  
exports and imports, w ith exports rising from 5.3 percent to 8 percent 
after econom ic reforms were implemented. On the other hand, it is 
apparent that the trade balance is still a constraint on GDP growth (see 
figure 2 .2  and table 2 .1). Empirical evidence also shows that the average 
growth rate o f  GDP decreased between the pre- and postreform periods 
and that the trade deficit w idened (see figure 2 .3). The role played by the 
balance o f payments as a determinant o f domestic econom ic perform­
ance emerged clearly in the postreform period (Frenkel and González 
1999; H olland, Vilela Vieira, and Canuto 2002; Moreno-Brid 1999;
T a b le  2 .1  T im in g  o f  R eform s








Sources: Ramos 1997; Stallings and Peres 2000.
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Figure 2 .2  Im ports and E xp orts in  the P ostreform  Period  







Note: Import and export growth rates for each period (before and after 
reform; see table 2.1) have been calculated on the basis of unweighted averages; 
each point above the 45-degree line represents the postreform period (even the 
year 2000).
Pérez and Moreno-Brid 1999). An actual growth rate higher than the 
balance of paym ents-constrained rate produces a balance o f payments 
deficit.
In the short term, the effect o f capital inflow s can relax the balance 
o f payments constraint and prevent a w idening o f  the relative incom e 
gap. H owever, in the long term, this situation w ill imply an unsustain- 
ably higher and higher level o f flow s and an increased foreign debt. As 
Prebisch (1950) concluded, there is no solution w ithout a change in the 
structure o f production that leads to a com petitive substitution of 
imports and/or increased exports, particularly of products with a higher 
technological content.
The trend o f these aggregate variables reflects the reinforcement o f a 
specialization pattern that still focuses on product lines in which the region 
has advantages in terms of natural resources and cheap labor. Orthodox 
authors have argued that trade liberalization and market deregulation 
w ould automatically bring about a shift in the Latin American production
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Figure 2.3 Growth and Trade Balance
Trade balance (% of GDP )
Source: ECLAC.
Note: Trade balance and income growth for each period are calculated 
using the average, weighted by country dimensions.
structure.4 In fact, within this general picture it can be observed that 
m ost Latin American econom ies have follow ed the expected path, 
changing their specialization on the basis o f  their factor endowments: 
natural resources and labor. Geographically, tw o separate patterns ap­
pear to have em erged for M exico  and the Central American countries 
on the one hand, and South America on the other. The South American  
countries have intensified their specialization in natural resources and 
standardized com m odities. These are now  highly capital-intensive indus­
tries w ith low  domestic value added. Firms producing for local markets—  
which are labor-intensive and engineering-intensive— have suffered m ost 
from trade liberalization and market deregulation initiatives. Conversely, 
countries such as M exico and the Central American nations have global­
ized their manufacturing and assembly activities, based on cheap labor. 
The structural features o f  the specialization pattern have affected the 
countries’ capacity to achieve equilibrium on their current accounts (Katz 
and Stumpo 2001).
Prebisch emphasized the balance o f  payments effects o f  differences in 
specialization patterns and the incom e elasticity o f demand for the dif­
ferent types o f goods that go along with them. It is generally recognized
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that the incom e elasticity o f demand is lower for m ost primary com ­
modities than it is for manufactured products. On average, the elasticity 
is less than 1, meaning that a decreasing proportion of incom e is spent 
on those com m odities. Thus, in the two-country, two-com m odity case, 
the lower incom e elasticity of demand for primary com m odities will 
mean that, for a given increment in world incom e, the balance o f pay­
ments of developing countries specialized in the production of primary 
com m odities will automatically deteriorate relative to the balance o f pay­
ments of developed countries that produce and export industrial goods 
(Thirlwall 1994). At a more general level, Pasinetti (1981) argued that the 
specific features o f a specialization pattern are reflected in the asymmetry 
of the elasticity o f demand for imports. These asymmetries, together with  
the structural determinants o f productivity changes, are the crucial vari­
ables underlying the capacity to  capture the benefits o f long-term export 
growth. Thus, in the present case, in which Latin America specializes in 
knowledge-poor goods while its imports are associated w ith goods of 
higher knowledge content, specialization patterns and the technology  
gap (which account for the distance between different countries’ levels 
of productivity) are the structural factors that explain the poor effects of 
trade openness on the long-term regional growth pattern.
T he L ow -G row th  T rap  
and  Its S tructu ral D eterm inan ts
The m odel introduced above can be considered a sort o f “theoretical 
abacus” that reproduces different scenarios characterized by specific 
links am ong technology gaps, demand for imports, and growth rates. 
Assuming that the specialization pattern is given, different scenarios can 
be represented on the basis o f how  the dynamics o f productivity rates, 
and the interplay o f those dynamics, interact w ith the growth rate (see 
table 2.2).
In Latin America, the trade multiplier declined follow ing liberaliza­
tion, dropping to less than l . 5 A vicious pattern o f export-led growth has 
thus taken shape in m ost countries o f the region, w hose average m ulti­
plier m oved from 0.43 to 0 .22  between the prereform and postreform  
periods. This vicious circle between export growth and incom e growth  
has led the region into a low -grow th trap (see figure 2 .4  and table 2.2). 
This contrasts sharply w ith the experience o f som e Asian econom ies, 
such as the Republic o f Korea, where the technology gap has narrowed 
substantially in recent decades.6
The data and the results for the trade multiplier equation are pre­
sented in table 2 .3 . In all o f the countries, the actual rate of growth  
is higher than the balance of payments equilibrium growth rate. These
Table 2.2 Theoretical Abacus of the Trade Multiplier
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G ro w th  P attern T rade M u ltip lie r S tructural D e term in an ts
Virtuous ifr
— >  1 
€
The domestic capacity to  reduce 
the technology gap is greater 
than the increase in the income 
elasticity of imports; hence, 
increased participation in 
international trade fosters 
output growth.
Stable \fr
~  =  1 
s
The domestic capacity to reduce
the technology gap offsets the 
country’s im port requirements, 
thus limiting the multiplier effect 





The limited capacity to  reduce the 
technology gap and the fast 
growth in im port requirements 
hamper the beneficial effect of 
increased participation in 
international trade.
results are reflected in the trade balance situation in the postreform  
period. As table 2 .4  shows, m ost countries had built up surpluses at the 
beginning o f the period, but those surpluses have n ow  been reduced 
and/or transformed into deficits. M oreover, deficits have increased at an 
accelerated rate.
This situation is rooted in the characteristics o f the specialization pat­
tern and, particularly, in the limited nature o f  the progress made in re­
ducing the technology gap. Although Latin America has narrowed the 
productivity gap, the decrease has not been as large as the increase in im­
port elasticity.7 In particular, when a country starts out w ith a w ide tech­
nology gap, it is the reduction o f this gap that w ill result in the clearest 
improvement in the relative domestic growth rate (that is, an increase in 
Tr). H ow ever, if the demand for imports increases at a higher rate, the 
positive effect o f shrinking the technology gap is neutralized and/or elim ­
inated. This is the case in Latin America, where the reduction o f the 
technology gap was not enough to offset the striking increase in import 
elasticity. As in the Prebisch-Singer case, the negative impact on dom es­
tic income is represented as a com bination o f adverse structural condi­
tions: a fast increase in incom e elasticity and a slow  reduction in the 
technology gap.
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Figure 2 .4  Trade M ultiplier in the Latin American 
Countries, Before and After Reforms
♦ Argentina ■ Brazil ▲ Chile x Colombia * Mexico
•  Peru + Uruguay o Latin America
Source: ECLAC.
Note: Each point represents the trade multiplier in the pre- and postreform 
periods.
Another finding concerns the link between exports and growth when  
exports are driven exogenously by growth in developed countries. Thus, 
if the trade multiplier decreases over time, the same rate o f growth in 
domestic incom e can be achieved only if exports increase at a higher 
rate. M oreover, a slow dow n in the growth of world demand for a coun­
try’s exports and a reduction o f the multiplier w ill am plify the negative 
impact on incom e growth.
At the aggregate level, the dynamics o f productivity growth are the 
result o f overlapping phenom ena. Productivity growth has not been fast 
enough, nor has the restructuring o f the pattern o f production special­
ization involved enough high-value-added activities, to enable the re­
gion’s countries to attain a significant improvement in international 
com petitiveness. The technology gap has been reduced only in tightly 
circumscribed production enclaves, and a new  dualism has becom e more 
visible in the production system. At the same time, Latin America has
O o
Table 2.3 Structural Change in Latin America, Before and After Reform
Before Reform After Reform Country
Before Reform After Reform








1970-90 1991-9 Argentina -0 .0 7 0.61 3.97 1.19
1970-89 1990-9 Brazil 0.59 0.39 6.42 1.48
1970-84 1985-98 Chile 0.65 0.71 1.98 0.79
1970-89 1990-9 Colombia 0.68 0.46 5.47 0.68
1970-85 1986-99 Mexico 0.82 0.53 4.28 0.78
1970-89 1990-6 Peru -0 .42 -0.61 2.92 0.98
1970-7 1978-99 Uruguay 1.53 -0 .48 2.98 0.31
Source: ECLAC.
Note: Apparent import elasticity and labor productivity (hence the technology gap) are standardized at constant 1985 prices.
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Trade Balance (% GDP) 
First Last
Year Year Difference
1991-9 Argentina 3.95 2.69 1.47 -3 .82 -5 .30
1990-9 Brazil 2.42 1.28 3.16 -2 .36 -5 .5 2
1985-98 Chile 6.75 4.21 7.45 3.39 -4 .0 7
1990-9 Colombia 2.50 0.78 3.78 -3 .52 -7 .30
1986-99 Mexico 3.16 2.06 3.62 2.48 -1 .14
1990-6 Peru 5.08 2.81 0.81 -4 .33 -5 .1 4
1978-99 Uruguay 2.06 0.45 1.96 -4 .43 -6 .38
Source: ECLAC.
Note: The trade balance and income growth for each period are calculated using 
weighted averages based on country size.
radically m odified the pattern o f technology accum ulation and know l­
edge diffusion across firms and sectors. Such changes are giving rise to a 
com plex process o f “destruction” of deeply rooted forms o f production  
organization and o f institutions, thereby gradually (and painfully) forc­
ing the countries to establish an outward-oriented and deregulated in­
centive regime together with a production system specializing in activities 
having a low  knowledge content (ECLAC 2004).
U nderstand ing  the M icroeconom ic Sources 
o f T echnology G aps
According to the analysis carried out in the previous section, the char­
acteristics o f domestic production and o f trade patterns appear to be the 
structural determinants o f growth patterns. In effect, the taxonom y pre­
sented in table 2 .2  allows us to identify dom estic capacity for reducing 
the technology gap as a factor that helps to ensure that export growth  
will drive the econom y toward a virtuous pattern o f growth; by the same 
token, this taxonom y also enables us to identify an increasing incom e 
elasticity o f imports as a factor that hampers this process. At this point, 
because the trend of the incom e elasticity o f imports depends on the do­
mestic specialization pattern, and considering that technological intensity 
is a key element in analyzing production structure dynamics, an exam i­
nation o f the m icrofoundations o f knowledge accum ulation patterns is
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necessary in order to understand the reasons behind one o f the main  
determinants o f  the region’s vicious growth pattern, that is, the very 
limited reduction o f the technology gap experienced by Latin American 
countries during the last decade (for em pirical evidence and an analyt­
ical form alization, see Cimoli and Katz [2001] and ECLAC [2000, 
2004]).
First o f all, the weak link between exports and growth reflects a new  
dualism in the production system and in the pattern of technology accu­
mulation. The benefits o f m odernization have been very unevenly distrib­
uted. M any production activities have been seriously disrupted by trade 
liberalization and the massive inflow of imports, particularly in technology­
intensive fields, which have rapidly begun to de-verticalize their production 
organization technologies, replacing domestically produced intermedi­
ate inputs w ith cheaper (and som etim es better) imported ones and reor­
ganizing themselves as more o f an assembly-type operation based on a 
much higher im port content. The heterogeneity of responses has been 
quite dramatic, not only across production sectors, but also across indi­
vidual firms w ithin narrowly defined industries. Thus, failure and suc­
cess tend to  occur side by side, even within the same production activity. 
The share o f GDP accounted for by “large” firms— either local sub­
sidiaries o f transnational corporations or dom estically ow ned conglom ­
erates increased significantly during the adjustment process, whereas 
countless small and medium -sized enterprises were forced to exit the 
market altogether.
Only a very small group o f modernized export firms are actually be­
com ing global in terms of their production orientation and their capacity 
to acquire foreign technology in international networks. The majority are 
much less efficient, and this tends to break dow n local networking ac­
tivities and hold back knowledge diffusion. The modernized firms are, in 
fact, characterized by fewer linkages with domestic institutions o f higher 
education and w ith local research centers and laboratories. Although  
universities have sought to improve and create linkages w ith the pro­
duction system, they are hindered by tw o factors: their ow n bureaucratic 
organization and these firms’ demand for knowledge from institutions 
and research centers located abroad. This is also true o f  the maquila in­
dustry in M exico and Central America, because the “m aquila innova­
tion system ” mainly supports and stimulates networking activities with  
firms and institutions located abroad, thus reinforcing the knowledge 
and technology advantages of the developed econom ies.
In the second place, it is w orth noticing that, fo llow in g  the trade 
reform s, the largest econom ies increased their share o f production in 
sectors such as natural-resource processing industries that produce 
industrial commodities (such as pulp and paper, iron and steel, vegetable
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oil, and so forth), maquila industries (electronics, television sets and video 
equipment, and so forth), nontradable services (telecommunications and 
energy), and in the som ewhat special case o f the autom otive industry, 
which has enjoyed special protection from  the wave o f liberalization. 
Other industries, such as footwear, garments, and furniture, and indus­
tries that produce engineering- and knowledge-intensive products (capi­
tal goods, agricultural machinery, machine tools, pharmaceuticals) have 
seen their share decline throughout the continent.
M ost Latin American econom ies have thus specialized on the basis 
of their abundant factor endowm ents: natural resources and labor. 
Another relevant issue is the role played by large dom estic firms and 
subsidiaries o f  m ultinational enterprises (M NEs) that have follow ed  
the international pattern in terms o f product specialization and technol­
ogy absorbed from foreign econom ies. Subsidiaries o f M N E s, w hose  
production is mainly concentrated in standardized products (particularly 
m otor vehicles, other consumer durables, and traditional manufactures), 
have adopted the technologies developed by their parent com panies in 
industrialized countries. The performance o f large dom estic firms can­
not be understood w ithout taking into account their learning efforts 
during the im port-substitution phase. It w as during that period that 
these firms developed econom ies o f scale to enable them to com pete in 
the international market after the econom y was opened up. This in­
volved the adoption o f plans, blueprints, and designs for the domestic 
market, as w ell as efforts to im prove organization and increase produc­
tion capacity. Examples o f such firms include large groups in the chem i­
cals, brewing, and glass-container industries, w hich not only increased 
their production capacity but also carried out research and develop­
m ent (R& D) activities to support the firms’ knowledge base during the 
im port-substitution phase.
The long-term accum ulation o f local technological capacity has been 
hampered by the replacement o f engineers w ith machines in the course 
of the reorganization o f production. Obviously, som e o f the engineering 
activities carried out on the plant floor during the im port-substitution  
period, either to extend the life cycle o f old machines or to perform tech­
nical tasks, are now  “em bodied” in the new  pieces o f equipment and 
have been rendered unnecessary, so that frequently the engineers and 
technicians involved in such activities can be dropped from the payroll. 
Similarly, entire R & D  and project engineering departments can be elimi­
nated when firms become part o f worldwide integrated production systems 
and R & D  and engineering efforts are transferred to headquarters. The 
same phenomenon is observed in the case o f public firms providing 
telecommunications, electricity, and transport services, which, after priva­
tization, discontinued their domestic R & D  and engineering departments
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and have since relied instead on  their respective central offices for 
technology and engineering services. These changes in the organiza­
tion  o f  production involve the “destruction” o f  hum an capital and d o ­
m estic technological capabilities and their replacem ent w ith  capital 
em bodied in new  technology and w ith  foreign-supplied R & D  and en­
gineering services. Some o f the skills and technological capabilities 
rendered redundant by the new  production organization arrange­
m ents can and have been successfully transferred to  other areas o f  the 
econom y— to a new ly emerging and rapidly expanding software indus­
try, for exam ple— but there are clear differences across nations, regions, 
and industries in terms o f  the extent to w hich such redeploym ent has 
actually taken place.8
C onclusions
The region has slow ly narrowed the productivity gap. H ow ever, the re­
duction o f this gap has not been enough to offset the extraordinary in­
crease in the elasticity o f demand for imports; as a result, the trade m ul­
tiplier (W/e) has declined between the pre- and postreform periods. The 
mechanism that links export growth and incom e growth has led m ost 
countries o f the region into a low -grow th trap, resulting in a vicious pat­
tern o f international specialization. A virtuous pattern can be obtained  
if the specialization pattern m oves toward products w ith higher techno­
logical content and if the regional productivity gap is reduced. Only un­
der such circumstances w ill the increase in exports lead to sustainable 
long-term incom e growth.
The m ain reason w hy it has proven to be so difficult to capture the 
benefits o f increased participation in international trade lies in the struc­
ture o f the production system and in the existing m odes of producing 
and diffusing technical change. A dual structure has arisen in which pro­
ductivity improves in very small enclaves, and few  linkages are generated 
with the rest o f the system. This pattern does not permit a higher increase 
in, or better diffusion of, knowledge and technical change. M oreover, 
the poor diffusion of R & D  activities and the replacement of local sources 
o f knowledge are radically reducing opportunities for narrowing the 
technology gap.
Econom ic reforms have thus led to a pattern of specialization based 
on allocative efficiency and static comparative advantages in m ost Latin 
American countries. In contrast, dynamic advantages require the devel­
opm ent and d iffusion o f technical and organizational innovations 
and depend increasingly on access to  advanced linkages between firms 
and know ledge flow s. As a result, openness to  trade has produced a
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disjointed structure that is unable to  diffuse technological capabilities  
locally  to produce an overall im provem ent across firms and sectors. 
This pattern adversely affects endogenous know ledge generation and 
hampers the creation o f  dom estic capacity for closing the technology  
gap, thereby lim iting the potential m ultiplier effect o f  export grow th  
on incom e growth and acting as one o f the main barriers to the coun­
tries’ efforts to capture the benefits o f increased participation in inter­
national trade.
A nnex A
The trade multiplier can be obtained on the basis o f the concept devel­
oped by Harrod (1933), Kaldor (1966 , 1975), and Thirlwall (1979); 
that is, y  =  ( l/e )x .  In Cim oli (1994) and Cim oli, D osi, and Soete (1986), 
this expression has been further developed with the incorporation o f  a 
proxy for the technology gap (1T); thus, the trade multiplier may be ex­
pressed by y  =  CE/e)x.
This last expression is based on the follow ing assum ptions. T o ob ­
tain an expression o f the balance o f trade equilibrium  condition, we 
m ust n ow  specify total dom estic im ports and exports. These are ex ­
pressed by M  and E, where M  is the total dem and for im ports in the 
hom e country and E is the hom e country’s exports (that is, the demand 
for im ports in the foreign country). The trade equilibrium  condition, 
as measured in one currency, is then M  =  E; or, w hen this initial con ­
dition is given, the balance o f paym ents equilibrium  on current ac­
count can be expressed by m  =  e in terms of grow th rates. T o obtain  
an expression o f  the trade m ultiplier, w e m ust n ow  specify im ports and 
exports. Using standard dem and theory, im ports m ay thus be specified  
as a m ultiplicative function o f dom estic incom e. Thus, M  =  ye, where 
e  is the incom e elasticity o f demand for imports and y  is domestic income. 
Export demand may also be expressed as a multiplicative function  
in which the arguments are world incom e (y*)  and the technological 
gap (IP). Exports m ay be expressed by E =  y * p 9 . In accordance w ith  
the structuralist view  (Bacha 1978; M cC om bie and Thirlwall 1994; 
Prebisch 1950), w e can argue that to  m aintain an incom e level equal to  
that o f developed econom ies, Latin America m ust reduce the incom e 
elasticity o f its dem and for im ports or narrow the technology gap; that 
is, y s =  y * ii9 . D ifferentiating it, a dynam ic version o f the m ultiplier is 
obtained: e(dy/y)  =  'Efiidy* I y*) .  Substituting x  =  [3y* in the last equa­
tion, we obtain y  =  {EIb )x . N ote that x  is the total export growth attrib­
utable to the grow th o f w orld  incom e (y*) and the incom e elasticity o f  
dem and for exports (¡3).
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A nnex B
Figure 2 .5  T rade M u ltip lier, 1 9 7 0 - 8 0  an d  1 9 8 5  to  the Last 
Y ear o f  the P ostreform  Period
♦ Argentina ■ Brazil ▲ Chile x Colombia * Mexico
•  Peru + Uruguay
Source: ECLAC.
Note: Each point represents the trade multiplier in the pre- and postreform 
periods.
T ab le  2 . 5  Structural C hange in  Latin A m erica, 1 9 7 0 -8 0 ,  1 9 8 5 -9 9
C ou n try
19 7 0 --1 9 8 0 1985--circa 19 9 9
Im p o r t
E lastic ity
(e)
T ech n o logy
G ap
(V)






Argentina 2.81 0.85 4.72 1.40
Brazil 0.91 0.41 5.95 1.28
Chile 2.37 0.85 1.98 0.79
Colombia 1.03 0.43 3.24 0.64
Mexico 1.57 0.70 4.46 0.69
Peru 0.74 0.10 5.19 -0 .28
Uruguay 1.56 -0 .52 3.32 1.56
Source: Prepared by author.
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T ab le  2 .6  G row th  R ate and T rade B alance A pplied  to  the M o d el, 









Trade Balance (% GDP)  
First Last
Year Year Difference
1985-99 Argentina 2.99 1.97 3.55 -3 .8 2 -7 .3 7
1985-99 Brazil 2.22 1.01 3.85 -2 .3 6 -6 .22
1985-98 Chile 6.75 4.21 7.45 3.39 -4 .0 7
1985-99 Colombia 3.32 1.67 0.67 -3 .52 -4 .2 0
1985-99 Mexico 2.69 1.66 2.47 2.48 0.01
1985-96 Peru 1.90 -0 .08 6.35 -4 .33 -10 .68
1985-99 Uruguay 3.53 2.34 7.85 -4 .43 -12 .28
Source: Prepared by author.
E ndnotes
1. The long-run character of the model allows us to disregard short-run 
changes in relative prices, including movements of the real exchange rate. This, in 
turn, reflects the fact that, in the long term, real exchange rates are relatively stable 
(Krugman 1989; McCombie and Roberts 2002).
2. In the literature on technology and trade, 'P has been called the “techno­
logical gap multiplier” (Cimoli 1994; Cimoli, Dosi, and Soete 1986).
3. Another way of looking at this model is from both the supply and the 
demand sides. The supply side is reflected by the technology gap multiplier and dif­
ferences in the dynamism of production structures (for example, learning processes, 
sectoral networks, and so forth). The demand side is associated with the dynamism 
of world demand and the particular features of the specialization pattern.
4. As Anne Krueger has argued, “Insofar as developing countries are rela­
tively abundantly endowed with unskilled labor and relatively short of capital, 
trade with other [less-developed countries] is likely to increase the imbalance in 
factor availability, whereas trade with the developed countries may serve as a 
means of exchanging abundant factors for scarce ones” (Krueger 1978, pp. 
270-72). In this respect, trade liberalization would strengthen the region’s com­
parative advantages by allocating resources for these production activities and 
would thus boost demand for unskilled labor, narrow the wage gap, and reduce 
the anti-export bias of the import-substitution era, during which the labor factor 
had been underused. Anne Krueger has also stated, “What is already clear is that 
the findings of the country studies support the view that altering trade strategies 
toward greater export orientation will certainly be consistent with the objective 
of finding more employment opportunities: scepticism based on the Leontief 
Paradox or factor-market distortion considerations does not seem to be war­
ranted” (Krueger 1978, pp. 270-72).
5. 1P is calculated with respect to the United States, which in this case is the 
technological frontier. However, this result does not change if we consider more 
direct competitors, such as the Republic of Korea (see note 6).
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6. The trade multiplier for the Republic of Korea rose from 1.01 to 1.42 be­
tween 1970-80 and 1981-99. In this case, it is interesting to note that both the 
technology gap and the elasticity of demand for imports decreased. Thus, a virtu­
ous pattern was established. These contrasts between Latin America and Korea 
should be seen in terms of the latter’s status as an economy that has consolidated 
the upgrading of its technological capabilities in the past few decades. One fact that 
explains the differences between Latin America and Korea is related to the concept 
of selective intervention, derived from the experiences of developmentalist ap­
proaches. For example, one of the keys to the success of this approach has been the 
ability to program the level and composition of noncompetitive intermediate and 
capital goods, as in Korea, where quotas, directed credit, and targeting were used 
to select those industries that were to provide foreign exchange through exports. 
The industries whose exports were promoted were those in which the country pos­
sessed a static comparative advantage, whereas the industries that enjoyed a pro­
tective policy were subject to the requirement that they should develop a dynamic 
comparative advantage. Thus, at the aggregate level, it was also possible to obtain 
a balanced portfolio in terms of sources and uses of foreign exchange. Among the 
industries that have received support in order to help them develop dynamic com­
parative advantages, it seems that the major actors in technological learning have 
been large business groups—the chaebols—which, at a very early stage of develop­
ment, were able to internalize skills for the selection of technologies acquired from 
abroad, their efficient use, and their adaptation and, not much later, were able to 
grow impressive engineering capabilities (Kim 1993). This process has been further 
supported by a set of institutions and networks for improving and upgrading hu­
man resources (Amsden 1989).
7. The increase in import elasticity is observed over the long term. It is not a 
transitory phenomenon resulting from income changes, but instead mainly an ef­
fect of the specialization pattern.
8. In general, because companies transfer only some of their R&D activities 
to Latin America, the present concentration of corporate R&D can be expected to 
lead, by and large, to even sharper international disparities in the pattern of tech­
nology accumulation. The internationalization of R&D is carried out within de­
veloped economies and regions with already proven technological advantages. This 
view is supported by the results obtained in empirical studies on the organization 
of research activities in multinational firms, which clearly show that even multina­
tional companies perform most of their innovative activities in their home country 
(Cimoli and Katz 2001).
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3
Four Sources of 
“De-Industrialization” and 
a New Concept of the 
“Dutch Disease”
José Gabriel Palma
U sing kaldor’s analogy , one  of the  m ost notable “stylized facts” of 
the post-W orld War II (WWII) period is the rapid decline in manufactur­
ing em ployment in m ost industrial countries and in many middle- and 
high-income developing countries. Although it is well known that over 
the long-term course o f econom ic development, the structure o f em ploy­
ment changes substantially, relative variations in the scale and speed o f  
change during this period constitute a phenom enon w ithout precedent.
In essence, during the long-term course o f econom ic developm ent, 
changes in the structure o f  em ploym ent are set in m otion by an increase 
in the productivity of the agricultural sector.1 This increase in produc­
tivity reduces the labor requirements of agriculture and, at the same
The author is Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge University. This chap­
ter builds on Robert Rowthorn’s influential work on this subject. I am extremely grate­
ful to him for sharing his data and for many lengthy discussions on the subject. I would 
also like to thank Daniel Hahn, Richard Kozul-Wright, Carlota Pérez, Hashem Pesaran, 
Guy Standing, Fiona Tregenna, Ben Turok, and especially Stephanie Blankenburg and 
José Antonio Ocampo, and participants at seminars in Bangkok, Bilbao, Cambridge, 
Cape Town, Chicago, Geneva, Kuala Lumpur, Mexico City, and Santiago for their help­
ful comments on a previous draft. Last, I am very grateful to John Wells, with whom 
I had frequent discussions on the subject before his sudden death. The usual caveats 
apply.
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time, raises both the demand for agricultural intermediate and capital in­
puts, and the demand for consum er goods by those benefiting from the 
increase in productivity in agriculture. As a result, tw o processes are set 
in m otion: one in w hich labor begins to be released from agriculture; and 
one in which labor is progressively absorbed into other sectors o f the 
econom y— initially by those activities w hose products benefited from  
higher demand from agriculture and later by the more general dynamics 
o f econom ic grow th. During this new  phase, generally called the in­
dustrialization  phase, labor is absorbed m ainly by manufacturing and 
services. During the next phase, alongside a continuing contraction of 
em ploym ent in agriculture and an expansion o f  em ploym ent in services, 
com es a tendency for the share o f manufacturing em ploym ent in total 
em ploym ent to stabilize. Finally, a new  phase emerges in which em ­
ploym ent in  manufacturing begins to fall (first in relative terms and 
then, at least in som e countries, in absolute terms); in the meantime, 
services continue to be the main source o f labor absorption.2 This last 
phase is com m only referred to as the de-industrialization  phase.3
M ost industrial countries reached this phase o f de-industrialization  
around the end o f the 1960s and the beginning o f the 1970s, whereas 
som e high-incom e developing countries (such as the rapidly industrial­
izing econom ies o f East Asia) began this phase in the 1980s. H owever, 
at about the same time (and for a number o f different reasons that w ill 
be discussed in more detail below), som e Latin American countries also 
began to de-industrialize rapidly, despite the fact that their level o f in ­
com e per capita was far low er than the levels found in other countries 
that had either de-industrialized earlier, or that were beginning to de­
industrialize at the same time.
Am ong industrial countries, one group o f countries in which the scale 
and speed o f change were m ost remarkable was the European Union  
(EU), where manufacturing em ploym ent was reduced by alm ost a third 
in the last three decades o f the 20th  century.4
Figure 3.1 shows how, in the years between 1960 and the early 1970s, 
both output and productivity in the European U nion’s manufacturing sec­
tor were growing at similarly high speeds (with annual average rates o f 5 .9  
percent and 5.3 percent in 1 9 60 -73 , respectively). In the post-1973 period, 
both these rates fell drastically; however, the production  rate dropped far 
more rapidly, ending up at just half that o f productivity (1.4 percent and 
2.8  percent, respectively). Therefore, the origins of the rapid fall in m an­
ufacturing employment in the European Union can be explained easily—  
at least in arithm etic  terms. Because the growth in em ploym ent is equal 
to the growth in output less that o f  productivity, the result o f  the above 
asymmetry is a decline in em ployment. From this (arithmetic) stand­
point, w hat happened in the European Union after 1973 should be con­
sidered as basically a case o f “output-led” de-industrialization— that is,
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Figure 3 .1  M an u factu rin g  and Services in  th e EU, 
1 9 6 0 - 2 0 0 0
Indexes Log-scale
Source: Rowthorn 1997.
Note: mf = manufacturing; ser = services.
the result o f a rapid slow dow n o f the rate o f growth o f output— rather 
than a case o f “productivity-led” (or a “new-technological-paradigm-led”) 
de-industrialization.5
Figure 3.1 also shows that in the services sector the reverse phenom e­
non took place: Although in this sector the rate o f growth o f both output 
and productivity also began to fall sharply in the early 1970s, it was 
growth in produ ctivity  that fell much faster, with productivity growing at 
less than half the rate of output (1.1 percent and 2 .6  percent, respectively).
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This reversed asymmetry resulted in a rapid increase in employment. 
Consequently, after the early 1970s, both sectors— manufacturing and 
services— demonstrated significant contrasts in their capacity to absorb 
labor.
As a result, between 1973 and 2000  the European Union was able to 
raise its production o f manufactures by about 50 percent while cutting 
em ploym ent by alm ost 30 percent. At the same time, in order to con­
tinue raising its output of services (even though this w as done at a slow  
pace, and certainly much m ore slow ly than in the preceding period), the 
European Union had to increase em ploym ent in this sector by m ore than 
50 percent.
The literature on the subject has developed various hypotheses to ex ­
plain the fall in manufacturing em ploym ent in industrial countries since 
the late 1960s. The four better-known hypotheses are the following:
1. The fall is no more than a “statistical illusion” (caused mainly by 
the reallocation of labor from  manufacturing to services follow ing a 
rapid increase in the number o f  activities being contracted out by m an­
ufacturing firms to specialist service producers, including transport, 
cleaning, design, security, catering, recruitment, and data processing).
2. The decrease is the result o f a significant reduction in the income 
elasticity o f demand for manufactures.
3. The decline is the consequence o f  the rapid productivity growth in 
(at least som e sectors of) manufacturing, brought about by the propa­
gation of the new  technological paradigm o f microelectronics. (This 
w ould have been a case o f the new  technology tending to produce “job­
less grow th.” )
4. The fall is the result o f  a new  international division o f labor (in­
cluding “outsourcing”), which is detrimental to manufacturing em ploy­
ment in industrial countries, especially as concerns its non-skilled labor.6
The main aim of this chapter is to study the trajectory of manufactur­
ing employment in the post-WWII period— in particular, the “inverted-U” 
phenomenon of the process of economic development, in which, as income 
per capita increases, the percentage of employment in manufacturing first 
rises, then stabilizes, and finally falls. A sample of 105 countries will be 
used over the period 1 9 7 0 -9 8  (the same 105 countries throughout); for 
1960, however, there was information for only 81 o f those countries; see 
annex B). The sources o f the data analyzed here are the International 
Labour Organization databank for manufacturing employment and the 
Penn Tables for incom e per capita.7 Table 3.1 summarizes the em ploy­
ment data by region.
This chapter w ill illustrate that these data provide significant 
confirm ation o f this inverted-U relationship between m anufacturing
T a b le  3 .1  E m p loym ent in  M an u factu rin g  (% o f  total)
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Region
1998
1960 1970 1980 1990
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 4.8 6.2 5.5 5.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 15.4 16.3 16.5 16.8 14.2
Southern Cone and Brazil 17.4 17.2 16.2 16.6 11.8
West Asia and North Africa 7.9 10.7 12.9 15.1 15.3
Southeast Asia 8.7 9.2 10.7 13.0 13.9
East Asia (except China and Japan) 10.0 10.4 15.8 16.6 14.9
NIE-ls 10.5 12.9 18.5 21.0 16.1
China 10.9 11.5 10.3 13.5 12.3
Developing Countries 10.2 10.8 11.5 13.6 12.5
Industrial Countries 26.5 26.8 24.1 20.1 17.3
Source: Calculations made using statistics from the International Labour 
Organization databank.
Note: Regional averages are weighted by economically active population. 
Economies included under the heading “Developing Countries”: Sub-Saharan Africa— 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democ­
ratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sene­
gal, South Africa, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Latin America and the Caribbean— 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Uruguay (within this category, the subcategory “Southern Cone” includes 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay). 'West Asia and North Africa—Algeria, Arab Republic 
of Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey. Southeast Asia— 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. East Asia—Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan (China) 
(within this category, the subcategory “NIE-ls” includes Hong Kong [China], Repub­
lic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan [China]). Economies included under the heading 
“Industrial Countries”: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Por­
tugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
em ploym ent and incom e per capita. H ow ever, it w ill also show  that 
this relationship has characteristics that are far more com plex than has 
so far been recognized.
T he F our Sources o f D e-Industria lization
Rowthorn (1994) defined de-industrialization as the decline in manufac­
turing em ployment that takes place when countries reach a certain level 
of income per capita. This section will establish that, in addition to this 
process— (henceforward called the first source o f de-industrialization)—  
there are three further processes at work.
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An Inverted-U Relationship Between Manufacturing 
Em ploym ent and Income Per Capita
The point o f departure for this approach to de-industrialization is the 
inverted-U developed by Rowthorn (1994), w ho, having discussed and 
critiqued the above-m entioned hypotheses in detail (particularly the sec­
ond and third ones), defined de-industrialization as the decline in m an­
ufacturing em ploym ent that takes place when countries reach a certain 
level o f incom e per capita. In his cross-section regression for 1990 (built 
from a sample o f 70 countries), this level is approximately U S$12,000 in 
1991 international dollars (see figure 3.2).
Although the analysis o f  our sample confirms R ow thorn’s hypothesis, 
there are also grounds for arguing that the process of de-industrialization 
is a rather more com plex phenomenon. De-industrialization, in fact, is not 
simply the result o f a single process (the existence of a stable inverted-U  
relationship between manufacturing employment and income per capita), 
but a consequence o f the interaction o f four distinct phenom ena.
F igure 3 .2  R o w th o rn ’s R egression: M an u factu rin g
E m p loym en t and In com e Per C apita , 1 9 9 0
Manufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1991 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for manufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
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A Declining Relationship Between Income Per Capita 
and Manufacturing Em ploym ent
The first phenom enon to note is that R ow thorn’s inverted-U relation­
ship is not stable over time, but instead follow s a continuous downward  
slope for middle- and high-incom e countries (see figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3 Second Source of De-Industrialization: 
A Declining Relationship, 1960-98
Manufacturing employment ( % of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for manufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: 1960— Cross-section regression for 1960, using a sample of 81 
countries. 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998— Cross-section regressions for the 
corresponding dates, using a sample of the same 105 countries. For the 
specification of the regressions, see annex A. The regression for 1998 
corresponds to employment for that year, but income per capita is for 1992, 
the last year for which the Penn Tables offer information so far. Unfortunately, 
there were too few countries with reliable employment information for 1950 
to construct a comparable regression. In the five regressions, all parameters 
are significant at the 1 percent level and the adjusted R2 are between 57 percent 
and 72 percent (for point estimators and test statistics, see annex A). All 
regressions also pass the tests for homoscedasticity and for normality of 
residuals at the 5 percent level of significance.
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This continuous decline over time in the relationship between m an­
ufacturing em ploym ent and incom e per capita is the second source of 
de-industrialization identified in this chapter. In essence, for middle- and 
high-incom e countries, w hether or n o t they had reached the turning  
p o in t o f  the regression, there was a declining level o f  manufacturing em ­
ploym ent associated with each level o f incom e per capita. Although the 
reasons for this steady decline (in particular, the big drop observed dur­
ing the 1980s for industrial countries) still need to be fully understood, 
evidence so far indicates that it is the result o f  a com bination o f factors, 
including, at least in part, three o f the hypotheses m entioned above: the 
statistical illusion hypothesis; (in an indirect way) the propagation o f the 
new  technological paradigm (microelectronics)8; and the increasingly 
significant process o f breaking down the value chain being carried out 
by multiproduct transnational corporations, which is leading to the re­
location to developing countries o f the labor-intensive assembly-end  
part o f the value chain. H ow ever, at least o f equal (if not more) im por­
tance are the consequences o f the new politics and econom ics o f the 
1980s— especially the sharp slow down of econom ic growth that followed  
the implementation o f those policies— and the massive institutional and 
financial transformations that characterized the world econom y in this 
period.
Although a detailed analysis o f  the role that each o f  these factors has 
played in de-industrialization is outside the scope o f this chapter, it is 
im portant at least to em phasize that the existing literature does not pay 
sufficient attention to the latter phenom enon: the role that the 1980s  
switch in the “policy regime” o f m ost industrial countries (from post- 
WWII Keynesianism, broadly speaking, to the 1980s radical brand of 
m onetarist-oriented deflationary policies) had on manufacturing em ­
ployment. As is clear from figure 3 .3 , the com bined effect that the latter 
had on manufacturing em ploym ent was devastating— in particular, the 
stagflation that follow ed the (barking-up-the-wrong-tree) sharp defla­
tionary response to the second oil shock.
M onetarist-oriented deflationary policies became dom inant after the 
failure o f the Carter Adm inistration’s attempt to stimulate aggregate de­
mand in the United States in 1977 -78 ; as a result o f these expansionary  
policies, the U.S. trade deficit reached the equivalent o f one quarter of 
exports just at a time when the rest o f  the industrial countries were no  
longer w illing to absorb “excess” dollars. The resulting weakness o f the 
dollar, in tandem  with rising inflation, set the stage for the Federal Re­
serve’s radical m onetarist era follow ing the appointm ent o f Paul Volker 
and his trebling o f  interest rates between 1979 and 1981. In turn, the 
election o f M argaret Thatcher in 1979 consolidated this new radical 
monetarist era both in its neoliberal politics and in its deflationary eco­
nomics; at around the same time, the “Chicago Boys” policies in Pinochet’s
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Chile signaled the (not very democratic) emergence of these policies in 
developing countries.
In the EU, for example, there was an immediate collapse of growth  
rates: In the United Kingdom, during Prime Minister Thatcher’s first two  
years in office (1979-81), the growth rate o f output fell from 3 .7  percent 
to -2 .2  percent (in fact, output declined by no less than 17 percent in just 
six quarters); in Germany, it dropped from 4 .2  percent (1979) to -0 .6  per­
cent (1982); in France, from 3.2 percent (1979) to 0.8 percent (1983); and 
in Italy, from 6.0 percent (1979) to 0.3 percent (1983). This sharp slow ­
down had a major impact on unemployment— in the United Kingdom, 
it rose from 5.0 percent (1979) to 12.4 percent (1982); in Germany, from  
3.2 percent (1979) to 8.0 percent (1983); and in France, from 5.9 percent 
(1979) to 10.2  percent (1985).
M anufacturing w as particularly badly hit by these events. In the 
United Kingdom, for exam ple, net manufacturing investment became 
highly negative in 1981 and 1982. The com bination of these factors—  
massive reductions in private consumption (which fell from an annualized 
growth rate of 8.5 percent in the second quarter of 1979 to - 3 .7  percent 
in the same quarter of the follow ing year), high interest rates, low  levels 
of investment, and a sharp revaluation o f the pound— caused manufac­
turing em ploym ent to fall by 20  percent in the first three years o f Prime 
M inister Thatcher’s Adm inistration alone, and there was no significant 
recovery thereafter. H ence, there is little doubt that the remarkable de­
cline in the relationship between incom e per capita and manufacturing 
em ploym ent in industrial countries during the 1980s (clearly evident in 
figure 3.3 above) had as much to  do w ith  “p olicy” as w ith  other fac­
tors, such as the need for industrial restructuring, technological change, 
accounting issues, or the trend toward “financialization.”9
A  D ec lin e  in In co m e P er C a p ita  C o rresp o n d in g  
to  th e  T u rn in g  P o in t o f  th e  R egression
The third source of de-industrialization to be identified concerns the huge 
drop in the turning po in t o f the regressions that relate manufacturing em­
ployment to income per capita since 1980. As figure 3.4 shows, since the 
beginning of the 1980s there has been a dramatic reduction in the level 
of incom e per capita, from which the downturn in manufacturing em ­
ploym ent began: from U S$20,645 in 1980, to just U S$9,805 in 1990  
(and US$8,691 in 1998; all figures in 1985 international U.S. dollars).
This rapid low ering o f  the turning point o f  the regressions since 
1980  is crucial to an understanding o f one o f  the sources o f  the process 
that leads to de-industrialization. U ntil that date, no country— not 
even the United States, the country w ith  the highest incom e per capita 
in the sample— had reached a level o f incom e per capita anywhere near
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Figure 3 .4  Third  Source o f  D e-Industrialization: A  C hanging  
T u rn in g  P oin t in  th e R egression , 1 9 6 0 -9 8
M anufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for m anufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: 60, 70, 80, 90, and 98 =  regressions for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 
and 1998, respectively.
the point where the curves begin to fall. In 1990, by contrast, there were 
more than 30  countries w hose incom e per capita was above that critical 
point in the curve.10
H ow ever, as is w ell know n, the drop in manufacturing em ploym ent 
in industrial countries began in the late 1960s— that is, well before  any 
industrial country was anywhere near the turning point in the curve. 
This w ould suggest that the original impulse for de-industrialization w as  
not the fact that som e countries had already reached the level at which  
the curve begins to slope downward, but rather the remarkable fall in 
time o f the actual inverted-U relationship for middle- and high-income 
countries (shown in figure 3.3). It w ould not be until the 1980s that the 
de-industrialization phenom enon w ould include the additional element 
o f the downward slope o f  the curve as well (leading to an acceleration  
o f this process).
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W orking from a different perspective, this lowering o f the turning 
point o f the regressions had been predicted by Rowthorn and W ells 
(1987 , pp. 32 9 -3 2 ); according to them, because productivity catch-up is 
fastest in manufacturing, in developing countries de-industrialization  
was probably going to start at a lower level o f incom e per capita than in 
early industrializers. Nevertheless, nobody could have predicted that the 
drop in the turning point o f the regression could be o f  such a magnitude.
T he D u tch  D isea se
Finally, in addition to the three sources o f de-industrialization already 
m entioned, in several countries there is a fourth one: the so-called Dutch  
disease effect. Some countries, such as the Netherlands and a group 
of Latin American countries, registered a fall in their manufacturing 
em ploym ent that was clearly greater than w ould  have been expected to  
result from the three sources o f de-industrialization discussed above (see 
figure 3.5).
H owever, the follow ing analysis w ill show  that, rather than being 
simple cases o f overshooting, the Dutch disease is associated w ith a spe­
cific additional degree o f de-industrialization that is characteristic o f 
some countries that have undergone at least one o f  three brands o f trans­
form ations.
The origin of this “disease” lies in the fact that the relationship be­
tween manufacturing em ploym ent and incom e per capita tends to be dif­
ferent in countries that are follow ing an industrialization agenda that 
seeks to generate a trade surplus in manufacturing than it is in those that 
are content just to aim at a trade deficit in manufacturing (such as coun­
tries rich in natural resources and thus able to generate a trade surplus 
in primary com m odities that can finance their trade deficits in m anufac­
turing). H owever, in reality, as will be shown below , w hat I w ill call here 
the “primary com m odity effect” is a more general phenom enon that also  
applies to countries that generate a significant trade surplus in services, 
especially tourism and finance.
It is important to stress from the beginning that the first category of 
countries (the “m anufacturing” category) includes som e that are there 
out o f necessity and others that are there because o f their g row th  policy. 
That is, som e countries are there because they have no option but to aim  
at a trade surplus in manufacturing in order to be able to cover their 
trade deficits in primary com m odities and services; others are there be­
cause, even though they are able to  generate a trade surplus in primary 
com m odities or services, they are still trying to im plement an industrial­
ization agenda that aims to generate a trade surplus in manufacturing.
Following the Akaike regression-specification criterion, in this chapter 
the tw o types of countries (“manufacturing” and “primary com m odity”
8 2 BEYOND REFORMS
Figure 3 .5  Fourth Source o f  D e-Industrialization: C ases o f  
O vershooting?
M anufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for m anufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: LA-4 =  average for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay;
Neth =  Netherlands; 60, 70, 80, 90, and 98 =  regressions for 1960,
1970 ,1980 , 1990, and 1998, respectively.
countries) are differentiated by an intercept dummy in the above regres­
sions. Countries are classified according to  their position at the end o f  
the period— and once classified, they stay in the same group in all re­
gressions (to avoid circular-type arguments). Furthermore, as above, the 
cross-section regressions for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998 are based on  
the same sample o f 105 countries (because o f a lack o f data, however, 
the regression for 1960 is based on a sample of only 81 countries, all o f 
which are later included in the larger sample). The intercept dummy 
shows that the relationship between manufacturing em ploym ent and in­
com e per capita in the tw o groups of countries is located at different lev­
els in all five regressions (1960 , 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998); this 
dummy is significant at the 1 percent level in all regressions.11 Figure 3 .6  
shows this phenom enon for 1998.
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Figure 3 .6  Primary C om m od ity  and E xport Services 
Effects, 19 9 8
M anufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 internationl US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for m anufacturing 
employment; Summers and H eston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: 98 m f =  1998 regression corresponding to countries that aim at 
generating a trade surplus in manufacturing; 98 pc =  1998 regression of 
countries that have a trade surplus in primary commodities (or services, such 
as tourism  or finance). See annex B for the classification of countries in the 
sample. As m entioned above, the difference between the tw o types of 
regressions is an intercept dummy. Countries shown around the 98 mf 
regression are Cn =  China; Eg =  Arab Republic of Egypt; EU-5 = five 
continental countries of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, and Italy); Jp =  Japan; Kor =  Republic of Korea; Pk =  Pakistan;
SL = Sri Lanka; Tun =  Tunisia; and Si = Singapore. Countries shown 
around the 98 pc regression are Aus =  Australia; Bo = Botswana; Br =  Brazil; 
Ca =  Canada; Cl = Chile; Cy =  Cyprus; Gr =  Greece; HK =  Hong Kong 
(China); Ja =  Jamaica; M a =  M alta; Ne =  Netherlands; N i =  Nigeria;
No =  Norway; Pa = Panama; PG = Papua New Guinea; UK = United 
Kingdom; Ve =  Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela; and Zi =  Zimbabwe.
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Obviously, the main reasons for the different degrees o f  industrial­
ization o f  these tw o groups o f  countries are their differences in resource 
endowm ent and in growth policy; these factors end up being reflected in 
their patterns of international trade and in their internal econom ic— and 
em ployment— structures. H ow ever, as w ill be shown below , although  
this primary com m odity (or export services) effect is a necessary condi­
tion for developing Dutch disease, it is by no means a sufficient one.
Figure 3 .7  shows a remarkable similarity in the decline of the rela­
tionship between manufacturing em ploym ent and incom e per capita in 
bo th  categories o f countries between 1960 and 1998. One aspect o f 
these relationships must be emphasized: Although the primary com m od­
ity group o f countries does tend to reach a lower level of industrialization 
at any given point in tim e,12 the primary com m odity (“p c”) effect does 
not lead per se to a greater relative level o f de-industrialization over 
time. In fact, figure 3 .7  illustrates that both categories o f  countries ex ­
perience a similar drop in relative terms. Taking the highest point o f  the
F igure 3 .7  C hanges in  M anufacturing E m ploym ent and
Incom e in Prim ary C om m od ities, 1 9 6 0  and 19 9 8
M anufacturing employment (% of total)
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Source: International Labour Organization databank for manufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita. 
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curves for each group of countries, it is noticeable that, in these four 
decades, both categories o f countries lost about the same share o f m an­
ufacturing em ployment— from 39 percent to 21 percent in manufactur­
ing countries and from 29 percent to  16 percent in the others (that is, in 
the former, the 1998 inflection point o f the regression is located at a 
share o f manufacturing em ploym ent that is 45  percent below  that of 
1960, whereas, in the latter, the respective point is 46  percent below). In 
turn, from the point o f view  o f the horizontal axis (income per capita), 
the turning points o f both curves also fell to half their former levels: from  
about U S$18,000 in 1960 to U S$9,000 in 1998 (both figures in 1985  
international dollars).13
After this (of necessity, lengthy) introduction on the differences between 
these two types of countries, it is now  possible to explain my concept of 
Dutch disease properly. From the point of view of the m ethodology devel­
oped here, w hat is m ost interesting about this “disease” is that, in the 
light o f our analysis, it acquires a quite different connotation from the 
one that it has hitherto been associated w ith. This allow s us to  develop  
a new, more specific w ay o f looking at it. There is a group o f countries, 
both industrialized and developing (although the latter include only 
countries that have reached at least a m iddle-incom e level), that exhibits 
a specific additional de-industrialization phenom enon (additional to  
the three de-industrialization forces already discussed, that is). This phe­
nom enon is associated either w ith a sudden surge in exports of primary 
com m odities or services (particularly in countries that had not previ­
ously developed these sectors) or, as in the Southern Cone o f Latin 
America, w ith a sudden shift in econom ic policy. The Netherlands rightly 
gives its name to this phenom enon (see figure 3 .8 ).14
From this perspective, the Dutch disease is a process in which the dis­
covery of a natural resource (natural gas, in the case o f the Netherlands) 
causes a country to switch from  one group o f reference to the other, that 
is, from the group o f countries that aim at generating a trade surplus in 
manufacturing (type-mf regressions) to the group that is able to gener­
ate a trade surplus in primary com m odities (type-pc regressions). W hen  
this occurs, as figure 3.8a shows for the case o f the Netherlands, the 
country experiencing this disease m oves along tw o  different paths o f  
de-industrialization: The first, w hich is com m on to  the countries in its 
original group (from 60 m f to  98 m f), consists o f  the three processes 
discussed above; and the second, which is in addition  to  this “com m on” 
path, corresponds to a second surge o f de-industrialization resulting 
from the change in the reference group (from 98 m f to  98 pc). In this 
context, the Dutch disease should only  be regarded as the “excess” degree 
of de-industrialization associated w ith the latter movement; that is, only  
with the difference between em ploym ent in manufacturing falling to  
98 m f and falling to 98 pc. In the case o f the Netherlands, then, it is the
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F igure 3 .8  a. T he N etherlands: U nraveling the D u tch  D isease, 
1 9 6 0 -9 8
b. T he U nited  K ingdom : C atching the D utch  
D isease, 1 9 6 0 -9 8
c. T h e N etherland s and Five C ountries o f  the EU, 
1 9 6 0 -9 8
d. T he N etherland s and Four T raditional Primary 
C om m od ity  E xporters, 1 9 6 0 -9 8
a. b.
Manufacturing employment f % of total) Manufacturing employment {% of total)
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Log of income per capita 
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(1985 international US$)
Log of income per capita 
(1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for m anufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: EU-5 = Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy;
N e =  Netherlands; UCAN = United States, Canada, Australia, and 
N ew Zealand; and UK = United Kingdom; 60, 70, 80, 90, and 
98 =  regressions for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998, respectively.
FOUR SOURCES OF “ DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION” 8 7
difference between having fallen from 30.5  percent in 1960 to 19.8 per­
cent in 1998 (in this hypothetical non-Dutch disease scenario, this is the 
predicted level of manufacturing em ployment in the m f regression, given 
the actual 1998 level o f incom e per capita) and from 30.5  percent to 14.8  
percent, between those same years (actual Dutch disease situation).15
W hen thus perceived, it becom es clear that the Dutch disease is not a 
phenom enon limited to the Netherlands, because it has also occurred in 
other industrial countries, such as the United Kingdom, where there 
were both a significant discovery o f natural resources (North Sea oil) 
and an increase in the trade surplus for financial-services exports (see 
figure 3.8b). In the United Kingdom, the improvement in the trade bal­
ance in oil between 1979 and 1984 (from a deficit o f £2 .2  billion to a 
surplus o f £ 6 .6  b illion)16 in fact mirrored the decline in the trade sur­
plus in m anufactures (from a surplus o f £3 .6  billion to  a deficit o f  £6 .3  
billion between those sam e years). It is hardly surprising that the 
United K ingdom ’s econom ic and em ploym ent structure switched from  
one category o f countries (and from one industrialization agenda) to  
the other.
A com parison between the degree o f de-industrialization o f the 
Netherlands and other continental European Union countries can also 
help to explain the special nature of Dutch disease. Figure 3.8c shows 
how , while the share o f manufacturing em ploym ent in the five European 
Union countries fell according to the trade-surplus-in-manufacturing 
regression (from 60 m f to 98 m f), the Netherlands suffered an a dded  fall 
(from 98 m f to 98 pc, w hich is equivalent to an extra five percentage 
points, in this case).
As is clear from the graph, the major portion o f the fall in m anufac­
turing em ploym ent in the Netherlands took  place in the first half o f this 
period (following the discovery o f natural gas), whereas in the other five 
European Union countries, manufacturing em ploym ent began to fall 
only after 1980. As mentioned above, the latter drop was greatly influ­
enced by a shift in the political and econom ic policy regime o f these 
countries. The rapid decline in domestic demand (which resulted from  
high interest rates, the shift in incom e distribution toward capital, the 
breaking up o f the trade unions’ power, and so forth) meant that pro­
ductivity growth had much stronger negative effects on manufacturing 
em ployment than it w ould have had otherwise. In the case o f Germany, 
for exam ple, although its m achine-tool industry did not suffer signifi­
cantly (mainly because the relevant markets were characterized by a 
com bination o f high incom e and low  price elasticity o f demand), other 
segments o f its manufacturing sector (such as steel) were badly hit by the 
effects o f having to cope w ith rapid technological change in the context 
of demand-constrained domestic markets.17
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At the same time, figures 3 .8b  and 3 .8c indicate the remarkable dif­
ference between the United Kingdom and the “EU -5” (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Italy) during the 1980s: In the former, the fall in 
the share o f m anufacturing em ploym ent during this decade am ounted  
to 9 .2  percentage points; in the latter, it totaled 3.3 points. In the United  
Kingdom, the m ore unrelenting deflationary policies not only affected 
manufacturing m ore intensely (than in the EU-5), but also the discovery 
o f oil and the strengthening of the financial-services export sector meant 
that m anufacturing in the United Kingdom  had the added problem  that 
export markets were being lost (mainly, but certainly not exclusively) 
as a result of the revaluation of the pound sterling. As mentioned above, 
between 1979 (the year that Prime M inister Thatcher was first elected 
and w hen oil exports began) and 1984, the United Kingdom’s trade bal­
ance in manufactures switched from  a surplus o f £ 3 .6  billion to a deficit 
o f £6 .3  billion. In the EU-5 (and, in particular, in Germany), on the 
other hand, success in export markets was crucial in m itigating their 
de-industrialization.
A further com parison between the N etherlands and four other indus­
trial countries (in this case, countries that have been major primary 
com m odity exporters throughout the period: United States, Canada, 
Australia, and N ew  Zealand [UCAN]) w ill also help to illustrate the spe­
cific nature of the Dutch disease (as understood in this chapter). Figure 
3.8d  shows that, although these four U C A N  countries also ended up in 
the “primary com m odity” relationship in 1998 (98 pc), they did n ot suf­
fer from the Dutch disease (as the Netherlands did) because they had 
also started out in that type o f relationship back in 1960 (60 pc). C on­
sequently, although both the EU-5 and the U C A N  countries did expe­
rience a large (and similar, in relative terms) drop in the share o f  total 
em ploym ent accounted for by manufacturing em ployment during this 
period (9.2 and 10.5 percentage points, respectively), they each began  
and ended this four-decade period in the same reference group that they 
had started in; the Netherlands, on the other hand, switched from one 
to the other as a result of the Dutch disease (with an overall manufac­
turing em ploym ent loss o f no less than 15.1 percentage points).
M oreover, as already indicated, the phenom enon o f the Dutch disease 
was not limited to those industrial countries that discovered natural re­
sources, but also occurred in countries that developed important service 
export sectors, such as tourism (for example, Cyprus, Greece, and Malta) 
and financial services (for exam ple, H ong Kong [China], Luxembourg, 
and Switzerland) (see figure 3.9).
The countries shown in figures 3.9a and 3.9b  also began this period  
in the manufacturing regression (or to the left o f it, in the cases o f H ong  
Kong [China] and M alta), but they all ended it in (or very close to) the 
98 pc regression (rather than in their corresponding 98 m f regression).
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Figure 3 .9  a. G reece, C yprus, and M alta: A  T ourism  D utch  
D isease?
b. L u xem b ou rg, H o n g  K on g  (C hina), and  
Sw itzerland: A  F inancial D u tch  D isease?
a.
Manufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$) 
b.
Manufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for m anufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: C =  Cyprus (for the sake of clarity, the trajectory of Cyprus is only 
shown from 1980; at that point in time, this country had a level of manufacturing 
employment corresponding to 80 mf regression); G = Greece; HK = Hong 
Kong (China); L = Luxembourg; M  =  M alta; and S =  Switzerland; 60, 70, 80, 
90, and 98 = regressions for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998, respectively.
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Finally, this disease also spread to som e Latin American countries. 
But the key issue in this case is that it w as not brought about by the 
discovery o f natural resources or the developm ent o f  a service export 
sector, but instead occurred m ainly because o f a drastic sw itch in their 
econom ic policy regime. Basically, it was the result o f a drastic process 
o f trade and financial liberalization in the context o f a radical process 
o f institutional change, leading to a sharp reversal o f their previous 
(State-led) im port-substituting industrialization (ISI) agenda. Despite 
the w ell-know n abundance o f natural resources in the countries o f the 
region, ISI had brought many o f  them  to a level o f industrialization  
characteristic o f  the m f group (see figure 3 .10). This shift in policy  
regime, although in many w ays similar to that o f m ost industrial coun­
tries during the 1980s, hit their level o f  m anufacturing em ploym ent 
m ore drastically because it brought their process o f industrialization  
down from their policy-induced m f heights to a Ricardian resource-rich 
pc level. Brazil and the three Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, 
and Uruguay) were the Latin American countries that experienced the 
highest levels o f de-industrialization follow ing their econom ic reforms, 
while also being am ong the countries o f  the region that had previously 
industrialized the m ost and that had implemented such reforms m ost 
rapidly and drastically (see figure 3.10).
These four Latin American countries began this period (as did the 
Netherlands) w ith a level of m anufacturing em ployment typical o f coun­
tries aiming at a trade surplus in manufacturing (60 mf), although obvi­
ously for different reasons. For the Netherlands, it was a matter o f the 
m ost likely Ricardian position, given its resource endowm ents and level 
o f incom e per capita. For the four Latin American countries, in contrast, 
it was the deliberate result o f a structuralist ISI agenda. They had shifted 
to this developm ent m odel in the hope of improving their chances of 
catching up with industrial countries by prom oting specialization in 
products w ith higher productivity growth potentials that were more 
likely to m ove them up the technology ladder.18 M oreover, both the 
Netherlands and these four Latin American countries reached 1998 with  
a level o f manufacturing employment corresponding to the other cate­
gory of countries (98 pc). Again, the reasons vary. In the case o f the 
Netherlands, it was because o f the effects o f the discovery of natural re­
sources in a “m ature” manufacturing econom y, whereas in the four Latin 
American countries, it was generated by the previously mentioned sharp 
reversal o f ISI policies. The end of industrial and trade policies, together 
with changes in relative prices, in real exchange rates, in the institutional 
framework o f the econom ies, in the structure o f property rights, and in 
market incentives in general led them back to their “natural” Ricardian 
position— that is, one more in accordance w ith their traditional resource 
endowm ent.19
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Figure 3 .1 0  A rgentina, Brazil, and Chile: C atching the D u tch  
D isease?
M anufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for m anufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: A t  =  Argentina; Br =  Brazil; Cl =  Chile; and Ne = the Netherlands. 
For the sake of clarity, Uruguay is not included (its trajectory is similar to that 
of the other three Latin American counties, located between those of Argentina 
and Chile). The numbers 60, 70, 80, 90, and 98 =  regressions for 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990, and 1998, respectively.
From this point o f view , the major difference between Latin America 
and continental Europe is that, in the latter, the crucial transformations 
took place in industrial relations, the welfare State, public corporations, 
and so forth, whereas in Latin America, because these countries were hit 
by the new  policies at a much lower level o f incom e per capita, these new  
policies also obstructed their transition toward a more mature— that is, 
self-sustaining (in a Kaldorian sense)— form o f industrialization.20
In terms of the future prospects for manufacturing employment, the 
situation in the four Latin American countries that have already experi­
enced the Dutch disease seems to be fairly straightforward, as figure 3.10  
shows. W ith the drastic switch in econom ic policies, these four countries
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have not only returned to their expected Ricardian position, but their 
m iddle-incom e level in per capita terms has already carried them  al­
m ost as far as the leveled-out part o f the curve (Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay, in particular). Furthermore, it is also im portant to remember 
that this curve has been continuously falling since the 1960s, and there 
is no reason to suspect that this downward tendency has run its full 
course: The regressions and their turning points could easily keep getting 
lower. Therefore (and with the necessary strong caveats regarding the use 
of this type o f  cross-section regression for purposes o f prediction, in par­
ticular due to the “homogeneity conditions” it required),21 in the absence 
o f any new  and imaginative industrial and trade policies (that w ould res­
cue these countries’ pro-industrialization agenda by adapting it to their 
new  export-led strategy), the framework developed here would suggest 
that, at their absolute best, these countries will be able to maintain their 
present levels o f  manufacturing employment. M ore likely, the decline will 
continue, even if their income per capita increases rapidly— a prospect 
that at the time o f writing seems (at best) rather unlikely, at least in the 
immediate future.22
In sum, in this chapter the Dutch disease is perceived to be not just 
a simple “overshooting” of de-industrialization, but a specific type of 
excess, which is associated w ith the m ovem ent from a process o f  
de-industrialization typical o f countries following an industrialization 
agenda aim ing at generating a trade surplus in m anufacturing to a 
process o f de-industrialization typical of countries able (and content) to  
generate a trade surplus in primary com m odities or services. In general, 
the shift between the tw o types o f de-industrialization processes has 
taken place for one o f three different reasons: (1) the discovery o f  nat­
ural resources (for exam ple, the N etherlands); (2) the developm ent o f  
service export activities, particularly tourism  and finance (for exam ­
ple, Greece in the former, and H on g K ong [China] in the latter); and, 
finally, (3) changes in econom ic policy, w hich  brought countries that 
were above their natural Ricardian position  back to  their traditional 
(static) com parative advantage place (for exam ple, Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile).
Therefore, in analytical terms, (policy-induced) D utch disease in 
Latin America should be understood m ore as a case of “dow nw ard” de­
industrialization than in the other Dutch disease countries discussed above, 
where it was the result o f the emergence of other productive activities. In 
turn, all Dutch disease cases should be distinguished from more “normal” 
processes o f de-industrialization, such as those seen in many industrial 
countries after they have reached the level o f income per capita associated 
with the inflection point o f the manufacturing em ploym ent-incom e per 
capita relationship. The latter should be understood more as processes 
o f “upward” de-industrialization— that is, mature economies switching
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employment from manufacturing into other activities (mainly services) in 
their normal process of economic development.
Finally, one should also distinguish all the above types o f de­
industrialization from that found in the late 1980s and 1990s in many 
Sub-Saharan African econom ies, including South Africa, and in som e 
countries of the former Soviet U nion and Eastern Europe, which have 
been associated with a fall in incom e per capita. Because all these coun­
tries had levels o f incom e per capita below  the turning point o f the curve, 
a decline in incom e per capita was associated with a reduction in m anu­
facturing em ployment along the sam e relationship am ong these two  
variables: a case o f “reverse” de-industrialization.
Thus, in all, we have at least four different types o f de-industrialization: 
upward de-industrialization (continental Europe, Japan, and traditional 
primary com m odity exporting industrial countries); normal Dutch dis­
ease (the Netherlands and countries w ith new ly developed service ex ­
port activities); downward Dutch disease (Latin America); and reverse 
de-industrialization (Sub-Saharan Africa and countries o f the former 
Soviet Union).
Trying to Swim Against the De-Industrialization Tide
Finland, Sweden, and som e Southeast Asian countries rich in natural re­
sources are cases that, despite having abundant natural resources, did 
not follow  the de-industrialization tide.
F inland a n d  th e D iv e r s ity  o f  th e N o r d ic  C ou n tries
Figure 3 .11a shows the diversity of the process o f de-industrialization in 
three N ordic countries. The m ost interesting case is that of Finland, 
which follow s an industrialization path that runs opposite to the path 
associated with the Dutch disease. This country is rich in natural re­
sources, and in 1960 held a position that corresponded to that com par­
ative advantage, given its incom e per capita (that is, manufacturing em ­
ployment accounted for 21 .6  percent o f total em ploym ent, or 7.3 
percentage points below  w hat w ould have been its expected position had 
it then already been in the “manufacturing-trade-surplus” category of 
countries). H ow ever, through a greater processing o f the primary com ­
m odities that it exports and the developm ent of sectors such as the 
m obile phone industry (Nokia being the paradigmatic case), it managed 
to m ove in the opposite direction to the path associated w ith the Dutch  
disease— starting in 1960 in the 60 pc regression but finishing in 1998  
on the 98 m f regression (with a 20 percent share o f manufacturing
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F igure 3 .1 1  a. N o rd ic  Countries: Three D ifferent Industrial­
ization  Paths, 1 9 6 0 -9 8
b. F inland and Chile: A n  A nti-D utch  D isease and  
a D utch  D isease Industrialization?
c. Finland: C hanging V ertical Integration in  
Tim ber-B ased E xports, 1 9 6 3 -2 0 0 0
a.
Manufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$) 
b. c.
Manufacturing employment (% of total) Market shares of OECD imports
Log of income per capita (1985 international USS)
Source: Tradecan 2002 (database software for competitiveness analysis of 
nations; created by ECLAC and the W orld Bank). Regarding 3.11c, see also 
Palma (1996).
Note: Cl =  Chile; Fi =  Finland; No =  Norway; Sw = Sweden; 
w-chip =  wood-chips; w-mach =  machinery for the production of wood- 
chips, pulp, and paper; w-mf =  wood manufactures; 60 , 70, 80, 90, and
98 =  regressions for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998, respectively.
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em ploym ent, well above the 15.4 percent conditional expectation had it 
continued in the pc group o f countries).
N orw ay is another interesting case. In 1960 it was situated between  
the 60 m f and 60 pc regressions. In fact, its position in 1960 corre­
sponded exactly to its conditional expectation in the original “average” 
1960 regression— that is, the one that did not differentiate between  
“primary com m odity” and “m anufacturing” countries (see figure 3.3). 
The main reason for this was that, at the time, N orw ay had a m ixed com ­
position o f exports, com bining manufactures with primary commodities 
and services (the latter com ing from its strong maritime fleet). H owever, 
the discovery of oil and further developm ent o f primary com m odity  
exports (such as those produced by its flourishing fishery industry) 
brought N orw ay fully into the primary com m odity exporting family of 
countries (98 pc). In this context, although N orw ay has not suffered from  
full-fledged Dutch disease, it does present w hat could be called a “m ild” 
case. From the beginning of this period, however, Sweden, despite its 
abundance of primary com m odities, follow ed a systematic industrializa­
tion path corresponding to the “manufacturing-track” group of countries 
(such as the EU-5), m oving from 60 m f to 98 mf.
Returning to the case of Finland, when this country is compared with  
Chile, for exam ple, the contrasting paths of the “anti-Dutch disease” 
and Dutch disease industrialization processes become even more clear 
(see figure 3.11b). Whereas Finland was able to redirect the course o f its 
industrialization toward a path characteristic o f a country aiming at a 
trade surplus in manufacturing (going from 60 pc to  98 mf), Chile did 
the opposite by m oving from 60  m f to 98 pc. After Chile had spent many 
years follow ing strong ISI-type industrial and commercial policies, in the 
1970s it abandoned its pro-industrialization agenda and embarked on a 
drastic process o f trade and financial liberalization and econom ic re­
form. This led it back to its more natural Ricardian position. Despite 
Chile’s rapid econom ic growth for about half o f the period that had 
elapsed since the beginning o f its econom ic reforms, the comparative 
advantage associated w ith this position not only resulted in the reduc­
tion o f the relative size o f this country’s manufacturing sector in general, 
but even ended up drastically reducing the overall share o f manufactur­
ing value added in its main primary com m odity export (copper). This 
took the form of a steep drop in the share of refined copper and an 
increase in the share o f exports accounted for by the more primitive 
copper “concentrates.” In fact, the share o f total exports o f copper rep­
resented by copper concentrates increased from 3 percent at the time of 
trade and financial liberalization in the early 1970s, to 17 percent in 
1990 and to 40  percent in 2 0 0 2 .23 Figure 3 .11c shows how  Finland 
instead m oved in the opposite direction— one characterized by an in­
creasingly higher degree of processing o f the primary com m odities it
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exported— thus enabling the country to manage this anti-Dutch disease 
form o f industrialization.
Finland, Sweden, and, as w e will see below , som e Southeast Asian 
countries rich in natural resources therefore prove that from the per­
spective o f m anufacturing em ploym ent, there is no such thing as the 
so-called curse of natural resources.24 It seems blatantly clear that coun­
tries that export primary com m odities (and services) have sufficient 
degrees o f freedom to a llow  them to end up having a m anufacturing 
sector that, in terms of relative size, is m ore typical o f countries that aim  
at a trade surplus in manufacturing.25 H ow ever, as the Latin American 
experience in particular shows, it w ould seem that as globalization pro­
gresses, there are fewer and fewer countries wishing to take advantage 
o f such degrees o f  freedom.26
E a st A sian  a n d  S o u th ea st A sia n  In d u str ia liza tio n
Starting with the second-tier newly industrialized econom ies (NIE-2s) o f  
Southeast Asia, the m ost important feature com m on to all o f them is that 
they are follow ing a “m ixed” path toward industrialization; this m ixed  
path keeps them near or above the original “average” regressions (see 
figure 3.3 above); that is, those that did not differentiate between primary 
and nonprimary com m odity countries. Figure 3 .12  shows that M alaysia 
is another country that clearly swam  against the de-industrializing tide by 
sharply raising the proportion o f  em ploym ent located in its m anufac­
turing sector. Despite being a country rich in natural resources, it m oved  
from  a position corresponding to the average regression to one in the 
m anufacturing regression. In fact, by 1998 , its level o f manufacturing  
em ploym ent was even higher than that o f  the conditional expectation  
in 98 m f for a country w ith its level o f  incom e per capita. As for the 
other NIE-2s, they clearly fo llow  the intermediate or average course 
(between 98 m f and 98 pc) characterized by the original regressions 
(figure 3.3). In other words, despite being rich in natural resources, these 
three countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) had a level o f  
manufacturing em ploym ent as o f  1998 that was higher than w ould be 
indicated by a traditional Ricardian integration into the international 
division of labor. H ow ever, unlike M alaysia (and Finland and prereform  
Latin America), the industrialization agenda o f these countries does not 
seem to aim at a level o f manufacturing em ploym ent similar to that o f  
the “m anufacturing” ones, but only at an intermediate level (somewhere 
in between the tw o types o f countries).
In contrast, N IE -ls did industrialize (and very successfully) in a way 
that corresponds to their condition of being “poor” in primary com m odi­
ties; the exception, o f course, as shown in figure 3.9b above, is H ong Kong 
(China), which, having developed a powerful financial service econom y
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Figure 3 .1 2  a. N IE -2s: M anufacturing E m ploym ent and  
Incom e Prim ary C om m od ity , 1 9 6 0 -9 8  
b. N IE -ls:  M anufacturing E m ploym ent and  
Incom e Prim ary C om m od ity , 1 9 6 0 -9 8
a.
Manufacturing employment (% of total)
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6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.4 8.9 9.4
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
b.
Manufacturing employment (% of total)
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6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.4 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.3
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for manufacturing 
employment; Summers and H eston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: 60, 70, 80, 90, and 98 =  regressions for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 
and 1998, respectively; 98 av = cross-section regression for 1998 for the whole 
sample; HK = Hong Kong (China); I =  Indonesia; K =  Republic of Korea;
M  = Malaysia; N IE -ls =  first-tier NIEs; NIE-2s =  second-tier NIEs;
P =  Philippines; S =  Singapore; Ta =  Taiwan (China); and T  =  Thailand.
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in the 1980s, suffered probably the worst case of Dutch disease of them  
all; its manufacturing em ployment collapsed, from 42.1 percent o f total 
em ployment in 1980  to just 12.2 percent in 1998, which led it to end up 
the period at a point even lower than the 98 pc regression.
An important issue that emerges from figure 3.12b  is that the char­
acteristic com ponent o f  the industrialization o f the Republic o f Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan (China) is not their level of industrialization as 
measured by their manufacturing em ployment at the end o f the period 
(although in 1998 the latter did, in fact, have approximately 5 percent­
age points o f manufacturing employment above the value suggested by 
regression 98 m f for a country with its level o f incom e per capita). W hat 
is unique about their process o f  industrialization is the extremely steep 
rise in incom e per capita associated with that industrialization process. 
In other w ords, the real “m iracle” in these countries is not found in 
their levels o f industrialization but in the incom e multipliers and export 
linkages they were able to develop in parallel with this process. This 
contrasts sharply w ith developm ents in the maquila-based process seen 
in Central America and M exico.
M e x ic o  a n d  C en tra l A m e r ic a ’s M a qu ila  (or L a b o r-In ten sive  
A sse m b ly  A c tiv itie s ) In d u str ia liza tio n  P rocess
One noticeable characteristic o f Latin American industrialization in the 
post-WWII period was the hom ogeneity of the countries’ industrializa­
tion agendas during the period o f ISI (or State-led industrialization). 
N o w , however, one of its m ost conspicuous characteristics (after these 
countries’ econom ic reforms) is the diversity of the countries’ respective 
agendas. As discussed above, their initial degree o f similarity was asso­
ciated with the fact that m ost o f them were clearly m ore industrialized 
than countries rich in primary com m odities w ould be expected to be. 
H ow ever, w hat were relatively similar econom ic reforms and processes 
o f trade and financial liberalization in fact led to a marked diversity in 
the industrialization agenda of the region. In general, three distinct pat­
terns of industrialization were developed: (1) the Dutch disease path fo l­
low ed by Brazil and the Southern Cone countries, w ith higher incomes 
per capita and more advanced industrialization processes (Argentina, 
Chile, and Uruguay), as illustrated in figure 3.10 above; (2) the route 
taken by Central America and M exico (see figure 3.13); and (3) the pat­
tern exhibited by the Andean countries, which displayed little variation  
with respect to their earlier patterns, thus giving the impression that, as 
o f 1998, they had still not decided which path to take (see figure 3.14).
As can be seen in figure 3 .13 , Central America and M exico present 
a very different picture than Brazil and the Southern Cone countries do 
in terms of m anufacturing em ploym ent, and a remarkably different
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Figure 3 .1 3  Central A m erica and M exico: T he M aquila  
Effect, 1 9 7 0 -9 8
M anufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for manufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: CR =  Costa Rica; D = Dominican Republic; H  =  Honduras;
Me = Mexico; and S =  El Salvador; 60, 70, 80, 90, and 98 = regressions for 
1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998, respectively.
one from that o f  East Asian countries in terms o f the incom e m ultipli­
ers and export linkages associated w ith their export-led industrialization 
processes.
N o  other country in our sample shows such steep growth in m anu­
facturing em ployment as do the Dom inican Republic, El Salvador, and 
Honduras; in turn, no other country shows such poor manufacturing 
export incom e multipliers. In these countries, maquila industrialization  
for exports increased manufacturing em ploym ent very dramatically, 
but this is in no w ay associated w ith the same incom e growth as in East 
and Southeast Asia. In fact, particularly in El Salvador and Honduras, 
incom e per capita hardly grew at all during these three decades!27
At the same time, figure 3.13 shows the contrasting patterns of growth  
in M exico between the (ISI) 1970s, on the one hand, and the export-led
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growth process— with a substantial maquila com ponent— that has char­
acterized the m ost recent period. In the 1970s (as in the 1950s and 
1960s), for all its faults, ISI did deliver one o f the fastest rates o f growth  
in incom e in the developing countries— although it is also true that in the 
1970s, during the tail-end o f ISI, growth was boosted first by substan­
tial foreign borrowing and then by the discovery of large reserves o f oil. 
Furthermore, as the graph also shows, the oil riches did seem to have 
som e negative effect on manufacturing em ployment. On the other hand, 
in the period after ISI, trade and financial liberalization (and the North  
American Free Trade Agreement) not only led M exico into a period o f  
remarkably rapid growth in manufactured exports, but also brought 
manufacturing em ploym ent back to the average regression (following a 
pattern of manufacturing em ployment similar to that o f Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand). H ow ever, because M exico made little effort 
to deepen its export-led industrialization process, the incom e multipliers 
and the export linkages that this export m odel was able to develop were 
particularly disappointing.28
As a result, the export-incom e elasticity o f M exico during its m anu­
facturing-export-led period (since the early 1980s) is worlds apart from  
that o f the above-m entioned countries o f Southeast Asia, let alone those 
o f East A sia.29 Furthermore, the future prospects for Central America 
and M exico are m ore com plex than is usually acknowledged because the 
outlook for the w hole Latin American maquila industry is generally un­
certain. N o t only have these countries com pletely failed to “anchor” 
these activities in the region via an increase in the domestic content of 
their products, but they are also finding it particularly difficult to cope 
w ith the growing com petition from other developing countries. In fact, 
it is hard to tell whether the current, already rapid process o f  relocation  
o f M exican maquila to China (where they precisely cease to be maquila 
activities, because China produces a large proportion of inputs as well) 
will soon becom e a stam pede.30
The A n d ea n  C o m m u n ity  C ou n tries
As for the Andean countries, as o f 1998, Bolivia, Colom bia, Ecuador, 
and Peru had not taken either a maquila route or a Dutch disease path (see 
figure 3.14). Perhaps a crucial factor in this respect has been the capacity 
o f these countries to continue using regional integration (the Andean  
Community) as a mechanism for partly offsetting other de-industrializing 
forces. But it is hard to say at the m om ent whether the relatively high 
degree of manufacturing em ployment in these countries is essentially a 
reflection of a process o f econom ic reform that still has some way to go, 
or whether these countries are succeeding in finding an industrialization 
path that is different from that o f Brazil and the Southern Cone countries.
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Figure 3 .1 4  The Andean Pact in South America, 1998
M anufacturing employment (% of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for manufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: B =  Bolivia; C = Colombia; E = Ecuador; P =  Peru; and V = República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela.
The case o f the República Bolivariana de Venezuela, on the other 
hand, is perhaps an exam ple o f a country that exports primary com ­
m odities too easily. Given Venezuela’s peculiar political and econom ic 
institutional setting, its oil wealth has never been a natural incentive for 
its industrialization, nor has it been in any w ay an incentive for growth  
since the oil price increase o f 1973 .31
C hina, In d ia , a n d  T u rk ey
Finally, it is important to m ention the cases o f China, India, and Turkey 
in this of-necessity extremely brief review o f countries that have swum  
against the de-industrialization tide (see figure 3.15). From the point o f 
view o f this study, the m ost prominent characteristics o f these three 
processes o f industrialization are these: (1) in the case o f China (as in 
the N IE -ls and as opposed to the Latin American maquila m odel)32 its
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Figure 3 .1 5  China, India, and Turkey: M anufacturing
Employment and Income Primary Com m odity, 
1 9 5 0 -9 8
M anufacturing employment ( % of total)
Log of income per capita (1985 international US$)
Source: International Labour Organization databank for manufacturing 
employment; Summers and Heston Penn Tables for income per capita.
Note: Cn = China; In =  India; Tu =  Turkey; 60, 70, 80, 90, and 
98 =  regressions for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998, respectively.
industrialization has been associated with a particularly rapid increase in 
incom e per capita; (2) in the case o f  India, its industrialization has been 
characterized by an especially high level o f m anufacturing em ploy­
m ent33; and (3) in the case o f Turkey, its industrialization process has 
succeeded only in raising this country above the primary com m odity  
track, despite the fact that it has provided a large volum e o f m anufac­
tures for exports.
De-Industrialization—Does It Matter?
O ne o f the consequences o f  the process o f de-industrialization has 
been to  reopen one o f the age-old  debates in econom ics: Is a unit value
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added in m anufacturing equal to  one in primary com m odities or serv­
ices? In particular, is this so from  the point o f  v iew  o f the level and 
sustainability o f long-term  growth? This debate has re-em erged be­
cause, even though it is a w ell-k now n  fact that, over the long-term  
course o f econom ic developm ent, the structure o f em ploym ent 
changes substantially, relative changes in scale and speed occurring  
since the 196 0 s in m ost industrial countries and in m any m iddle- and 
high-incom e developing countries constitute a phenom enon w ithout 
precedent.
A lthough a detailed discussion o f this issue is beyond the scope of  
this chapter, from the point o f view  o f this debate one can basically clas­
sify growth theories into three basic camps. H ow ever, in order to  do 
this it is first necessary to introduce a distinction between tw o concepts: 
“activity” and “sector.” Exam ples of the former are research and devel­
opm ent (R& D) and education; exam ples o f the latter are manufacturing 
and agriculture. Taking this distinction into account, the three “growth  
cam ps” are (1) those (mainly traditional neoclassical models) that treat 
econom ic growth as a process that is both “activity indifferent” and 
“sector indifferent”; (2) those (mainly new  growth m odels) that instead 
postulate that growth is “activity specific” but “sector indifferent”; and, 
finally, (3) those (mainly post-Keynesian and Latin American struc­
turalist theories) that argue that econom ic growth is “activity neutral” 
but “sector specific.”
In the first cam p (grow th as activity and sector indifferent), one 
finds the Solow -type grow th m odels (both the traditional ones, in ­
cluding the K rugm an-type critique o f  the Korean m odel, and the later 
“augm ented” m odels) and the branch o f  endogenous grow th theories 
that associates grow th w ith  increasing returns that are activity in d if­
ferent. This w ou ld  include, for exam ple, early “A K ” m odels (in 
w hich production  is defined as a function  o f  techn ology  [A] and cap ­
ital [K], although this w ould  depend on  h ow  one interprets them ), as 
w ell as m ore recent endogenous grow th  m odels in w hich  changes in 
the rate o f grow th  are the result o f the cum ulative effect o f m arket 
im perfections arising in the process o f technical change. H ow ever, 
these im perfections, and the associated increasing returns, are som e­
h ow  seen as stem m ing directly from  w ithin  the production  function  
(rather than being based— as is characteristic o f  the new  grow th the­
ories classified here as belonging in the second cam p— on any speci­
fied m echanism , such as the use o f  R & D  or the production  o f hum an  
cap ita l).34
In the second camp (growth as an activity-specific but sector- 
indifferent phenom enon in new  endogenous growth m odels), one finds, 
in particular, the n ow  classic exam ples o f  Romer (1990) and the neo- 
Schumpeterian version of Aghion and H ow itt (1998). In these m odels,
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as well as in som e o f the later endogenous growth m odels, increasing 
returns, though generated by research-intensive activities, are explicitly 
not associated w ith  the size, depth, or strength o f  the manufacturing  
sector as such, or w ith the process of capital accum ulation w ithin the 
m anufacturing sector; nor do they allow  for specific effects from the 
m anufacturing sector on R & D  activities.
Essentially, growth m odels in this second camp are similar to the gen­
eral new  growth-theory approach o f  the first camp— namely, they m odel 
growth as a function of market imperfections that som ehow  create in­
creasing returns in the process o f technical change. H ow ever, the crucial 
difference between them and the more general m odels o f the first camp 
is simply that they explicitly attribute the increasing returns to R & D , 
whereas more general m odels do not address this issue. This is w hy the 
Romer et al. m odels are classified here as activity specific (for example, 
R & D  specific, human capital specific, and so forth); however, these 
m odels are explicitly non-sector specific, because they do not allow  for 
any w ay in which capital accum ulation in the manufacturing sector 
might have a feedback effect on R & D  (other than via exchange between 
the tw o, but not via a Kaldorian-style argument of capital accumulation  
embedding or em bodying technical change).
Thus, Aghion and H ow itt, for exam ple, accom m odated (physical) 
capital accum ulation by arguing that it is “com plem entary” to innova­
tion (that is, knowledge production) through its effect on the profitabil­
ity o f research. They admitted, however, that “there are many reasons 
for thinking that policies that favor capital accum ulation w ill generally 
also stimulate innovation and raise the long-run growth rate,” adding in 
a footnote that “ [a]nother reason, which does n o t h ow ever fit easily into  
the presen t fram ew ork , is that capital goods em body technologies” 
(1998 , p. 102; emphasis added). Although the effect o f research on prof­
itability is a very particular concept that they develop, the quote clearly 
indicates that “em bodim ent” á la Kaldor, Thirlwall, and other (mainly 
post-Keynesian) models o f the third camp cannot be accom m odated in 
their framework. They are, therefore, different from both the first and 
third camps because, w hile paying attention to R & D  (as som ehow  
being the m ain source o f  growth), they do not link it specifically with  
manufacturing.
In the third camp (activity-neutral but sector-specific growth theo­
ries), the approaches to econom ic growth found in Kalecki, Hirschman, 
Kaldor, Thirlwall, Pasinetti, Prebisch, and (arguably) Schumpeter stand 
out.35 In these sector-specific growth theories— which continue a long  
tradition that goes all the w ay back to Smith and H um e36— there are 
specific capital accum ulation effects on growth stem ming from the 
m anufacturing sector. In these m odels, the pattern o f grow th, increas­
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ing returns, and the w hole dynam ics of econom ic growth are crucially 
dependent on  the econom ic activities being developed (that is, on the 
structure of output). The crucial difference between this camp and the 
previous tw o  (but, in particular, between it and the first) is that in its 
m ore classical theories, issues such as the capacity to generate and dif­
fuse technological change, productivity growth potentials, ability to 
m ove up the technology ladder, externalities, synergies, balance o f pay­
ments sustainability, gains from trade, and, in the case o f developing  
countries, ultimately their capacity for catching up were directly linked 
to the size, strength, and depth o f the manufacturing sector. In the more 
recent theories o f this econom ic growth camp, increasing returns, “indi­
visibilities,” complementary capital, public goods, property rights, entre­
preneurial capacity, transaction costs, and the structure of incentives are 
also (directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly) related to the structure 
o f output.
Therefore, from  the point o f view  o f the possible grow th effect 
of de-industrialization, the first growth camp does not look  at de­
industrialization as a particularly relevant growth issue, other than in 
relation to the question o f whether other sectors o f the econom y w ould  
be able to absorb the labor force that is displaced from manufacturing. 
Furthermore, for these growth theories, even if the discovery of natural 
gas did produce som e structural changes in the Dutch econom y, to label 
these transformations a “disease” must be seen as, at the least, a m is­
leading dramatization!
From the point o f view  o f  the second cam p, de-industrialization in 
m ature  econom ies may or may not have a specific impact on growth; it 
w ould all depend on the specific form that this de-industrialization  
takes. For exam ple, it could actually result in a stim ulus  for growth if 
the dynam ic o f the “upw ard” de-industrialization is characterized by 
the reallocation o f resources within manufacturing into more R& D- 
intensive products. H ow ever, in the case of de-industrialization in mid- 
dle-incom e countries, it is difficult to imagine how  this approach to  
growth can view  “premature” (or “dow nw ard”) de-industrialization—  
particularly when it includes a reversion in the level o f processing o f pri­
mary com m odities for export, as in som e Latin American countries—  
could in any w ay be good for long-term growth.
Finally, it goes w ithout saying that in the third approach to  eco­
nom ic grow th both de-industrialization— especially if it has the addi­
tional com ponent related to the D utch disease— an d  the present diffi­
culties involved in generating and im plem enting new  and im aginative 
“palliative” trade and industrial policies (given the current interna­
tional ideological and institutional clim ates) are unam biguously major 
issues for grow th in industrial and developing countries alike. For
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exam ple, based on this approach, one interpretation o f the industrial 
countries’ remarkable slow dow n in productivity grow th since the mid- 
1970s w ould  be that it could be precisely the result o f “w ron g” p oli­
cies (particularly in the 1980s) and “w ron g” structural change (for 
exam ple, “financialization”) that have over-intensified the otherwise 
natural processes o f  de-industrialization. Another obvious exam ple 
w ould  be the likely dam aging long-term  grow th effects for developing  
countries o f premature de-industrialization (such as in Brazil and in the 
Southern Cone o f Latin America)— not just in terms o f the speed o f  
their econom ic growth but also (crucially) in relation to its sustain­
ability.
C o n c lu sio n s
If one makes a distinction between “relative” and “absolute” de­
industrialization, it should be noted that this chapter deals systemati­
cally only w ith the former— that is, the analysis has concentrated on the 
study o f the shrinkage of the manufacturing sector (in terms o f em ploy­
ment), relative to the rest o f  the econom y, in the context of a process of  
structural change brought about either by endogenous forces (for exam ­
ple, a m ovem ent toward service industries in mature econom ies) or by 
exogenous ones (for example, changes in econom ic policy in middle- 
incom e countries and the discovery o f natural resources). For reasons o f  
space, it has not been possible to properly analyze recent experiences o f  
“absolute” de-industrialization— that is, the decline of the manufactur­
ing sector w ithin the context o f a collapse in national incom e, such as 
the one that took place in the former Soviet republics and in parts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa.37
The data and analysis presented here have provided significant con ­
firm ation o f  the inverted-U type o f trajectory o f m anufacturing em ­
ploym ent w ith  respect to  incom e per capita. H ow ever, it has also been 
show n that this relationship has causes that are far m ore com plex than  
has thus far been recognized. First, the relationship between these tw o  
variables is not stable over time. M oreover, there is convincing evi­
dence that the original im pulse for de-industrialization w as not the fact 
that som e countries had already reached the level at w hich the curve 
begins to slope downw ard, but was instead closely related to a contin­
uous fall over tim e o f the actual inverted-U relationship for m iddle- 
and high-incom e countries. Furthermore, the radical m onetarism  of  
the 1980s exerted strong downw ard pressure on the relationship be­
tw een manufacturing em ploym ent and incom e per capita in industrial 
econom ies.38
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Second, the regressions presented above have also identified a huge 
drop in the turning point of the regressions that relate manufacturing em ­
ployment to incom e per capita since the 1980s. Since the beginning of 
that decade, there has been a dramatic reduction in the level o f incom e 
per capita from  w hich the downturn in m anufacturing em ploym ent 
begins: from  U S $21 ,000  in 1980  to less than U S $10 ,000  in 1990 (both  
m easured in 1985 international U.S. dollars). This rapid low ering of 
the turning point o f the regressions since 1980  is crucial to an under­
standing of the evolving nature o f de-industrialization: W hereas in 
the 1980s no country— n ot even the United States, the country w ith the 
highest incom e per capita in the sam ple— had reached a level o f incom e 
per capita anywhere near the inflection point o f the inverted-U curve, 
by 1990  there were m ore than 30 countries (including first-tier NIEs) 
w hose incom e per capita was beyond that critical point in the respec­
tive curve.
Third, the data and analysis presented in this chapter have allow ed  
us to  develop a new , m ore specific (and, it is to be h oped, m ore use­
ful) w ay o f  looking at the Dutch disease. There is a group o f  countries 
that exhibits a specific additional degree o f  de-industrialization (addi­
tional to the de-industrialization caused by the three de-industrializing  
sources m entioned above, that is). This added de-industrialization is 
associated either w ith a sudden surge in exports o f  primary com m odi­
ties or w ith the developm ent o f  a successful service export sector 
(m ainly tourism  or finance). From  this perspective, the D utch  disease 
is a process in w hich  a country undergoes a change in its group o f ref­
erence, sw itch ing from  one corresponding to  countries that need to  
generate a trade surplus in m anufacturing to  one corresponding to  
those able to  generate a trade surplus in primary com m odities or 
services. W hen this is the case, the country experiencing this disease 
m oves along tw o  different paths o f de-industrialization: the first, 
w hich  is com m on to  the countries in the original group; and a second  
surge o f de-industrialization resulting from  the change in reference 
group. In this con text, the D utch  disease should  be regarded only as 
the “ex cess” degree o f de-industrialization associated  w ith  the latter 
m ovem ent.
Fourth, although this disease also spread to som e Latin American 
countries, the key issue in this case is that it was not brought on by the 
discovery of natural resources or the developm ent of a service export 
sector, but rather by a drastic switch in the econom ic policy regim e.39 
This was basically the result o f a radical program o f trade and financial 
liberalization w ithin the context o f an overall process o f  econom ic 
reform and institutional change that led to a sharp reversal o f these 
countries’ (State-led) ISI strategy. Brazil and the three Southern Cone
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countries w ith the highest incom es per capita (Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay) were the Latin American countries that experienced the high­
est levels o f  de-industrialization w hile also being am ong the countries in 
the region that had previously industrialized m ost rapidly and had im ­
plem ented the m ost drastic policy reforms. From this point o f  view , the 
major difference in the consequences o f neoliberal policies and defla­
tionary econom ics between Latin America and industrial countries is 
that in the former— because they were hit at a much lower level o f in­
com e per capita— they also hampered the transition toward a m ore m a­
ture form  o f industrialization (that is, self-sustaining in a Kaldorian 
sense).
To begin w ith, ISI policies had achieved a degree o f manufacturing 
employment that “norm ally” corresponds to a situation in which the 
countries concerned seek to generate a trade surplus in manufacturing 
(although Latin American countries were never actually able to achieve 
this). In turn, a radical shift in the policy regime (m ostly im plem ented  
after the 1982  debt crisis) brought about the end o f industrial and 
trade policies and, in particular, changes in relative prices, in real ex ­
change rates, in the institutional fram ework of the econom ies, in the 
structure o f  property rights, and in market incentives in general. This 
shift led them to abandon their industrialization agenda, bringing them  
back to their “natural Ricardian p osition”; that is, a position associated  
with comparative advantages more in accordance with their traditional 
resource endowm ent.
Fifth, Finland, Sweden, M alaysia, and, to a lesser extent, other South­
east Asian countries rich in natural resources (such as Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand) prove that, from the perspective of m anu­
facturing em ploym ent, there is no such thing as the so-called curse of 
natural resources. It seems patently clear that countries rich in natural 
resources or having a high potential for developing strong export serv­
ices activities have sufficient degrees o f freedom to allow  them to pursue 
trade and industrial policies aimed at continuing to develop a strong 
manufacturing sector— let alone to  implement policies designed to avoid  
the Dutch disease. H owever, as the Latin American experience, in par­
ticular, shows, it w ould  seem that as globalization progresses, there are 
fewer and fewer countries left w ith the political will to take advantage 
of such degrees o f freedom and undertake policies that prom ote or m ain­
tain manufacturing capacity. This is not only because the new interna­
tional institutional order is rapidly trying to narrow dow n these degrees 
o f freedom, but also because o f the obvious role of ideology in econom ic 
policy making and the fact that the newly developed structure of prop­
erty rights has (at least so far) been perfectly capable o f  generating al­
ternative (nonmanufacturing) rents from which dom estic elites have 
been able to profit.
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H ow ever, whether a process of structural change that includes pre­
mature de-industrialization can ever deliver rapid and sustainable eco­
nomic growth is another matter altogether; so is the issue o f whether the 
current premature de-industrialization taking place in Brazil and in the 
Southern Cone o f Latin America contains an important com ponent of 
policy-induced “uncreative destruction.”
Annex A: Econometric Results— Ordinary Least 
Squares Estimation
Parameters’ Point Estim ation
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Intersect -16 .71  -15 .96  -14 .98  -17 .78  -16 .47
L n Y p c  4.189 3.889 3.660 4.491 4.204
L n Y p c s q  -0 .218  -0 .195  -0 .183  -0 .242  -0 .228
Note: Regression 1 corresponds to  the “average” regression for 1960 (see figure 3.3); 
regression 2 corresponds to the regression for 1970; regression 3 to the regression for 
1980; regression 4 to the regression for 1990; and regression 5 to 1998. Ln Y pc =  log 
of income per capita; Ln Y pc sq = square of the log of income per capita.
“T ” Values
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression S
Intersect -3 .5 -4 .9  -4 .3 -5 .5 -5 .0
Ln Y pc 3.3 4.5 4.1 5.5 5.0
Ln Y pc sq -2 .6 -3 .5  -3 .2 -4 .7 -4 .3
“P" Values
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Intersect 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ln Y pc 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ln Y pc sq 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Regression Statistics
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression S
R-bar-sq 0.65 0.72 0.67 0.64 0.57
F (2, 78) 75.1 — — — -
F (2, 102) — 135.5 107.0 92.2 70.1
p of F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: R-bar-sq is the adjusted coefficient of determination; F is the F statistic. All 
tegressions pass the tests for homoscedasticity and for the normality of residuals at the 
5 percent level of significance.
— N ot available.
(Annex A continues on the following page.)
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Annex A (continued)
Parameters’ Point Estimation
Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 Regression 10
Intersect 
pc dummy 
Ln Y pc 





-15 .35  -14 .82 
-0 .434  -0 .419  
3.848 3.760 
-0 .196  -0 .194
-17 .90  -16.73 
-0 .274  -0.243 
4.637 4.401 
-0 .255  -0 .245
Note: Regression 6 corresponds to the regression for 1960 when an intercept dummy 
is added for countries able to generate a trade surplus in primary commodities or export 
services (see figures 3.7 and 3.8); regression 7 corresponds to the regression for 1970; 
regression 8 to the regression for 1980; regression 9 to 1990; and regression 10 to 1998. 
Ln Y pc =  log of income per capita; Ln Y pc sq =  square of the log of income 
per capita; pc dummy is the intercept dummy.
“T ” Values
Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 Regression 10
Intersect 
pc dummy 
Ln Y pc 





-5 .2  -5 .0  
-4 .1  -4 .0  
4.9 5.0 
-3 .9  -4 .0
-7 .2  -6 .9  
-2 .8  -2 .5  
7.3 7.2 
-6 .4  -6 .4
“P ” Values
Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 Regression 10
Intersect 
pc dummy 
Ln Y pc 














Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 Regression 10
R-bar-sq 
F (3, 77)
F (3, 101) 










Note: All regressions pass the tests for homoscedasticity and for the normality of 
residuals at the 5 percent level of significance.
—  N ot available.
Annex B: Country Classification
The classification o f countries w as based on their 1998 positions; all 
Latin American countries are classified in the primary com m odity group 
(including those that export maquila manufactures, as a result o f  the 
problem s discussed above— in particular, these exports’ low  levels o f do­
mestic value added).
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Countries
Non-primary commodity (and 
export services) group
Primary comm odity (and export 
services) group
Present Austria Korea, Rep. of Argentina Malawi
in all Belgium Malaysia Australia Malta
samples Denmark Morocco Bolivia Mauritius
Egypt, Arab Pakistan Botswana Mexico
Rep. of Philippines Brazil Mozambique
Finland Portugal Canada Namibia
France Singapore Chile Netherlands
Germany Spain Colombia New Zealand
India Sri Lanka Congo, Rep. of Nicaragua
Indonesia Sudan Costa Rica Niger
Ireland Sweden Côte d’Ivoire Norway
Israel Taiwan (China) Cyprus Panama
Italy Thailand Dominican Paraguay
Japan Tunisia Republic Peru













Missing Bangladesh Algeria Guinea-Bissau
in the China Angola Lesotho
1960 Syrian Arab Burkina Faso Luxembourg
sample, Rep. Burundi Madagascar
but Cameroon Mali
present Cape Verde Mauritania
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Endnotes
1. In som e historical experiences, like th a t o f G reat Britain, this process starts 
w ith  w h a t is usually called the “ag rarian  rev o lu tion .”
2. O ften , m ore lab o r is released by one sector th an  can be absorbed  by o thers, 
leading to  problem s such as the g row th  o f unem ploym ent, inform ality , and  so on.
3. T h ro u g h o u t th is chap ter, de-industrialization  w ill be analyzed solely from  
the p o in t o f view  of m anufactu ring  em ploym ent.
4 . In the U nited K ingdom , the  fall w as even m ore d ram atic , w ith  the level 
d ropping  by h a lf in the sam e period  (see figure 3.10).
5. O f course, in o rder to  understand  this process n o t just sim ply in arithm etic 
term s b u t in its p roper m acro  and  m icro fram ew orks, one w ould  have to  go m ore 
deeply in to  the  causal re la tionsh ips betw een the trends in  o u tp u t, em ploym ent, 
and  p roductiv ity  g row th . Furtherm ore, a t the  risk o f stating  the obvious, surely the 
issue is n o t to  determ ine w hether the  de-industrialization  w as the result o f rising 
p roductiv ity  g row th  or  o f falling o u tp u t g row th , b u t m ore critically the result of 
focus on  the actual re la tionsh ip  betw een p roductiv ity  g row th  and  o u tp u t g row th . 
U nfortunately , the  study of this relationship  falls outside  the scope o f this chapter.
6. For a  detailed  analysis, critical discussion, and  bibliographical references on 
these hypotheses, see R ow thorn  (1997, 1999) and R ow thorn  and Ram asw am y 
(1999).
7. In add ition , the ECLAC Statistical D ivision has p rov ided  d a ta  on  m an u ­
facturing  em ploym ent in L atin  A m erica during  the  1960s.
8. See, in particu lar, Pérez (2002).
9. “ F inancialization” includes, in ter alia, the rise in size and  dom inance of the 
financial sector relative to  the  nonfinancia l sector, as well as the  diversification to ­
w ard  financial activities in nonfinancia l corporations.
10. Inasm uch as R o w th o rn  (1994) used d a ta  fo r 1990 for his regression (see 
figure 3.2), this p a rticu lar effect w as already clearly in operation .
11. In the  five regressions, all param eters are significant a t the 2 percent level 
(or less), and  the adjusted  R 2 are betw een 67 percen t an d  77 percen t (see annex  A). 
All regressions also pass the tests o f hom oscedasticity  and  norm ality  o f residuals at 
the 5 percent level o f  significance.
12. F rom  now  on , the p rim ary  com m odity  and  ex p o rt services countries will be 
referred  to  sim ply as the  “prim ary  com m odity  g ro u p ” (pc).
13. T he d rop  in the level of incom e per capita  a t w hich  the  inflection points are 
located  is n o t surprising , how ever, because the difference in the regressions is just 
the  dum m y in the  intercept. As indicated  before, in 1960 no coun try  had  reached 
the  incom e per capita  associated w ith  the tu rn ing  p o in t o f bo th  regressions.
14. O n  th is po in t, I disagree w ith  m y friend, D utch econom ist W illem  Buiter, 
w ho  always rem arks th a t the so-called D utch disease is just a “slander” on  the D utch 
economy! The literature on the general m acro-m echanism s a t w o rk  in the D utch dis­
ease is extensive; see, for exam ple, Pieper (2000), Ros (2000), and R ow thorn  and  
W ells (1987).
15. An alterative form  of m easuring the  D utch  disease along these lines w ould  
be to  have a g row th  m odel for the N etherlands th a t som ehow  included the effect 
o f the discovery o f n a tu ra l resources as an  exp lanato ry  variable an d  to  use this re­
gression to  predict w h a t w ould  have been the expected level o f incom e per capita  
in 1998, h ad  th is country  n o t discovered n a tu ra l gas. In this case, the  D utch disease 
effect could  be m easured as the  difference betw een the  actual and predicted  levels 
o f m anufacturing  em ploym ent in 1998 in the  m f regression, given the  hypothetical 
incom e per cap ita  o f a non-D utch  disease scenario.
16. A billion is 1 ,000 m illion.
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17. See, in particu lar, Solow  (1997).
18. A lthough L atin  Am erica’s “ stru c tu ra lis t” industria lization  agenda did no t 
succeed (as East A sia’s did) in creating  a trad e  surplus in m anufacturing , im port- 
substitu ting  industria lization  in  L atin  Am erica a t least did lead to  a significant re­
duction  in the trad e  deficit in m anufactures (as well as in the trade  surplus in 
p rim ary  com m odities); see Palm a (2003).
19. It should  be em phasized th a t, in these countries, it w as policy ra th e r th an  a 
surge in p rim ary  com m odity  exports th a t b rough t ab o u t their D utch  disease. In fact, 
these exports only surged in these countries after their respective (post-econom ic re­
form ) financial crises and  subsequent devaluations; therefore, by 1998, only in Chile 
had  there been a rap id  expansion of unprocessed prim ary  com m odities exports 
(generating, in this case, an  additional im petus for its de-industrialization).
20. See, in particu lar, K aldor (1967).
21. See, for exam ple, Pesaran  et al. (2000).
22. The signing of new  bilateral free trad e  treaties w ith  the  U nited States, such 
as th a t recently signed by Chile, is unlikely to  help p rom ote  industria lization . In 
fact, as is well know n, o th er th an  fo r agricu ltu ra l p roducts , the trea ty  betw een 
Chile and  the U nited States has little to  do  w ith  trad e  issues, b u t is instead  focused 
o n  restricting  C hile’s capacity  to  im plem ent trad e  and  industria l policies and  con­
tro ls in the cap ital account o f the  balance o f paym ents; on  this issue, see, in p a rtic ­
u lar, B hagw ati (2003) and Stiglitz (2003).
23. O n this subject, see, in particu lar, C apu to  (1996), E conom ist (2001), 
L avanderas (2001), and  Tom ic (1985).
24. T his concept is very p o p u lar these days in som e of the  m ost sim plistic 
“new -institu tionalis t” literatu re  th a t seeks to  explain  the developm ent failure o f 
resource-rich countries. For a critical review  o f this literatu re, see Di Jo h n  (2003).
25. For policies fo r avoiding the D utch  disease, see, in particu lar, Pesaran 
(1984); for an  analysis o f the  specific experience o f a  developing country  th a t 
avoided the D utch  disease in the  late 19 th  century  (despite the  fact th a t its level of 
exports o f p rim ary  com m odities suddenly m ore th an  doubled), see Palm a (2000); 
fo r a com parative analysis of trad e  and  industria l policies in East Asia and Latin  
A m erica, see Palm a (2004, 2005).
26. As Stiglitz keeps rem inding us, “W ashington C onsensus”-type o f thinking is 
n o t renow ned for its flexibility o r its im agination (see, for exam ple, Stiglitz [2002]).
27. For a  detailed discussion o f this issue, see Palm a (2002).
28. In  a study  of the  television industry  in T ijuana, for exam ple, C arrillo  (2002) 
clearly show ed b o th  sides o f  M ex ico ’s m anufacturing  export-led  success. O n  the 
one hand , in 2001 M exico p roduced  ab o u t 30  m illion television sets, 90 percen t o f 
w hich  w ere exported  to  the  U nited  States (representing 78 percent o f all im ports of 
television sets in to  the  U nited States). O n  the o th er hand , C arrillo ’s calculations 
show ed th a t, in value term s, 98 percent of inputs fo r the  M exican  television indus­
try  are either direct im ports o r indirect ones (that is, inpu ts th a t are supplied by fo r­
eign firms in M exico, w hich them selves im port practically  all o f  their inputs). In 
fact, M exican com panies only supply the  rem aining 2 percent o f inpu ts (m ostly 
card b o ard  boxes and  plastic sheets needed for packaging and  the  p rin ting  o f som e 
m anuals).
29. In 2001 , fo r exam ple, M exico exported  roughly  the sam e am o u n t o f m an ­
ufactures as the R epublic o f  K orea (abou t US$150 billion); how ever, its overall 
m anufacturing  sector generated less th an  ha lf the  latter cou n try ’s level o f value 
added  and  absorbed  m ore th an  tw ice the level o f im ports; see U N C TA D  (2002) 
and Palm a (2002).
30. See, fo r exam ple, ECLAC (2002), M o rtim o re  (2000), and  Palm a (2002).
31. See, in  particu lar, Di Jo h n  (2003); see also Palm a (2003). It m ust have taken  
som e do ing for o il-rich R epública B olivariana de Venezuela to  m anage to  have a
1 1 4 BEYOND REFORMS
level o f incom e per capita  to d ay  th a t is well below  w h a t it h ad  a t the tim e o f the 
first oil-price shock three  decades ago!
32. For im p o rtan t insights on  C h ina’s econom ic success, see Sen (1999).
33. See, for exam ple, B haduri and  N ayyar (1996).
34. See B arro  and  Sala-i-M artin  (1995) and  B lankenburg  (2000, 2004) for 
overviews of new  g row th  theories.
35. It could be argued th a t these g row th  theories a re  also activity  specific ra th e r 
th an  ju st activity neu tra l; how ever, in K aldor’s w o rk  and  in the  w o rk  of the o ther 
au th o rs  m entioned above (w ith som e exceptions), the  in ternal organ ization  o f 
m anufacturing— fo r exam ple, the  ro le o f R & D  versus th a t o f o th er (w hat has here 
been called) “ activ ities”— is usually  n o t central to  their analysis.
36. “H u sb an d ry  [...] is never m ore effectively encouraged th an  by the increase 
o f m anufactures” (H um e, 1767, vol. Ill, p. 65; quoted  in Reinert, 2003 , pp. 4 5 1 -78).
37. In the th ird  section o f this chap ter, “ ab so lu te” de-industrialization  w as also 
called “reverse” de-industrialization .
38. T he form er aim ed a t rolling back the w elfare state, the rad ical tran sfo rm a­
tio n  of industria l re la tions (in o rder to  “ discipline” labor), and  the  creation  o f a 
new  stream  o f rents (for exam ple, p rivatizations) in  o rder to  give a new  im petus to  
capitalist accum ulation  (or, perhaps, just as p a r t o f the  long-aw aited  revenge of the 
rentier); the la tter w as necessary for dealing w ith  the  newly discovered Friedm an- 
type obsession w ith  inflation.
39. See, for exam ple, ECLAC (2003) and Palm a (2003).
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Globalization, 
Rising Labor Inequality, 
and Poverty in Latin America
Rob Vos
A s t r i k i n g  ASPECT OF e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y  in developing econom ies during 
the last 10 to 15 years has been the spread o f packages aimed at liberal­
izing the balance o f payments current and capital accounts. Dramatic 
leaps toward external openness took  place throughout Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, Asia, and parts o f Africa. Together w ith large but highly 
volatile foreign capital m ovem ents (often but not always in connection  
w ith privatization of State-owned enterprises), this wave of trade and fi­
nancial deregulation redefined the external environment for a major part 
o f the nonindustrialized developing world. In Latin America, the stabi­
lization and structural adjustment efforts immediately follow ing the 
debt crisis o f the early 1980s had focused mainly on fiscal and monetary 
adjustment and realignment o f exchange rates. Then, in the late 1980s  
and early 1990s, came drastic reductions in trade restrictions and do­
mestic and external financial liberalization, alm ost sim ultaneously in 
m ost countries. Steps were also taken toward restructuring tax systems 
and deregulating labor markets.
All these changes are very recent. It w ill take time before their full ef­
fects on  growth, em ploym ent, incom e distribution, and poverty can be 
fully assessed. Still, external liberalization marks a dramatic switch in 
developm ent policies away from the traditional regime o f widespread
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State controls and im port-substituting industrialization. Accordingly, 
one w ould  expect to  see m ajor consequences. The old  regim e, to  a 
large extent, was built upon the infant-industry argument to create 
“learning-by-doing” externalities and enhance Hirschman-type dom es­
tic linkages so as to lay the foundations for a sustainable growth process. 
Import substitution did yield m oderate to high growth for a prolonged  
period o f time, as gross dom estic product (GDP) growth averaged over 
6 percent per annum  and productivity (measured as output per worker) 
doubled between 1950 and 1970  (Stallings and Peres 2000 ). Despite  
this relatively successful grow th perform ance, however, the pioneers o f  
developm ent econom ics w ho gave the theoretical justification for a 
governm ent-supported industrialization strategy were am ong the first 
to observe the flaws o f the policy regime, even before the econom ies ran 
out o f steam and m acroeconom ic problem s started to  m oun t.1 The pro­
tectionist regime was rightfully criticized for failing to prom ote efficient 
and com petitive industrial production (and thereby providing a source 
o f “structuralist in flation”), for creating insufficient em ploym ent, and 
for failing to reduce incom e inequality. Sectoral balance and incom e 
distribution form ed a central elem ent in the critique: The protectionist 
policies had biased relative prices in favor o f capital-intensive industrial 
production, causing em ploym ent creation to lag behind population  
growth and skew ing incom e distribution against wage earners and 
farmers. W idening inequalities placed a limit on the growth of the d o­
mestic market and thus on further growth in general. The solutions had 
to be found in redistribution policies as much as in econom ic opening. 
As noted, full econom ic liberalization ultimately became the dom inant 
paradigm o f the new  policy regime, thus marking the end o f classical 
developm ent econom ics as an influential factor in shaping developm ent 
policies.
A fundam ental question that is n ow  being asked is whether the lib ­
eralization o f trade and capital flow s w ill be better at m eeting the de­
velopm ent goals o f grow th, equity, and poverty reduction. W ill a 
w orld system  in w hich national econom ies are highly integrated in 
com m odity and capital markets (in terms o f increased transaction  
flow s and tendencies toward price equalization) prom ote equality and 
reduce poverty? In answering this question, I w ill draw heavily on the 
findings of a set o f 16 Latin American country studies that analyzed the 
distribution and poverty effects o f trade and capital account liberal­
ization (see Ganuza et al. 2001; Ganuza, M orley, R obinson, and V os  
2 0 0 4 , forthcom ing; and V os, Taylor, and Paes de Barros 200 2 ). The 
first section o f the chapter raises som e analytical issues that suggest 
that there are no easy answers to  the question as to  whether the re­
forms w ill prom ote poverty reduction. The second section provides a 
summary o f  som e o f the m ain findings o f the Latin American country
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studies. The third section draws som e conclusions for policy m aking  
and further research.
Analytical Issues
The reforms have been justified by expected increases in efficiency and 
output growth. The governments and international institutions prom ot­
ing them have been less explicit, however, about their distributional con­
sequences. During the 1990s the predom inant view  has been that liber­
alization is likely to lead to better econom ic performance, at least in the 
m edium -to-long run. According to this view, even if there are adverse 
transitional impacts, they can be cushioned by social policies and, in any 
case, after som e time has passed they will be outweighed by more rapid 
growth. Both theory and empirical evidence are less conclusive about 
this. In the follow ing discussion I will review som e o f the main issues, 
but no attempt w ill be made at comprehensiveness.
T h e S u pp ly-S ide  S to ry
The new  policy view  basically stemmed from supply-side arguments. 
The purpose o f trade reform is to switch production away from non­
tradables and inefficient import substitutes toward exportables in which  
countries have a com parative advantage. Presumed full em ployment of 
all resources— labor included— permits such a switch to be made pain­
lessly. Standard trade theory based on the Heckscher-O hlin m odel and 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem (HOS) w ould predict, further, that workers 
in developing countries w ould benefit from freer trade because this 
w ould lead such nations to specialize in types o f production that make 
m ore intensive use o f the m ost abundant factor, which w ould presum ­
ably be (unskilled) labor. Under the given assum ptions, this should be 
conducive to greater incom e equality.
Opening up the capital account is supposed to  attract financial inflows 
that will stimulate investment and productivity growth. In a defense 
based on cross-country regressions for Latin America, Londono and 
Székely (1998) argued that equity is positively related to growth and in­
vestment. In turn, these variables are asserted to be positively related to  
structural reforms, and liberalization is therefore seen as being support­
ive o f low-incom e groups.
This story contrasts with findings of many other studies, however, 
which, referring in particular to the effects o f trade reforms, found that the 
opening of domestic markets to external competition in Latin America is 
associated with greater wage inequality (Berry 1998; Beyer, Rojas, and 
Vergara 1999; Cragg and Epelbaum 1996; Feenstra and Hanson 1997;
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Hanson and Harrison 1999; Ocampo and Taylor 1998; Robbins 1996; 
Robbins and Gindling 1999; W ood 1 9 9 4 ,1 9 9 7 ). M uch of the increase in 
wage inequality and unemployment in several countries over the last two  
decades has been attributed to the change in the structure of labor demand 
in favor of skilled workers. This is reflected in the overall increase in the 
returns to education for skilled labor and, in some countries, in the rise o f  
unemployment among less skilled individuals (Freeman 1995; Gottschalk 
and Smeeding 1997). Márquez and Pages (1997) estimated labor demand 
m odels with panel data for 18 Latin American countries and found that 
trade reforms had a negative effect on employment growth. M eanwhile, 
Currie and Harrison (1997), Revenga (1997), and Ros and Bouillon  
(2002) have analyzed the cases o f M orocco and M exico and found that 
reductions in tariff levels and import quotas have had a m odest but nega­
tive impact on employment, which has partly been the result of firms’ 
efforts to cut margins and raise productivity.
This developing-country evidence stands in stark contrast to that o f  
East Asia, where many studies have observed an improvement in incom e 
equality after a strong export-led strategy was introduced in the 1960s  
and 1970s. In line w ith this view , W ood (1994 , 1997) has found evi­
dence of rising demand for unskilled labor and a decline in wage in­
equality in the Republic o f  Korea, Taiwan (China), and Singapore fo l­
low ing trade liberalization. These cases are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the integration o f developing countries into the interna­
tional econom y is accom panied by a reduction in incom e inequality and 
greater em ploym ent, as claimed by Krueger (1983 , 1988).
This apparent contrast between experiences could suggest that the is­
sue is an empirical matter rather than a theoretical puzzle. Econom ists, 
however, do not agree on the causes o f  the change in the structure o f la­
bor demand.
The controversy is based mainly on the HO S m odel and interpreta­
tions o f  the recent wave o f technological innovations, which has had 
strong impacts on the structure of labor dem and.2 Because developing  
countries tend to have abundant unskilled labor, the increasing in ­
equality is puzzling. According to  the H O S m odel, developing coun­
tries should specialize in the production of goods that are intensive in 
unskilled labor, thus increasing the relative demand for this factor and 
reducing wage differentials.
The question has been raised, however, as to whether the empirical 
evidence o f rising inequality is sufficient to challenge the relevance o f the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, because Latin America’s comparative ad­
vantage may not be to specialize in labor and low-skill-intensive pro­
duction. This possibility has been brought up not only because o f Latin 
America’s abundant endowm ent o f  natural resources, but also because 
the predominance o f low -skilled workers (say, w ith fewer than nine
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years o f education) is probably less marked in the region’s labor force 
than in much o f Asia and Africa.3 These conditions will change the ex ­
pected outcom es of trade liberalization. Latin America’s abundant en­
dowm ent o f land (relative to labor) and its unequal distribution has been 
shown to drive up incom e inequality follow ing trade liberalization.4 
Other factors, such as China’s growing presence in world markets, for 
instance, may also depress wage improvements in Latin America’s ex­
port sectors (De Ferranti et al. 2002; W ood 1994). These conditions are 
probably only part o f the explanation for rising inequality follow ing  
trade liberalization. An alternative hypothesis suggests that the recent 
opening to trade observed in various developing countries may have un­
leashed a sim ultaneous process of technological m odernization and an 
increase in capital stock that have had a positive impact on the demand 
for skilled labor. These developm ents w ould  then drive up the returns to  
human capital and intensify the dispersion of wages.
D em a n d -S id e  Issues
Although trade reforms may have im portant supply-side effects, aggre­
gate demand also has an impact on growth and distribution, just as cap­
ital inflows have an impact on relative prices. The im port-substitution  
m odel relied on the expansion o f internal markets with rising real wages 
as part o f its strategy. Under the new  regime, the question o f  controlling 
wage costs has taken center stage. As long as there is enough productiv­
ity growth and no substantial displacement o f  workers, wage restraints 
need not be a problem because the expansion o f output can create room  
for the growth o f em ploym ent and real incom es. But if wage levels are 
seriously reduced and/or workers with high consum ption propensities 
lose their jobs, then the resulting contraction o f  domestic demand could  
cut labor incom e in sectors that produce for the dom estic market. In­
com e inequality could then rise if displaced unskilled workers end up in 
informal services for which there is a declining demand.
Larger inflows o f capital follow ing liberalization tend to lead to real 
exchange rate appreciation, which can offset liberalization’s incentives 
for the production o f traded goods and force greater reductions in real 
wage costs. On the demand side, though, capital inflows m ay stimulate 
aggregate spending through increased domestic investm ent (either di­
rectly or through credit expansion) and low er saving (credit expansion  
triggering a consum ption boom ). Furthermore, although m acroeco­
nom ic stabilization policies that use the exchange rate as a nom inal an­
chor may exacerbate real exchange rate appreciation, inflation can be 
brought under control, thereby allowing a recovery o f real wages. 
Poverty, and in particular urban poverty, m ay decline, because much of 
the short-run econom ic expansion w ill be in nontraded goods. The
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expansion o f aggregate demand may quite likely prove to be short-lived  
if the consequent w idening o f the external balance is not sustainable and 
if volatility in short-term capital inflows and a lack o f regulatory control 
put the dom estic financial system at risk. H ow ever, even if a financial 
crisis can be avoided, the econom y may be pushed onto a deflationary 
path. A stop in capital inflows, as happened in the late 1990s, may not 
trigger a strong export drive in response, if  there has been an earlier ero­
sion of com petitiveness and aggregate demand, and in this case imports 
will have to be slashed. M orley and Vos (forthcoming) showed that ex ­
ports became the main driving force o f aggregate output growth in m ost 
Latin American countries in the second half o f the 1990s, even though  
the export sector was not very dynamic and virtually none o f  the 
econom ies m anaged to increase their penetration in world markets. For 
sure, this is export-led growth on a slippery path.
The thrust o f these observations is that the effects o f balance o f pay­
ments liberalization on growth, em ployment, and incom e distribution  
arise out o f a com plex set o f interactions involving both the supply and 
the demand sides of the econom y. Income redistribution and major 
shifts in relative prices are endogenous to the process, and there are no 
simple conclusions about the effects of liberalization.
A  S im ple  A n a ly tic a l F ra m ew o rk
A  m ore com prehensive approach for analyzing the effects o f balance of 
payments liberalization could start with a simple m odel for traded and 
nontraded goods, because large shifts in price and quantity relationships 
between the tw o sectors have been observed in practice. Direct effects o f  
the removal o f barriers to trade and capital m ovem ents show  up first in 
the traded (or tradable) goods sector, but spillovers in both directions 
w ith nontraded goods have been immediate and substantial. Taylor and 
Vos (2002) pointed out the major connections in a stylized fashion.
Assume traded goods are produced under imperfect com petition. The 
simplest m odel involves a discriminating m onopolist that manufactures 
goods that can be both exported and sold at hom e, as in O campo and 
Taylor (1998). H ouseholds at home buy both dom estically made and 
im ported consumer goods. Prior to liberalization, firms have established  
markup rates over variable costs in both markets (their levels w ill de­
pend on the relevant elasticities). The market prices and productivity lev­
els o f unskilled labor and intermediate imports determine variable cost; 
skilled labor and physical capital are fixed factors in the short run. The 
traded goods’ price level Pt follow s from the markup over variable cost.
With stable markup rates, traded goods comprise a Hicksian fix-price 
sector with a level o f output X t determined by effective demand. The 
level o f production o f nontraded goods is also determined by demand,
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but the sector may well have decreasing returns to unskilled labor in the 
short run. A higher production level X„ is made possible by greater un­
skilled em ploym ent L„. H ow ever, cost-m inim izing producers w ill hire 
extra workers only at a low er real product w age w/P„, where w  is the 
unskilled nom inal wage and Pn is the price o f nontraded goods. In other 
words, a higher price-wage ratio P J w  is associated w ith greater non­
traded goods production and em ployment and, if there are decreasing 
returns, reduced labor productivity. If P J w  is free to vary, then non­
traded goods aggregate into a flex-price sector (which w e assume in the 
basic version o f  the m odel). W ith stable markup rates in the traded 
goods sector, the intersectoral price ratio PtIPn will fall as P J w  rises; 
that is, rising prices for nontraded goods are associated with real appre­
ciation as measured by the ratio o f traded to nontraded goods price in­
dexes.
Figure 4.1 provides a graphic presentation o f the model. The extreme 
northeast quadrant is the key one because it shows how  prices and out­
put in the tw o sectors are determined. A long the schedule for “nontraded  
goods equilibrium,” a higher traded goods output level X t is assumed 
to generate additional dem and for nontraded goods. Because it is met 
by an increase in supply, the nontraded price-wage ratio P J w  will rise. 
In the market for traded goods, a higher level o f P J w  can be associ­
ated w ith  either higher or low er dem and, depending on incom e effects. 
The “traded goods equilibrium ” schedule illustrates the former case: 
D em and for X t is stim ulated by an increase in P J w .  As drawn in the 
figure, the short-run macro equilibrium defined by the intersection o f  
the tw o curves is stable.
As indicated above, in m ost Latin American econom ies the current 
and capital accounts o f the balance o f payments were liberalized nearly 
sim ultaneously in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Given this history, the 
tw o policy regime shifts have to be considered together. H ow ever, for 
the sake o f analytical clarity, it is useful to  dissect them  one at a time. A 
full analysis w ould  need to consider the effects o f other reforms as w ell 
(in particular dom estic financial, tax, and labor market deregulation), 
but for the present purpose the analysis is limited to the effects o f capi­
tal and current accounts liberalization.
Capital Account Liberalization. Upon removing restrictions on capital 
m ovem ents, m ost countries received a surge o f inflows from abroad. 
These inflows were subject to the accounting restriction that an econ­
om y’s net foreign asset position (total holdings o f  external assets minus 
total external liabilities) can only change gradually over time through a 
deficit or surplus on the current account. H ence, when external liabili­
ties increased as foreigners acquired securities issued by national gov­
ernments or firms, external assets had to rise sharply as well. The new  
assets typically showed up on the balance sheets o f financial institutions
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Figure 4.1  Initial Equilibrium Positions in Traded and
N ontraded G oods M arkets and Probable Shifts 
After Current and Capital A ccounts Liberalization
N ontraded sector price-wage
ratio (Pn/w )  Traded goods
Source: Taylor and Vos 2002.
and included the larger international reserves o f the central bank. Unless 
a concerted effort w as made to “sterilize” the inflows, they set o ff a d o­
mestic credit boom . Poorly regulated financial systems ran a high risk o f  
lapsing into a classic mania-panic-crash sequence along the lines de­
scribed by Kindleberger (1996). The events in Latin America’s Southern 
Cone around 1980 were only the first o f m any such disasters.
W hen the credit expansion was allowed to work itself through, it w as 
possible for interest rates to settle at low  levels. H ow ever, other factors 
entered to push both levels and the spread between borrowing and lend­
ing rates upward. One source o f w idening spreads was related to asset 
price boom s in housing and stock markets, which forced rates to rise on  
interest-bearing securities such as government debt. Another source that 
som etim es played a role w as the efforts made by the countries’ central
GLOBALIZATION, LABOR INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY 1 2 5
banks to sterilize capital inflow s, because this pushed up interest rates 
as w ell. Finally, in noncom petitive financial markets, local institutions 
often found it easy to raise spreads. H igh local returns pulled in more 
capital inflows, thereby worsening the overall disequilibrium.
N o t surprisingly, exchange rate m ovem ents com plicated the story. As 
indicated, in many countries the exchange rate was used as a nominal 
anchor in anti-inflation programs. Its nom inal level was devalued at a 
rate lower than that o f inflation, leading to real appreciation. In several 
cases the effect w as rapid, w ith traded goods’ variable costs in dollar 
terms jumping im mediately after the rate was frozen. At the same time, 
interest rates w ould be driven upward (a tendency that w ould  be am pli­
fied if real appreciation w as expansionary in the short run), providing a 
disincentive to investment and long-run productivity growth. Abandon­
ing capital controls made this trade-off far more difficult to manage. 
Some countries did succeed in keeping their exchange rates relatively 
w eak, but they were in a m inority during the first half o f the 1990s when  
capital inflows were boom ing. There was an initial “sudden stop ” in 
capital flow s to the region follow ing the M exican peso crisis in 1995 and 
a more forceful one after 1997  w ith the Asian and Russian crises. This 
made it im possible to continue the nom inal-exchange-rate-based stabi­
lization policies, and a fair number o f countries were forced to switch  
exchange rate regimes from fix to flex (such as M exico in 1995, Ecuador 
and Brazil in 1999 , and Argentina in 2002) and back (such as Ecuador, 
which introduced full dollarization in 2000).
To summarize, capital account liberalization, w hen com bined with a 
boom  in external inflows, could easily trigger an “excessive” credit ex ­
pansion. Paradoxically, the credit boom  could be associated with rela­
tively high interest rates and a strong local currency. These were not the 
m ost secure foundations for the liberalization o f the current account, as 
subsequent events w ould  prove.
Current Account Liberalization. Current account deregulation basically 
took  the form of the conversion of quota restrictions (where they were 
significant) into tariffs, follow ed by the consolidation o f  tariff rates into 
a fairly narrow band (for exam ple, between zero and 20 percent). W ith  
a few  exceptions, export subsidies were also removed. These measures 
had visible effects on the level and com position o f effective demand and 
on patterns o f em ploym ent and labor productivity.
Dem and com position typically shifted in the direction o f imports, es­
pecially w hen there w as real exchange rate appreciation. In several cases, 
national savings rates also declined. This shift can be partly attributed to 
an increased supply o f im ports at low  prices (increasing household  
spending, aided by credit expansion follow ing financial liberalization) 
and partly to a profit squeeze (cutting retained earnings) in industries 
producing traded goods. The subsequent decline in private saving was
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sometimes partially offset by rising government saving in cases where fis­
cal policy became more restrictive. M any countries displayed “stop-go” 
cycles in government taxing and spending behavior.
Especially when it w as com bined w ith a real appreciation, current ac­
count liberalization pushed traded goods producers toward workplace 
reorganization (including greater reliance on outsourcing) and downsiz­
ing; cases in point include the M exican and Argentine manufacturing 
sectors. If, as assumed above, unskilled labor is a major com ponent o f  
variable cost, then these workers w ould bear the brunt o f such adjust­
m ents via job losses. In other words, traded goods enterprises that stayed 
in operation had to cut costs by generating labor productivity growth. 
Thus, depending on demand conditions, their total em ployment levels 
could very easily fall.
The upshot of these effects often took the form o f increased inequal­
ity between groups o f workers— in particular, between the skilled and 
unskilled. This outcom e is not only at odds w ith the predictions o f the 
simple two-factor Stolper-Samuelson theorem  (assuming unskilled labor 
w ould  be the abundant production factor); it is also analytically differ­
ent, because the adjustment involves m ore than mere responses to rela­
tive factor and com m odity prices. There are m acroeconom ic effects, 
such as the im pact o f exchange rate m ovem ents and capital flow s on re­
munerations and interest rates. The analysis also departs further from  
the standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory framework underlying 
Stolper-Samuelson by working w ith more than tw o production factors 
and allowing for factor im m obility and product market imperfections. 
These considerations, along w ith changes in the sectoral com position o f  
output as emphasized in figure 4 .1 , are important factors in determining 
the distributive effects o f trade liberalization. W ith liberalization stim u­
lating productivity increases in som e tradables, which, in turn, led to a 
reduction o f  labor demand from modern, traded-goods production, pri­
mary incom e differentials widened between workers in such sectors and 
those em ployed in nontraded, informal activities (for exam ple, informal 
services) and the unemployed.
Graphic Illustration o f  the Possible Effects o f  Balance o f  Paym ents L iber­
alization. It is easy to trace through the im plications of these changes in 
figure 4 .1 , beginning w ith the traded-goods equilibrium schedule in the 
northeast quadrant. The sector may be subject to  several conflicting  
forces:
• By shifting demand toward imports, current account liberalization 
tends to reduce output X t . This demand loss is strengthened by real ap­
preciation and weakened— or even reversed— by devaluation. Rem oval 
o f export subsidies m ay hurt manufacturing and raw materials sectors in 
som e cases.
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• Dom estic credit expansion and a falling savings rate stimulate de­
mand for both sectors, although high interest rates may hold back 
spending on luxury manufactured items, such as consumer durables and 
autom obiles (in countries where they are produced).
The outcom e is that the shift in the traded-goods equilibrium sched­
ule is likely to be am biguous, as shown by the double-headed arrow in 
the diagram. The contractionary forces that have just been m entioned do 
not impinge directly on nontraded goods; as show n, the corresponding  
market equilibrium schedule is shifted upward. The likely results after 
both schedules adjusted were a higher nontraded price-wage ratio Pnlw , 
a fall in the intersectoral terms o f trade Pt/P„, and an am biguous change 
in X t.
Turning to em ploym ent and productivity changes, a fair share of new  
jobs may be created in the nontraded sector, ow ing to  aggregate demand  
expansion; that is, L i  m oves up along the demand schedule in the 
northwest quadrant. W ith overall decreasing returns in the sector, its 
real wage w/P„ and labor productivity level X n/L i  could be expected  
to fall.
Increased labor productivity in the traded sector means that the 
traded goods labor demand schedule in the middle quadrant on the right 
m oves toward the point o f origin. Regardless o f w hat happened to  their 
overall level o f activity, traded goods producers generate fewer jobs per 
unit o f output. Reading through the lower quadrant on the left, Lsn or 
unskilled labor supply in nontraded goods tends to rise. The effect on  
overall unemploym ent (L% — L i)  is unclear. During the expansionary  
phase of the business cycle, unemploym ent m ay fall enough to generate 
strong upward wage pressure. H ow ever, in practice, wage dynamics are 
driven by institutional circumstances in partially segmented labor mar­
kets, w ith details differing from one country to  another. In many cases, 
stable or rising unemploym ent and unresponsive wages cause the over­
all incom e distribution to becom e more concentrated. A typical case 
found in several instances has been that surplus labor was absorbed by 
the informal sector. This puts downward pressure on the m ean incom es 
of the self-employed in that sector, generating a widening differential be­
tween wage and nonwage labor incom es. The differential between  
skilled and unskilled wage rates tends to rise as well, because the pro­
ductivity switch was associated with more skill-intensive production.
The last curve to shift is the one corresponding to the trade deficit in 
the extreme southeast quadrant: Higher import demand and typically 
lagging exports cause it to m ove away from the point o f origin. The 
trade deficit thus increases for a given output level. The corresponding 
increase in “required” capital inflows feeds into the shifts in the capital 
account discussed above.
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Growth, Distribution, and Poverty in Latin America: 
Recurring Problems
Although there are no simple conclusions, evidence from  a set of com ­
parative studies of the postliberalization performance of 16 Latin Amer­
ican and Caribbean econom ies during the 1990s suggests that diverging 
outcom es are closely associated w ith the issues described above.5 M ost 
Latin American countries achieved moderate growth rates in the 1990s. 
H ow ever, a few  exceptions aside, it is hard to speak o f a strong and sus­
tained recovery from the dismal performance o f the 1980s. W hat is 
m ore, tow ard the end o f the decade, growth tapered o ff in many coun­
tries as a result o f  emerging dom estic financial crises and/or external 
events. Adverse foreign shocks included the im pact o f  the Asian crisis 
on capital flow s to Brazil w ith spillover effects on neighboring coun­
tries, particularly Argentina, and falling export earnings for m ost pri­
mary exporting econom ies as a result o f plum m eting com m odity prices. 
W hereas it is also true for Latin America that poverty falls w ith growth  
(see figure 4 .2 ), significant deviations from the trend line are strongly
Figure 4 .2  Growth and Poverty in Latin America in the 1990s
GDP per capita 
(annual growth rate)
Source: ECLAC data.
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associated with specific m acroeconom ic conditions and, more specifi­
cally, w ith the pattern o f  growth.
M a cro eco n o m ic  C o n d itio n s
Let us first look  at som e o f these m acroeconom ic conditions. Particu­
larly in the first half o f  the 1990s, capital inflow s to m ost countries in­
creased substantially, prom pting both aggregate dem and grow th and 
real exchange rate appreciation (with a few  exceptions, as noted be­
low ). The latter outcom e was consistent w ith  reductions in inflation, 
w hich helped support higher average real w ages in m ost countries. The 
surge in capital in flow s produced expansionary m acroeconom ic cycles, 
and the associated real w age increases lifted dom estic market con­
straints. Growth accelerated and poverty declined during such episodes, 
but rather than constituting a “big push” à la R osenstein-Rodan  
(1943 , 1984), the overall picture w as one o f  m acroeconom ic stop-go  
cycles along the lines o f  w hat is show n in figure 4 .1 , w ith wages and 
aggregate dem and strongly contracting as capital inflow s slow ed  
dow n. In m ost cases, private spending proved to  be the major source 
o f grow th (though typically in conjunction w ith  expanding trade), 
w ith  consum ption grow th m ore often than investm ent being the major 
driving force (table 4 .1 ). As indicated above, by the end o f the 1990s, 
exports started playing a larger role in output grow th— however, in a 
context o f  faltering growth dynam ics (M orley and V os forthcom ing). 
Rem arkably, the countries that m anaged to stay on a more dynam ic 
export-led grow th path throughout the decade m aintained either rela­
tively com petitive exchange rates or a credible system  of export incen­
tives, or both. H ow ever, export stim ulus through com petitive ex ­
change rates is n ot necessarily a guarantee o f  higher aggregate output 
grow th and poverty reduction. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, 
volatility and sudden stops in capital in flow s pushed m any econom ies 
onto a deflationary path as it becam e necessary to  squeeze aggregate 
dem and in order to com press im ports and thus com pensate for a lack 
o f export dynam ism.
O b se rv e d  P a ttern s o f  G ro w th  a n d  In eq u a lity
Even if w e concentrate our attention on the period o f more rapid GDP 
growth in the 1990s, liberalization efforts yielded only m odest aggregate 
productivity increases in m ost Latin American countries (see table 4 .2). 
In a majority of cases, as was to be expected, there was greater produc­
tivity growth in traded than in nontraded sectors. Changes in aggregate 
productivity are the result o f the sum of productivity changes in the var­
ious sectors, weighted by sectoral output shares, plus the reallocation of
£5 Table 4 A  Factors of Growth in Latin American Countries in the 1990s  
o  ________________________________________________________________
Export-Led
GDP Growth/Leading Exports with Private Public Spending Private Spending
Factor Spending (Years) Exports Only (Years) Driven (Years) Driven (Years)
Negative or zero GDP Jamaica, - /+  (1995-2000) Venezuela , R. B. de Colombia (1995-2000)
growth (<0.5%) Paraguay, + /-  (1995-2000) (1995-2000) Ecuador (1995-2000) 
Venezuela, R. B. de 
(1995-2000)
Low GDP growth Brazil (1990-4) Argentina (1995-2000) Honduras Bolivia (1995-2000)
(0.5-4.0%) Ecuador(1990-4) Brazil (1995-2000) (1995-2000) Honduras (1990—4)
Nicaragua (1990—4) El Salvador (1995-2000) Jamaica (1990-4)
Venezuela, R. B. de Mexico (1990—4)
(1990-4) Paraguay (1990-4) 
Peru (1995-2000) 
Uruguay (1990s)
Moderate to high Bolivia (1990-4) Chile (1995-2000) Argentina (1990-4) Colombia (1990—4)
GDP growth Chile (1990-4) Costa Rica (1990s) Peru (1990-4)
(>4.0%) Dominican Republic 
(1995-2000)






Source: Morley and Vos (forthcoming), based on a decomposition m ethod of the Keynesian multiplier by final demand categories.












1990-7 Free trade agreements
Colombia 1992-5 Liberalization and boom
1995-8 Stagnation
Costa Rica 1987-91 Trade liberalization
1992-8 Further opening








Sector Reallocation Effects: 
Employment
-2 .8 -2 .9 -3 .0 Large (toward agriculture, 
informal trade)
1.0 1.0 0.8 Large (toward urban 
informal trade)
0.7 2.0 -0 .4
-4 .0 -2 .4 -5 .1
4.4 2.4 4.6
0.9 4.4 -1 .2
0.8 0.1 1.3 Small
2.6 3.7 1.9 Small (-)
0.1 -1 .2 0.9 Small (-)
3.9 4.8 3.5 Small (-)
2.6 2.7 2.9 Small
2.0 2.8 1.9 Small
1.5 2.3 0.9 Small
0.6 3.0 -1 .0 Small
(Table continues on the following page.)
Table 4.2  (continued)
Productivity Growth









Cuba 1989-93 Opening for exchange market -8 .3 -13 .7 -5 .0 0
1994-8 Fiscal adjustment, flexibilization 
informal activity
4.1 11.1 0.1 0
Dominican
Republic
1991-6 Postliberalization 3.5 5.7 2.3 Small
Ecuador 1992-7 Postreform 0.1 1.3 -0 .9 Large I 
goodi
El Salvador 1991-5 Balance of payments and 
financial liberalization
14.3 -0 .6 31.3 Large
1995-6 Demand contract 9.6 4.4 14.0 Small
Guatemala 1987-92 Balance of payments 
liberalization
0.4 -0 .4 1.1 Large
1992-7 Balance of payments with 
domestic financial 
liberalization
0.3 -1 .3 0.8 Large
Jamaica 1980-9 Preliberalization 3.2 1.7 0.9 Small
1990-2 Financial liberalization 3.7 1.2 2.1 Small
1993-8 Trade liberalization -1 .0 0.5 -1 .6 Small
Mexico 1988-93 Financial liberalization 0.6 6.0 -0 .5 Small
1994-7 Peso crisis, NAFTA -0.8 -0 .2 -2.1 Small
Panama 1991-4 Stabilization and recovery 0.2 4.3 -2 .0 Large (out of agriculture)
1994-8 Trade reform 0.2 1.2 -0 .5 Fair (into informal services'
Paraguay 1982-92 Trade and exchange rate 
reform
-0 .4 1.2 -2 .5 Large (away from traded 
goods sectors)
1992-7 MERCOSUR and financial 
liberalization
-5 .7 -2.1 -8 .7 Large (away from traded 
goods sectors)
Peru 1986-90 Fligh Inflation period 0.7 1.1 0.6
1991-8 Balance of payments 
liberalization
0.6 1.1 0.5
Uruguay 1986-90 Pre-MERCOSUR 0.4 -0 .7 0.6
1990-4 MERCOSUR (I) 3.8 0.0 2.2
1994-7 MERCOSUR (II) 2.7 6.5 2.4
Source: Taylor and Vos 2002.
Note: MERCOSUR Common M arket of the South/Mercado Común del Sur; NAFTA N orth American Free Trade Agreement. Productivity 
growth =  annual rate of change of productivity.
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labor from low - to high-productivity sectors (see Taylor and Vos 2002). 
Findings from the country studies indicate that w ithin-sector produc­
tivity shifts and output growth rates largely determined the aggregate 
outcomes; that is, there w as not enough o f a shift from low - to high- 
productivity sectors to drive overall productivity growth. Typically, rel­
atively small em ploym ent reallocation effects were found, but in a few  
cases— Ecuador, Guatemala, M exico, and Panama— there were major 
labor reallocation effects, w ith low -productivity agriculture or urban 
informal services acting as “employers o f last resort.” H ence, produc­
tivity growth has remained rather sector specific and is not “lifting all 
b oats,” as had been hoped.
Turning to the pattern o f  growth and incom e distribution, in m ost 
countries o f the region one can observe a rise in the inequality o f primary 
incom es during the 1990s (see table 4.3). There is only a small number
Table 4 .3  Growth and Inequality in Latin America in the 1990s
Inequality in Overall Primary Incomes
Growth After Rising Inequality Decreasing Inequality Unchanged
Liberalization (Yearsj (Years) (Years)
H ig h A rg e n tin a  (1 9 9 1 -4 , C h ile  (1 9 9 2 -7 ) U ru g u ay
(> 5 % ) 1 9 9 6 -8 )
C hile  (1 9 7 6 -8 1 , 
1 9 8 4 -9 2 )
C o lo m b ia  (1 9 9 1 -5 )  
D o m in ic a n  R ep u b lic  
(1 9 9 1 -8 )
P eru  (1 9 9 1 -7 )
El S a lv ad o r (1 9 9 1 -7 )  
P a n a m a  (1 9 9 0 -4 )
(1 9 9 0 -7 )
M o d e ra te B oliv ia  (1 9 8 9 -9 7 ) B razil (1 9 9 4 -7 ) U ru g u ay
(2 -5 % ) B razil (1 9 8 7 -9 4 )  
C o s ta  R ica  (1 9 9 2 -8 )  
E c u a d o r  (1 9 9 0 -7 )  
M e x ico  (1 9 8 8 -9 4 )  
P a n a m a  (1 9 9 4 -8 )  
P a ra g u ay  (1 9 8 8 -9 1 , 
1 9 9 2 -4 )
C o sta  R ica  (1 9 8 7 -9 2 )  
C u b a  (1 9 9 4 -8 )
(1 9 8 6 -9 0 )
L o w C o lo m b ia  (1 9 9 5 -8 )
(0 -2 % ) E c u a d o r  (1 9 9 5 -9 )  
M e x ico  (1 9 8 5 -7 )  
P a ra g u ay  (1 9 9 5 -8 )
N eg a tiv e C u b a  (1 9 8 9 -9 3 )
( < 0 % ) M e x ico  (1 9 9 4 -5 )
Source: Taylor and Vos 2002.
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o f episodes after the liberalization process in which incom e inequality  
has been decreasing. Trade liberalization and capital account opening  
appear to have com e w ith a “skill tw ist.” Looking m ore deeply into sec­
toral adjustment patterns, it becomes clear that the drive toward effi­
ciency gains has led to the adoption o f more skill-intensive technologies, 
in many instances driving the abundant supply of unskilled workers into  
unemploym ent or low -paid informal sector em ploym ent along the lines 
shown in figure 4 .1 . Virtually w ithout exception, w age differentials be­
tween skilled and unskilled workers rose in Latin America during the 
postliberalization period. Excess labor w as typically absorbed into the 
nontraded, informal trade, and services sectors (as in Bolivia, Colom bia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru), or— as happened in a few  
cases— traditional agriculture served as a sponge for the labor market 
(Guatemala, M exico, and, in the late 1980s, Panama).
The sectoral patterns have not been uniform. In Argentina, for in­
stance, productivity increases in the traded goods sector affected w ork­
ers of all skill levels. W age rigidity being greater for unskilled workers, 
there was a reduction in earnings inequality in the sector, but overall the 
greater inequality in Argentina resulted from rising incom e concentra­
tion in the nontraded sector, com bined w ith the greater skill intensity of  
new  investment, and from rising unem ploym ent in the traded goods sec­
tor. By contrast, in M exico, reorganization o f manufacturing produc­
tion was found to be a major source of greater skill demand, pushing up 
wage inequality in the traded goods sector, w hile many o f the displaced 
workers were absorbed by agriculture, at least until 1994. In Brazil, pro­
ductivity growth produced em ployment losses in the manufacturing sec­
tor. Labor demand fell for everyone in modern manufacturing, but 
skilled workers suffered the m ost. Real hourly wages also fell for both  
skilled and unskilled workers in modern industry, but, here again, 
slightly less for unskilled workers, showing— as in Argentina— greater 
rigidity in w age adjustm ent at the low er end; hence, skilled-unskilled  
incom e differentials show ed a slight decline. As indicated, in m ost 
other cases such productivity grow th in traded goods sectors pushed  
up skill differentials in the sector and w idened the gap between formal- 
and informal-sector workers.
As shown in figure 4 .3 , rising per-worker differentials do not neces­
sarily translate into rising inequality and poverty at the household level. 
Cases o f rising inequality clearly predominate (east o f the vertical axis), 
but so do episodes in which poverty fell during the 1990s (south o f the 
horizontal axis). Econom ic growth evidently helped reduce poverty, 
even in cases in w hich liberalization tended to heighten the degree o f in­
equality. As a result, m ost cases o f poverty reduction occurred in the first 
half o f the 1990s, and those o f poverty increases occurred in the period
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Figure 4.3  Poverty and Inequality o f  Per Capita H ousehold  
Income in Latin America During the 1990s
Rising Poverty, Falling Inequality
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of growth slow dow n thereafter. Only in a few  cases— particularly, Chile, 
El Salvador, and Guatemala— was poverty reduction associated with  
moderate to  strong export-led growth and falling inequality. In m ost 
other cases, the resumption o f growth follow ing a surge in capital in­
flow s paved the w ay for an expansion of aggregate demand and suffi­
cient overall em ployment growth, or a rise in real wages, to bring about 
a reduction in poverty. In Argentina and M exico, the rise in inequality 
has been associated with labor demand shifts favoring skilled workers 
and em ployment shifts whereby unskilled workers are absorbed into in­
formal activities or unemployment. On balance, these effects have led to  
a rise in poverty despite positive per capita growth. In other cases, chang­
ing labor market conditions have triggered strong labor supply responses, 
including rising female participation, as in urban areas o f  Ecuador and 
in Panama. Elsewhere, emigrant remittances (Central America, Cuba, 
Dom inican Republic, and Ecuador after 2000) or social security trans­
fers (Costa Rica) have a strong positive influence in terms o f the reduc­
tion o f poverty and inequality at the household level.
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The E ffects o f  T rade R e fo rm s on  S k ill In ten sity  
a n d  L a b o r  In co m e  In eq u a lity
In the above analysis, we looked at observed patterns of growth and 
changes in inequality. Because countries introduced trade reforms in con­
junction w ith stop-go m acroeconom ic policies, it is difficult to discern 
the precise impact o f each o f these factors. Ganuza, M orley, Robinson, 
and Vos (2004) thus tried to disentangle their differential effects by sim ­
ulating the effects with the help of a “top-dow n ” multiple m odeling  
framework w ith the com putable general equilibrium (CGE) m odel as the 
first layer and a m ethodology o f m icrosim ulations as the second layer. 
The latter translates the general equilibrium effects o f trade reform on  
the labor market onto household incom es, allowing one to derive an es­
timate of the impact o f m acroeconom ic changes on poverty and inequal­
ity, making use o f the full incom e distribution from micro (household  
survey) data.
This m ethodology seems particularly useful for analyzing the im pli­
cations for skill intensity and wage gaps of trade reforms when taken in 
isolation. The short answer is that these effects essentially depend on  
whether the traded goods sector is relatively skill intensive and on how  
wage rates are set in the labor market. In about one third o f the country 
cases analyzed, import liberalization leads to  higher overall skill inten­
sity o f production and widening wage gaps. In another one third o f the 
cases, skills differentials decline, and in the final group there is little 
change. According to CGE m odels, if countries apply a unilateral, uni­
form tariff cut, the earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers 
is expected to increase in six country cases (Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dom inican Republic, Ecuador, and El Salvador), whereas a smaller 
earnings gap is expected in Honduras, M exico, and Uruguay and, to a 
lesser extent, in Argentina and Colom bia. In all other countries, the sim ­
ulation of further unilateral trade opening shows no substantial shifts in 
skill inequality.
H ence, rising skill intensity resulting from import liberalization does 
not seem to explain all o f the rising labor income inequality observed in 
table 4 .3 . Technology changes associated w ith capital inflows should  
also be considered . The m odeling analysis suggests that at least as much, 
if not m ost, o f the rise in earnings gaps that may be associated with trade 
reform originates from sectoral labor shifts, along the lines discussed  
earlier; that is, w ith many more workers shifting to lower-paid jobs in 
informal sectors and fewer benefiting from higher-paid new  jobs in m od­
ern sectors (manufacturing or nontradables). Trade reform has not only  
com e with a skill twist, as m entioned above, but also, at least as im por­
tantly, it has com e with a “sectoral tw ist” inducing greater labor income 
inequality.
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Conclusions
The core issue of econom ic developm ent involves the m ovem ent of  
resources (labor, in particular) from low - to high-productivity sectors, 
thereby creating new growth dynamics. This is w hat structural adjust­
ment should be about. This is not a one-tim e process, but rather a 
revolving one. N or is it likely to be a sm ooth and continuous process; in­
stead, it w ill tend to occur in spurts (“big pushes” ). If, as in postliberal­
ization Latin America, the spurt lacks dynamism or is hampered by 
m acroeconom ic volatility, new  developm ent traps m ay emerge. The 
country evidence reviewed in this chapter shows that trade liberalization 
and capital account opening have generated efficiency gains in som e sec­
tors (particularly manufacturing and modern services) but at the cost o f 
an expulsion o f labor to low-productivity sectors (traditional agriculture 
or informal services). Such labor reallocations have been a major source 
o f widening incom e gaps. Skill intensity has increased in m ost parts o f 
the modern sector o f the econom y, despite the predominance o f un­
skilled workers in the labor force. Perhaps unskilled labor is not Latin 
America’s comparative advantage after all, but, clearly, shifts in macro 
prices (the real exchange rate and interest rates, in particular) and the 
opening o f the capital account have provided strong incentives for the 
im portation o f more skill-intensive technologies. These results cannot be 
fully attributed to the trade reforms conducted in the 1990s. CGE m odel 
sim ulations suggest that there are as m any cases in which import liber­
alization has fomented greater skill intensity as there are cases in which  
unskilled labor has benefited and cases in which there is not much of an 
effect on average skill intensity and skill-related wage inequality.
Surges in capital inflows, rather than export drives, have been the m a­
jor tools for overcom ing demand constraints. Volatility in capital mar­
kets thus has directly affected growth, because the trends toward em ­
ploym ent growth, real wage increases, and poverty reduction seen in the 
expansionary phase of the cycle are reversed again during downswings 
in capital inflows. These factors, which to a large extent act upon the 
demand side o f the econom y, appear to have predominated among the 
observed inequality and poverty outcom es o f trade and capital account 
liberalization in Latin America during the 1990s. Because o f the financial 
volatility and the stop-go pattern o f m acroeconom ic policies, growth per­
formance and poverty outcom es have been positive during some episodes 
and negative during others, but on the w hole, they have been rather 
disappointing.
Structural reforms have thus interacted poorly w ith short-term  
m acroeconomic adjustment mechanisms. Policy reforms in Latin America 
have focused too  much on elim inating protection and dom estic price
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distortions and too little on the need for active government policies to  
provide adequate levels o f social overhead capital (infrastructure, educa­
tion, market institutions) and to prom ote the creation of vertical techno­
logical linkages. In the empirical discussion, a few concrete policy issues 
came to the fore, such as the use of credible export prom otion policies 
as a potential element in prom oting certain technological externalities in 
various countries (for exam ple, Chile, the Central American nations, 
and the D om inican Republic). Rising skill-based earnings differentials 
hint at insufficient human capital investment, and financial opening in 
m ost countries preceded establishm ent o f adequate regulatory frame­
w orks and mechanisms to limit volatility in capital inflows. These issues, 
along with a greater concern about incom e distribution and poverty re­
duction, are now  surfacing as “second-stage reform s” on the liberaliza­
tion agenda (Kuczynski and W illiam son 200 3 ), but clearly they ought 
to have been part of the reform process right from the start. Belated as 
their placement on the agenda may be, these issues should now  be pur­
sued aggressively and should becom e the focus o f research and policy 
recom m endations.
E ndnotes
1. See, for instance, Hirschman (1968) and Prebisch (1961, 1963).
2. In the literature, this is known as the skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) hypothesis. It is claimed that labor demand in many advanced economies 
has shifted away from unskilled workers and toward skilled workers as a conse­
quence of technologies that require fewer workers but higher skill levels. The SBTC 
hypothesis has no direct link with trade, at least in the case of industrial countries, 
although the same does not seem to be true for developing countries. The SBTC 
hypothesis is seen as the main theoretical alternative to the view that trade is the 
key cause of rising wage inequality.
3. Spilimbergo, Londono, and Szekely (1999) and Wood (1997) provided 
some evidence on this point.
4. See Birdsall and Londono (1997), Fischer (2001), and Learner et al. (1999).
5. The findings reported below are based on two rounds of studies. The first 
looks at the broader set of reforms, but particularly current and capital accounts 
liberalization. These results have been published in Spanish (see Ganuza et al. 
2001) and in English (see Vos, Taylor, and Paes de Barros 2002). The second source 
focused in greater detail on the impact of trade liberalization and export promo­
tion on poverty and inequality. These findings are in Ganuza, Morley, Robinson, 
and Vos (2004, forthcoming).
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T he  topic  of business cycles in  econom ics is ancient, but rarely ad­
dressed in the context o f developing or transition econom ies. T o a de­
gree, the absence o f theory fits the reality. A lthough they are buffeted  
by frequent and at times substantial m acroeconom ic disturbances, 
nonindustrial econom ies often do not seem  to  generate their ow n en­
dogenous fluctuations. But cyclical phenom ena do still appear. For ex­
ample, devaluation/appreciation cycles, oscillating capital inflows and 
outflow s, and investm ent/excess capacity swings have occurred in many  
countries over the years.
This chapter sets out sim ple form al m odels for the sorts of cycles 
just m entioned. Three sim ple principles are em ployed: O utput is de­
termined by effective demand; dem and is influenced by shifts in the 
incom e distribution; and there are strong, potentia lly  destabilizing  
interactions betw een the real and financial sides o f  the econom y. W e 
begin w ith  a m em ory-refreshing glance at Richard G ood w in ’s (1967) 
predator-prey grow th cycle, w hich  deals w ith  interactions between  
distribution and dem and, and then go on to  the other three m odels, 
pointing out policies that m ight be used to  dam pen cyclical fluctua­
tions, or even be put to better use. In particular, intelligent ways to 
m anage exchange rate, capital market, and investm ent policy are 
discussed.
The author is Arnhold Professor of International Cooperation and Development, New 
School University, New York. The analysis in this chapter draws on Taylor (2004). 




The form al specifications presented here all boil dow n to sets o f  tw o  
differential equations w ith a similar m athem atical form. Consider the 
Jacobian }  o f the tw o equations evaluated at a stationary point:
/  =
/ l l  /12
721  7*2 2 .
(5.1)
where TrJ =  / u  +  j2 2 and D e t ]  =  / n  722 — j 12 j 2\. W e will be considering 
systems in which the first variable has stable ow n dynamics, / n  <  0 , 
whereas the second feeds back positively into itself, j22 >  0 , creating a 
potential instability. If the system is to avoid a saddle point with  
DetJ  <  0  and instead generate cycles, it has to be damped by oppositely  
signed off-diagonal entries— 7 1 2 /2 1  <  0 and I/1 2 / 2 1 I >  I/1 1  / 2 2 I- That is, 
an increase in the second variable sets o ff a response in the first that 
drives the second back down. If this effect is strong enough, the destabi­
lizing positive feedback from j22 >  0  can be overcome.
This sort o f specification is especially relevant to econom ic variables 
set up as ratios o f quantities (for exam ple, output-capital) or as real 
prices (exchange rate-price level), which in practice often behave in a 
quasi-stationary fashion, rather than trending over time. W hen they 
form a stable system , differential equations involving such variables 
w ill generate a convergent spiral around the stationary point in a two- 
dim ensional phase diagram. Continuing exogenous “shocks” w ould  be 
required to  keep the damped cycle going over time. The spiral may also  
tend toward a “limit cycle” approaching a “closed orbit,” or else it may 
diverge in an expanding spiral. In the follow ing discussion, w e will not 
be greatly concerned with w hich o f these possible outcom es happens. To  
find out, one has to resort to relatively sophisticated mathematics, which  
w ould take too  much time to develop here . 1 Rather, the emphasis will 
be on describing econom ic mechanisms that can make the potentially  
destabilizing positive value o f 722  and damping through 721 and 712  show  
up in the first place.
G oodw in ’s M odel
The G oodw in m odel is a simplified version o f this setup. As noted  
above, it is based on distributive conflict between capitalists and w ork­
ers. The workers, as it turns out, are econom ic predators, w ith output 
and em ploym ent as their prey. The original m odel presupposed full uti­
lization o f capital and savings-determined investment, but Taylor (2004)
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showed h ow  such un-Keynesian hypotheses can easily be relaxed. Let 
K  =  k X ,  w ith k  as a “technologically determ ined” capital-output ratio. 
The employed labor force is L =  bX.  If N  is the total population, then 
the em ploym ent ratio A is given by A =  L /N  =  b{K/i<)/N.  The growth  
rate o f N  is n. The wage share is B ,  and if all profits are saved and 
depreciation ignored, the growth rate g  o f the capital stock becomes 
g  =  (1 -  B )  X /K  =  (1 - B ) / k .
Over time, the evolution o f the em ploym ent ratio is determined by 
growth in output and population,
A =  A(g -  n) =  A{[( 1 -  B ) / k ] -  «}, (5.2)
where A =  d X / d t . A long Phillips curve lines, the wage share is assumed 
to rise in response to the em ployment ratio,
B =  B ( - A + B X ) .  (5.3)
At a stationary point where A =  IP =  0, the Jacobian of (5.2) -  (5.3) 
takes the rather extreme form,
J =
0  —A/ k
B q r  0
(5.4)
The tw o variables basically damp fluctuations in one another, w ith  
no dynamics o f their ow n. Hirsch and Smale (1974, p. 262) showed that 
with zeros along the diagonal o f the Jacobian, A and B  chase each other 
endlessly around a counterclockwise closed orbit in the (A, B)  plane that 
encircles the stationary point (A*, B*'). See figure 5.1, in which the par­
ticular orbit that the variables trace is set by initial conditions. The labor 
share is the predator because it rises with A. The em ploym ent ratio, in 
turn, is the prey because a higher value o f B  squeezes profits and cuts 
back accum ulation and growth.
A C on trac tio n a ry  D evalua tion  Cycle
The real wage or wage share is by no means the only object o f distribu­
tive conflict, especially in developing econom ies open to international 
trade. In part because it affects the real wage, the real exchange rate 
Z =  e/P  often is a bone o f contention (e stands for the nom inal exchange 
rate in units o f the local currency against the foreign currency, and P is 
the national price level). Its m ovem ents can set o ff cycles, especially 
w hen real devaluation has contractionary effects on output— apparently
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Figure 5.1  C losed  O rbits in  th e G o o d w in  M o d el
X
the case historically in m any developing countries. W ith a lag, devalua­
tion may lead to an export push, follow ed by wage increases that cut 
back on exports and ultimately on demand and real wages themselves. 
Following Larrain and Sachs (1986), it is easy to m odel such interactions 
over time.
Let e  =  E / K  be the export-capital ratio. A lagged response o f e  to  
changes in z  is a realistic assum ption,
s  =  a[e*(z) -  «], (5.5)
where s*{z)  is the “long-run” export level corresponding to a given value 
o f z. Because o f preexisting contracts, the need to search for new foreign 
outlets, and so on, exports do not im mediately respond to price signals. 
Rather, their foreign currency value e j e  is likely to follow  a J-curve as a 
function o f time. After a nom inal devaluation, e je  first drops as e jumps 
up, and then gradually rises according to (5.5).
It is convenient to gauge econom ic activity by the output-capital ra­
tio  u =  X /K .  Suppose that the m oney w age rate w  changes according  
to a sim ple Phillips curve, tv =  f3bw(u — u ) ,  in w hich ¡3 is a response
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coefficient, b the labor-output ratio, and u a long-term level of the output- 
capital ratio .2  From this equation, higher activity will make m oney wages 
begin to  rise. Suppose that the price level is set as a markup over labor 
and import costs, P =  (1 +  r)(wb  +  ea), in which a is the import-output
ratio. Then w  >  0 means that the real exchange rate will start to appreci­
ate (move downward), leading export expansion to slow .
O ne can show  that real exchange rate dynamics are given by
i  =  z ( l  -  <f>)[e -  fib(u -  u)],  (5.6)
where <f> =  ea/(ea + wb)  is the share o f  imports in variable costs, and 
e =  e /e  is an exogenous growth rate o f the spot exchange rate. If deval­
uation is contractionary, an increase in z  pushes u down, making 
dz /dz  >  0 and creating a potential instability.
Around a steady state w ith e  =  z  =  0 , w ith positive e  and z, the signs 
o f the entries in the Jacobian o f (5.5) and (5.6) are as follows:
s  z
e  -  +  (5.7)
z -  +
The off-diagonal terms have offsetting signs and can stabilize the sys­
tem. In contrast to the G oodw in m odel, it is n ow  the “prey” variable z 
with unstable ow n dynamics— instead o f  rapidly reproducing wage- 
share foxes, think o f real exchange rate rabbits.
Figure 5 .2  illustrates the resulting cycles. The “export response” 
curve corresponds to e  =  0  and the “rate dynam ics” corresponds to 
z  =  0. Starting from an initial equilibrium, a m axi-devaluation follow ed  
by an exchange rate freeze displaces the real rate upward. There is fur­
ther depreciation until a trajectory crosses the rate dynamics schedule. 
As a result o f  the lag in the export response, e  keeps growing until the 
spiral crosses that curve. A  dow nsw ing follow s, setting o ff a clockwise 
spiral w ith oscillating exports and real exchange rate (not to mention  
output and inflation), or else cyclical divergence. A closed orbit w ould  
be an intermediate case.
An alternative policy could involve a steady depreciation at a rate e. 
Via (5.6), this w ould shift the rate dynamics schedule to the right, lead­
ing to  a long-term export gain but a lower real wage. If higher profits 
and m ore exports stimulated technical advance, the econom y could  
jump to a higher growth path. Amsden (1989) emphasized that such a 
strategy contributed to the Republic o f  Korea’s export miracle around  
the three-quarter mark o f  the 20th  century. Because o f  capital account 
complications o f the sort about to be discussed, Ocampo (2003) suggested
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that an appropriately managed floating rate is the corresponding con ­
temporary alternative.
A D eveloping-C ountry  D ebt Cycle
The instability in (5.6) is the result o f interactions between the real wage 
and effective demand. Another story can be built around capital m ove­
ments and “confidence” in the home country’s ability to manage its ex ­
ternal debt, bringing in interactions between the real and financial sides of 
the econom y, as discussed above. Such effects have been important in the 
debt cycles observed in many developing countries in the 1990s. A simple 
formal model emphasizing short- to medium-term dynamics follows, 
drawing heavily on ideas proposed by Frenkel (1983) and Neftci (2002).
W e can begin by stating the familiar “uncovered interest rate parity” 
equation relating hom e and foreign interest rates and exchange rate ex ­
pectations in the form
i =  i* +  (e/e) +  a . (5.8)
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The new  symbols include i for the hom e interest rate and i* for the 
foreign rate. It is assumed that there is a “credible” forecast e  (redefined 
from last section) o f the expected instantaneous change in the nom inal 
rate e, perhaps based on a crawling peg being pursued by the central 
bank. But even taking that into account, there is an observed “spread” 
between the hom e and foreign interest rates, w ith the former being sub­
stantially higher (as much as 1 ,000 or 2 ,0 0 0  basis points). In effect, at 
least som e market participants believe that there is a possibility o f a large 
devaluation at som e future time, and thereby insist on a return far ex ­
ceeding i* +  (e/e) if they are to hold hom e’s securities. The magnitude 
of the spread is measured by cr, and its dynamics have been crucial in ob ­
served crises. Falling w ell short o f the drama o f the real world, a simple 
exam ple is presented below , based on the potentially unstable dynamics 
of foreign investor confidence in the hom e exchange rate.
A post-Keynesian wrinkle is that (5.8) can be interpreted as fixing (at 
least a floor under) the hom e interest rate on loans. That is, on the right- 
hand side of (5 .8), the total cost o f funds for a firm borrowing abroad 
to finance a project at hom e w ill be the foreign rate +  expected cost from  
depreciation +  spread. Lending rates at hom e are unlikely to  fall below  
this sum. But with (5.8) setting i, the hom e supplies o f  credit and m oney  
w ill have to be endogenous along post-Keynesian lines. W e forego the 
analytical details here.
To set up equations for foreign borrowing, we can begin by letting 12 and 
12* stand for home and foreign private sector wealth, respectively. Let T  and 
T* be the stocks o f bonds (“T-bills”) issued by the two countries’ govern­
ments, and let qP K  and q*P*K*  be the asset values o f their capital stocks 
(q and q* are “valuation ratios” or levels of “Tobin’s q ”). Then total world 
wealth is f l  +  efl*  =  (qPK +  T) +  e(q*P*K* +  T*).  Expressions for the 
two countries’ individual levels o f wealth will be presented momentarily.
W ith regard to foreign borrowing, assume that the hom e private sec­
tor holds no foreign assets (we thus ignore interesting issues of “dollar­
ization” and “capital flight” ), and that the foreign country does not 
bother to hold hom e’s securities as reserves. H om e’s net foreign assets N  
then becom e N  =  eR* — Tf,  w ith eR* as the domestic value of hom e’s 
international reserves R*,  and Tf  as foreign private sector holdings of 
the hom e country’s bonds. If bond markets clear and both countries 
satisfy their balance sheets, it is easy to show  that 12 =  qP K  +  T  +  N  
and 12* =  q*P*K* +  T* — N/e .  Let 77* be the share of the foreign pri­
vate sector’s portfolio assigned to home bonds, or
Tf  =  er?*!!* =  eV*(q*P*K* +  T *  -  N/e) .  (5.9)
W e concentrate on the dynamics o f hom e’s external debt Tf  and re­
serves e R * . The coefficient 77* in (5.9) w ill be determined in temporary
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equilibrium by the interest rates, the expected rate o f depreciation, and 
the spread, so to see w hat happens to Tf over  time, we can just exam ine 
the behavior o f the equation Tf  =  er]*Cl*. Substituting through the rele­
vant incom e/expenditure and flow s o f funds relationships gives
T f =  7f [ e A *  +  (eP*auK -  Pa*u*K*) +  iTf] (5.10)
with
A*  =  (q*g* +  y  *)P*K (5.11)
and a and a* and u and u*,  respectively, standing for im port-output and 
output-capital ratios in the tw o countries.
The term eA*  represents the increase in demand for hom e’s T-bills 
induced by growth in foreign w ealth (with q*  as the foreign country’s as­
set valuation ratio, g* as its capital stock growth rate, and y* its primary 
fiscal deficit as a share o f  the value o f  the capital stock P*K*).  The term 
(eP* auK — Pa*u*K*)  in (5.10) is the hom e trade deficit that must be fi­
nanced by external borrowing, and the last term iTf  shows that the home 
country is pursuing Ponzi finance in the sense that it is running up more 
external debt to meet existing interest obligations.
The change in home’s foreign reserves (ignoring its interest receipts 
ei*R*  as being trivial) is eR* =  Tf — (eP* auK  -  P a * u * K * ) -  iTf, or flow  
capital inflows minus the trade deficit and interest payments abroad. Sub­
stituting (5.10) into this expression shows that
eR *  =  ey*A*  -  (1 -  rf ) [ {eP *a u K -  Pa*u*K*)  +  iTf\. (5.12)
So reserves grow  faster w ith “autonom ous” capital inflows eq*A*,  
and otherwise are eroded by the trade deficit and interest payments (with 
the term 1 — 17* taking spillovers into growth o f foreign wealth into con ­
sideration).
Reserve increases are likely to lead to an expansion o f m oney and 
credit. In the real econom y, both activity u and the trade deficit 
(1eP*auK — Pa*u*K*)  should rise, reducing the growth o f reserves: 
d(eR*)/d(eR*)  <  0 in (5.12). A higher rate spread cr will push up the in­
terest rate i from (5.8). The cost o f external debt service iTf  w ill increase, 
but the trade deficit is likely to fall. W e assume the latter effect dom i­
nates, so d(eR*)/da >  0. The “stable reserves” schedule in figure 5.3  
corresponds to the condition eR* =  0. Suppose that ij* increases in a 
foreign portfolio shift toward hom e bonds. Because in (5.12) w e have 
d(eR*)/d(eR*) <  0 , eR* w ould  have to rise to hold eR* =  0; that is, the 
stable reserves schedule shifts outward.
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Figure 5 . 3  C yclical A djustm en t o f  R eserves an d  th e R eturn  
Spread A fter a Shift in  F oreign  P ortfo lio  




Turning to the evolution o f the spread over time, it is likely that higher 
reserves reduce anxiety in forward markets, so that dd/d(eR*)  <  0. On 
the other hand, there may be positive feedback of expectational changes 
into themselves, d&ldcr >  0 , because a fall in the spread induces less per­
ceived risk to  holding home securities (and a rise creates greater preoc­
cupations). W e get the differential equation
& =  f(eR*,  a) ,  (5.13)
w ith the partial derivatives just indicated. The stable reserves schedule in 
figure 5.3 represents the condition & =  0.
Figure 5.3 shows local dynamics for the system (5.12) -  (5 .13). As in 
figure 5 .2 , the dynamic system generates clockwise spirals. By shifting 
the stable reserves schedule outward, an increase in rj* m oves the steady- 
state equilibrium from A to B. W ith the capital inflow , reserves start to
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increase, in turn m aking cf <  0. These trends continue until the econom y  
reaches point C, where an increasing trade deficit makes eR* <  0. At 
point D , reserve losses become severe enough to force the return spread 
to start to rise, pushing up the interest rate as well. In the diagram, a sta­
ble or unstable cycle may ensue. In practice, in the 1990s, rising rates 
and currency imbalances in developing-country balance sheets (with as­
sets m ostly denominated in local currencies and liabilities in foreign cur­
rencies) forced a  to jump upward and crises follow ed. But the cyclical 
dynamic path that led into the collapses was exactly the one illustrated 
in the transition from points A through D  in figure 5.3.
W hat could be done to avoid such a destabilizing spiral? Restrictions 
on capital inflow s as applied in Chile and Colom bia in the 1990s could  
m itigate the effects o f an upward jump in 17*. “Liability policies” aimed 
at improving private and public sector debt profiles w ould operate in the 
same direction, as w ould better prudential regulation of the domestic fi­
nancial system. In som e countries, partial sterilization of capital inflows 
has been feasible for the central bank; countercyclical fiscal policy may 
be another option. For more detailed analysis o f such policy m oves, see 
Ocam po (2003).
Excess C apacity , C o rp o ra te  D eb t Burden, 
and  a “ C ola S how er”
Sticking to a stable interest rate in a generally post-Keynesian world, 
it is interesting to  ask how  animal spirits and corporate (as opposed  
to fiscal) debt interact over the cycle— som e diagnoses o f  the East Asian 
financial crises com e to mind. Cycles im posed on a growth m odel intro­
duced by Lavoie and Godley (2000) help illustrate the dynamics. Several 
questions can be addressed:
1. Is there a tendency for industrialized econom ies (such as Korea’s) 
to generate excess capacity and/or a rising organic com position of capi­
tal, to prime the plum bing for a Schumpeterian “cold show er” ? 3
2. If investment continues to rise while capacity utilization is falling, 
h ow  does the implied “realization crisis” work itself out?
3. In particular, how  long can investors’ optim ism  persist w hen over­
capacity begins to raise its head?
Such questions were hotly debated in Left U.S. policy circles around 
the latest turn o f the century (see, for exam ple, Greider [1997] and 
many subsequent pieces). They obviously cannot be fully answered by 
contem plating a clockwise spiral in a two-dim ensional phase plane, but 
perhaps the construct to fo llow  can shed som e light.
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The key state variable for Lavoie and Godley is A, redefined from the 
second section above as the ratio o f corporate debt to the replacement 
value o f the capital stock. That is, A =  L/PK,  w ith L as business debt 
currently outstanding. For simplicity, w e assume that business firms 
borrow only from banks, and that the banking system balance sheet 
takes the “W icksellian” form M  =  L, with M  as the m oney supply. Ba­
sically, “loans create m oney” in the story to follow . The firms also issue 
equity to the household sector. They practice markup pricing over wage 
costs at a constant rate, implicitly setting the profit rate r. Like r and A, 
several other variables in the m odel are norm alized by PK.
A key distinction centers on the effect o f A on the output-capital ratio
u. Is effective demand “debt burdened” (du/dX <  0) or “debt led” 
(du/dA >  0)? Second, if the debt ratio behaves in self-stabilizing fashion  
(dk/dX <  0 in a total derivative through the dynamic system ), then w hat 
about the sign o f d k /d u ? Lavoie and Godley called a negative value 
“norm al.” A  positive “M inskyan” response of debt growth to econom ic 
activity is not a bad label. 4
In a bit m ore detail, macro equilibrium can be described in terms of 
saving and investment functions. The growth rate of the capital stock  
permitted by available saving, g s, follow s from the flow  o f fund balances 
for firms and households. Firms save a proportion Sf of  their incom e net 
of interest payments r — jX (with r as the profit rate and j  as the prede­
termined real rate o f interest). Their other sources o f funds are new bor­
rowing XL and issuance o f equity. A  working hypothesis is that they fi­
nance a share \  ° f  their capital form ation g  =  I / K  (I is gross investment 
and we ignore depreciation) w ith  new shares. If V  is the stock o f equity 
outstanding and Pv its price, w e get PvV/PK =  xg-
Investment g  equals the sum o f business retained earnings S f ( r  — /A) 
and new issues o f securities. The overall business flow  o f funds is S f ( r  
— jX) +  XL +  P„V — g  =  0 , which can be restated as
sf (r -  /A) +  AL -  (1 -  X)g =  0 . (5.14)
A post-Keynesian or “endogenous m oney” tw ist in this equation is 
the term for the growth of bank credit, AL. The profit rate r  and growth  
rate g  are determined on the real side o f the m odel, so the supply o f bank 
loans has to be endogenous to allow  firms to carry through their invest­
ment plans.
Total primary wealth in the econom y is i l  =  qPK,  all held by house­
holds. Their consum ption yh =  P C /P K  is assumed to depend on (nor­
malized) incom e and w ealth, jh  =  ( 1  — Sh)£h +
H ousehold incom e comprises the wage bill per unit o f capital stock  
( u  — r ) ,  loan interest paid by firms that is assumed to be transferred to 
the household sector by banks (/A), and the part o f earnings not retained
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by firms that flow s to households as dividends (1 — Sf)(r — /A). W ith  
¿jk =  u — r +  jX +  (1 — Sf)(r — /A) =  u — Sf(r =  /A), the household flow  
o f funds is
sh[(u -  sf)(r -  /A)] -  <f>q -  x g  ~  AM = 0 .  (5.15)
Because L =  M and L =  M  from the banking system ’s balance sheet, 
accounting consistency ensures that households obligingly pick up the 
new  deposits AM that bank lending creates.
The growth rate o f the capital stock permitted by available saving, gs, 
follow s from the sum of (5.14) and (5.15),
shu +  Sf( 1 -  sh)(r -  /A) -  <pq -  g s =  0. (5.16)
Post-Keynesian investment functions emphasize cash-flow  considera­
tions. If the interest burden /A increases, firms are likely to cut back on  
capital form ation g'. For symmetry with the saving function (5.16), it is 
convenient to make g' depend on q,  and w e also carry a term in capacity 
utilization:
g' =  go +  Pu +  q q  -  'T/A. (5.17)
The short-term macro equilibrium condition is g' — g s =  0 , or
go +  (V +  <W<7 +  [sy(l ~  Sh) -  V]  /A -  [sf (l  -  sh)Tr +  sh -  p]u =  0,
(5.18)
where the profit rate r =  ttu,  w ith i t  as the share o f profits in total in­
com e (assumed constant for simplicity).
The usual stability condition is a positive value for the term in brack­
ets multiplying u in (5 .18), Sf( 1 — s/,)7r +  si, ~ /3  >  0. Assuming that it is 
satisfied, note the am biguous effect o f ;A on u. A bigger debt burden re­
duces investment demand through the coefficient — iT but also cuts into  
firms’ saving. Filtered through profits distributed to households, lower 
retained earnings create a net leakage reduction of s / ( l  -  sa);A. If this 
term exceeds IT, effective demand is debt led. W hen 'T >  s /f l  — s/,)/A, 
demand is debt burdened. The remaining term in (5.18) involves q.  
Through both investm ent and saving effects, a higher q  increases the 
level o f econom ic activity.
To set up a cycle m odel around A, w e can bring in investment confi­
dence. The straightforward approach is to make the intercept term go in 
the investment function (5.17) a dynamic variable,
go =  4  (A, go). (5.19)
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Positive feedback can be introduced by making the second partial 
derivative of the function fg positive; a degree of caution on the part of 
investing firms (borrower’s and lender’s risks, and so forth) suggests that 
the first partial should be negative.
From the business sector’s flow of funds (5.14), a differential equa­
tion for A can be written as
k = (Sfj ~  g)A + (1 -  x )g  ~  Sfiru. (5.20)
As noted above, dk/du from this equation can take either sign, 
whereas we assume that dk/d\ <  0. The short-term macro variables g 
and u will both respond positively to go, so (5.20) can be restated as
k — /a(A, go). (5.21)
Given the signs of the partial derivatives of fg postulated in connec­
tion with (5.19), the existence of a cyclical solution to (5.19) and (5.21) 
requires that dk /dg0 >  0; that is, a Minskyan debt growth response to 
rising animal spirits. Figure 5.4 shows the dynamics, with the “growth”
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schedule corresponding to g0 =  0 and the “debt” curve corresponding to 
A >  0. The familiar clockwise spiral appears.
An initial low-level temporary equilibrium at A will be associated 
with a falling debt burden and improving animal spirits until the (go, A) 
trajectory crosses the debt schedule at B. Then A begins to rise, while 
go still increases until the growth schedule is crossed (point D ). Au­
tonomous investment begins to fall, and the cycle bottoms out as the 
debt ratio declines after the trajectory crosses the corresponding sched­
ule again at E. Around that point, presumably, the cold shower kicks in.
What happens to capacity utilization while this spiral uncoils? Almost 
certainly, u responds positively to g o- It is also likely that effective de­
mand is debt burdened. On these assumptions (du/ dgo >  0 and du/dA < 0 ) ,  
we can sketch the positively sloped “capacity utilization” contours in 
figure 5.4. Each curve shows combinations of go and A that hold u con­
stant, with its level increasing across contours toward the southeast. On 
this accounting, a realization crisis occurs at point C, where the trajec­
tory is tangent to a contour line. Thereafter, u falls while animal spirits 
continue increasing until point D—growing overcapacity precedes a fall 
in optimism in this scenario. Together with a rising debt burden, a lower 
level of u slows investment demand; ultimately, output X  =  uK  will be­
gin to fall as well.
One argument in the late 1990s was that a cycle of the sort sketched 
in the diagram was especially threatening because industrial capacity 
had been growing worldwide since the mid-1980s, under the stimulus of 
globalization. Instead of just one country’s macro system, the whole 
world’s was supposed to be going through a confidence squeeze. Appar­
ent over-investment in capital goods supporting information technology 
(excess capacity for computer components) and infrastructure for the 
Internet (thousands of miles of unused fiberoptic cable) only made the 
situation worse.
Second, inflation had slowed almost everywhere, so that falling markup 
rates resulting from rising interest costs and decreasing capacity utiliza­
tion were beginning to cause price levels to decline. Following Palley 
(1996), it would be straightforward to add a more complete treatment 
of the financial system to the present setup to show how debt deflation 
could further cut into economic activity.
Third, wage increases as advocated by people on the Left could restore 
aggregate demand—as may be the case in many developing countries—is 
wage led.5 It is also true that demand is not stimulated by higher inter­
est rates. So attempts to push rates down make sense in terms of the 
present model. Whether such a move would forestall massive worldwide 




There are numerous oscillatory processes at work in the real economy, 
out there. Moreover, their importance changes over time. Simple little 
two-dimensional models cannot begin to cope with all the fluctuations 
(and fluctuations of fluctuations) that exist.
Nevertheless, they can focus attention on key oscillations. Devaluation 
and external debt cycles in developing economies surely happen. In both 
rich and poor countries, distributive and some sort of Lavoie-Godley- 
Minsky financial oscillations are visibly present. Trying to put the whole 
set of motions into a plausible package is the challenge, which neither 
econometrics nor computer simulation is likely to meet fully. But at least 
the toy models and their fancier cousins give a modicum of insight into 
some of the mechanisms underlying the intrinsic fluctuations of capital­
ism. In the future, of course, new models will have to be developed to 
track novel forms of cycles when they inevitably begin to spiral.
Endnotes
1. In con tinuous tim e, oscillating variables appear in a tw o-dim ensional sys­
tem  w hen its eigenvalues are conjugate com plex (as opposed  to  real); th a t is, they 
can  be w ritten  in the form  A =  a  + ;3i and  A =  a  +  ¡3i, w ith  a  =  TrJ -  2. For the 
oscillations to  converge locally, the real p a r t  a  o f the eigenvalues has to  be nega­
tive. Steady cycles show  up  w hen the  real p a r t equals zero, and  there  are divergent 
spirals w hen it is positive. The tw o  stan d ard  m ethods to  investigate the properties 
o f such systems are H o p f b ifu rcations and  the Poincare-B endixson theorem . The 
form er analyzes the changing n a tu re  o f cycles as the real p a r t o f the eigenvalues 
shifts th rough  the  value zero. T he latter sets o u t global conditions for convergence 
to  a closed orb it. H irsch  and  Smale (1974) is a classic tex t on  these m atters, and 
Lorenz (1989) offered econom ic in tu ition .
2. As stated , the  Phillips curve presupposes the existence o f a “ n a tu ra l” level u 
o f u a t w hich there  is zero w age inflation . This unpala tab le  assum ption  can be re­
laxed, bu t to  set up  a sim ple cycle m odel it is convenient to  em ploy it here.
3. T he reference is to  Schum peter’s fam ous 1930s pronouncem en t to  credulous 
H arv ard  undergraduates th a t the G reat D epression w as an  unavoidable  capitalist 
“cold show er” (H eilbroner 1999).
4. T here is an  obvious parallel betw een using d eb t and  a d istributive variable, 
such as the w age share o r  p ro fit ra te , as a shift variable fo r effective dem and. The 
literatu re  on  w age-led or profit-led  dem and shifts o rig inated  w ith  R ow th o rn  (1982) 
and D u tt (1984), and was reviewed by Blecker (2002) and T aylor (2004). Similarly, 
norm al and M inskyan  responses o f deb t g row th  to  econom ic activity ru n  parallel 
to  “ forced saving” and “ profit-squeeze” responses of the w age share. M insky 
(1975) seemed to  p o in t to  the label adop ted  here.
5. O ne sym ptom  o f w age-led dem and  is con tractionary  devaluation . Analytical 
linkages betw een the cycles discussed in the  second an d  fo u rth  sections o f  this 
chap ter w ould  be interesting to  explore.
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Fiscal Policy Efficacy and Private 
Deficits: A Macroeconomic 
Approach
Manuel Marfan
T h e  a n a ly s i s  is in s p ire d  b y  t h e  Chilean economic situation throughout 
the 1990s, in which a disciplined fiscal policy and an independent central 
bank that succeeded in pursuing an inflation target were not enough to 
revert overall excess expenditure, exchange rate misalignment, or, more 
generally, external vulnerability. Our conviction is that the fundamen­
tals behind these events are not idiosyncratic to the Chilean case, but are 
valid for a more general case of emerging economies open to interna­
tional financial markets. This chapter concentrates on the policy dilem­
mas faced by successful emerging economies in the context of voluntary 
financial flows.
The main point stressed here is that when inflation is endogenous in 
an otherwise MundelTFleming context, the efficacy of alternative policy 
instruments changes substantially. We argue that conventional monetary 
and/or exchange rate policies handled by the central bank are effective 
to pursue nominal targets, but ineffective to alter real variables in the 
short run, including the real exchange rate. Fiscal policy, in turn, is al­
ways effective on real variables in the short run, irrespective of the 
exchange rate regime.
The author is a member of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile and was Director 
of the Division of Economic Development, Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and Senior Adviser on M acroeconomic Policy to the M inister of Fi­
nance, Under-Secretary of Finance, and M inister of Finance of Chile during the 1990s.
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There are relevant additional conclusions related to the previous 
point. First, inflation is an incom plete measure o f econom ic overheating 
and m acroeconom ic inconsistency. Inflationary pressures com ing from  
unsustainable growth may be totally or partially reverted by currency 
appreciation. Excess growth and currency appreciation, in turn, m ay co ­
exist as long as current account deterioration is feasible in the short run. 
A deteriorating current account may also be a sym ptom  o f overheating 
and m acroeconom ic inconsistency.
Second, exuberant private sector behavior arising from optim istic 
medium-term prospects m ay generate short-run overheating. Conven­
tional central bank policies (monetary and/or exchange rate policies) are 
unable to restore a sustainable equilibrium. The government, however, 
can correct misalignment of real variables by generating a fiscal surplus 
that com pensates for excess private expenditure. The greater the exu­
berance o f  the private sector, the greater the fiscal thrift needed.
Third, the public sector does not have the institutional role o f com ­
pensating for excess private expenditure, im posing a policy dilemma 
that cannot be solved by conventional policy instruments. W e explore 
som e unconventional policy instruments, such as a cyclical tax and a 
simplified version o f a tax on financial flows.
The chapter has five sections. The first one makes a basic algebraic 
approxim ation o f the m odel. The second section constructs a theoretical 
argument applicable to the general case o f a small econom y open to vol­
untary financial flows. It concludes that fiscal policy is the unique con ­
ventional policy instrument that is effective on real variables and derives 
the optim al fiscal policy that ensures sustainable equilibrium. The third 
section argues that the optim al fiscal policy derived in the previous sec­
tion is politically unfeasible. It presents broad data for nine econom ies 
that faced episodes o f  private exuberance throughout the 1990s. The 
fourth section analyzes the pros and cons of tw o heterodox policy in­
struments that can help attain overall consistency. The final section sum ­
marizes the main findings. The annex develops the underlying m athe­
matical model.
A Basic A pprox im ation
Our approach concentrates on the short run, where the time span is the 
relevant one for fiscal policy analysis (normally a year). The analysis 
considers that inflation is an endogenous variable, explained by cost- 
push pressures and demand inflation. W ithin the cost-push com ponent, 
we concentrate on nom inal exchange rate pressures. N om inal deprecia­
tion m ay be inflationary as long as it raises the price o f traded goods and 
services, including the price o f traded inputs used in nontraded goods
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production. In the very short run, lagged effects may induce overshoot­
ing and/or price oscillations. W e simplify these effects by assuming that 
the pass-through of nom inal depreciation to inflation is com pleted  
within the time span relevant for fiscal policy analysis, w ith no lags re­
maining. W e also simplify w age inflation dynamics by assuming that 
wage contracts consider productivity growth and expected inflation . 1 
W ithin demand inflation, the relevant com ponent is the gap between  
actual and potential gross national product (GNP).
Equation (6.1) summarizes these com ponents:
p  =  c0e +  ( 1  -  c0)p* +  ci (y  -  y d); 0  <  c0 <  1 ; ci >  0 , (6 . 1 )
where p  and p*  represent actual and expected inflation, e is the rate of  
nominal depreciation (e >  0  means a depreciation), and y  and y d are 
actual and potential G NP growth, respectively .2  A  straightforward dy­
namics for the real exchange rate (e — p)  is derived from (6 . 1 ):
( e - p )  =  (ci / c0)(yd ~ y )  +  ( ( 1  -  c0 )/c0) (p -  p*).  (6 .2 )
The real exchange rate is sensitive to inflation surprises (p — p*). 
However, under rational expectations there are no systematic deviations 
of p  from p*,  so the real exchange rate evolves according to the state of 
the cycle (yd — y).  In the absence o f surprises, real appreciation w ould  
be associated with cyclical peaks (y >  y d), whereas real depreciation  
w ould need a depressed econom y. This argument has nothing to do with  
whether depreciation is expansionary or contractionary; rather it con­
cerns how  a change in the nom inal exchange rate is split between infla­
tionary pressures and changes in the real exchange rate. A nominal 
devaluation w ould  generate inflation if y  >  y,j, and the same nom inal de­
valuation w ould generate a real depreciation if y <  y d. This outcom e is 
irrespective o f the exchange rate regime, which usually determines the 
evolution of the nom inal exchange rate.
Our third equation considers the current account of the balance 
of payments. W e take the standard view  in which the current account 
improves w ith a real depreciation or with lower G NP growth:
C =  a.\{d{e — p) — y); a \ ,d  >  0,  (6.3)
where C represents the change in the current account surplus as a per­
centage of GNP.
From (6.2) w e observed that excess growth and real appreciation go 
together. Thus, an overheated econom y deteriorates the current ac­
count as a percentage of GNP because o f both the direct effect o f  excess 
growth and the indirect effect o f an appreciating currency. To consider
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the situation o f  a sustainable current account, w e define C as the thresh­
old for C consistent w ith long-run sustainability. If external financing is 
available, C may fall below  C in the short run, at the expense o f in­
creasing external vulnerability. For algebraic simplicity w e also define yx 
as the G NP rate o f  growth consistent with a sustainable current account:
y* -  -C /f li . (6.4)
Combining the last two expressions, w e derive the equation for the 
current account:
C =  a i(yx +  d(e — p) — y) +  C. (6.5)
That is, the actual current account C w ould deviate from its sustain­
able path C, depending on the gap between actual growth (y) and the 
one consistent w ith external equilibrium plus the slack provided by real 
exchange rate m ovem ents (yx +  d(e — p)).
N ote that w hen expectations are fulfilled (p =  p*  in equation [6.1]) 
and the current account is in its sustainable path (C =  C in equation  
[6.5]), w e can derive the sustainable equilibrium rate o f  GNP growth  
and the equilibrium rate o f  real depreciation:
y  =  y =  {coyx +  C i d y d)/{c0 +Cxd)  (6 .6 )
(e -  p) =  e =  cd y d  -  yx)/(c0 +  a d ) .  (6.7)
The sustainable rate o f growth is a weighted average of the domestic 
constraint on growth (yd) and the external sustainability growth (yx). The 
equilibrium real exchange rate, in turn, depends on the gap between these 
tw o constraints on growth: It depreciates when the external constraint is 
more binding than the domestic constraint on growth (yx <  yd) and ap­
preciates when the domestic constraint is more binding (yd <  yx), an in­
tuitive outcom e. N otice that excess growth is unambiguously linked to  
real exchange rate misalignment and an unsustainable current account:
y  >  y  C <  C <£=*► (e — p) <  e. (6 .8 )
Throughout the text w e refer to y,  e, and C as the optim al or sustain­
able rate of growth, real depreciation, and current account, respectively.
From a different perspective, the current account is also equal to  
excess dom estic expenditure, which m ay be rooted either in private or 
public sector excess expenditure:
0 =  C +  S +  H , (6.9)
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where S is the change in the fiscal deficit as a percentage o f  GNP (or fis­
cal stance), and H  is the change in private sector excess expenditure (or 
private deficit pressure), also as a percentage o f GNP. Excess expendi­
ture is defined as the difference between savings and real investment.
So, on the one hand, the current account performance is linked to 
GNP cycles that, in turn, are linked to real exchange rate cycles. O n the 
other hand, the current account performance is also linked to expendi­
ture cycles, whether public or private.
For the sake o f com pleteness, we list the rest o f our assumptions:
1. A budget law know n in advance by all econom ic actors sets gov­
ernment expenditures.
2. The central bank handles its policy instruments to optim ize a loss 
function representing its policy targets. All agents know  the central 
bank’s loss function.
3. The private sector spends according to an (expected) intertem po­
ral plan. In particular, changes in its deficit (H ) depend positively on pri­
vate sector confidence— or medium-term prospects— and depend nega­
tively on the real interest rate. Private sector confidence, in turn, m ay be 
affected in the short run by m acroeconom ic inconsistency. Unexpected  
private income is com pletely saved in the short run.
4. The central bank and the underlying policy regime determine the 
(nominal) supply o f m oney. The demand for real cash balances evolves, 
depending on the rate o f GNP growth and the nom inal interest rate, 
with the conventional signs.
5. The interest rate follow s a conventional arbitrage rule, equal to the 
international interest rate plus the expected nom inal depreciation and a 
country-specific risk premium (perfect financial m obility). The risk pre­
m ium may be affected by m acroeconom ic inconsistency.
6 . The central bank reacts instantaneously to surprises, a plausible 
assumption w hen the short run is a w hole fiscal year. Private agents set 
their expectations rationally but are subject to surprises. The government 
also sets its expectations rationally and is the slow est agent (that is, pri­
vate agents set their expectations know ing the fiscal policy in place). 
W hen pursuing a m acroeconom ic goal, the government optim izes the 
expected value o f the target variable.
Fiscal Policy Efficacy U nder an  O pen  C ap ita l A ccount
W ith perfect capital m obility the private sector faces no liquidity con ­
straints. So the private sector deficit responds to an intertemporal opti­
m ization dom inated by private sector confidence and an interest rate
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follow ing an arbitrage rule. There is no a priori reason w hy the private 
deficit should be positive or negative in the short run. An exuberant pri­
vate sector with a high degree o f confidence in medium-term prospects 
m ay exhibit an expanding deficit in the short run. A  depressed private 
sector w ould display a conservative attitude w ith  a smaller deficit or 
even a surplus. An exuberant or depressive private sector does not imply 
irrational behavior. It is merely the outcom e o f the optim ization of the 
net present value o f the relevant variables.
Some o f our results are dependent on the fact that whereas the pri­
vate sector optim izes its behavior on  an intertemporal basis, the evolu­
tion o f the real exchange rate is determined by an equation such as 
(6 .2), which only has short-run com ponents. C onventional m acroeco­
nom ic policy, especially w hen responding to reaction functions know n  
by all agents, is less effective to  dom inate the arguments behind private 
sector behavior.
If inflation was exogenous— that is, if equation (6.1) was not valid—  
the m odel w ould reproduce the standard conclusion that fiscal policy is 
effective on short-run growth under a fixed exchange regime, whereas 
m onetary policy w ould be the effective instrument under a floating  
regime. Under such a setting, however, a floating exchange rate regime 
means that the real exchange rate floats, and a fixed exchange rate 
regime means that the real exchange rate is fixed. But w ith endogenous 
inflation such as equation (6 .1 ), the exchange rate regime is a rationale 
for the nom inal exchange rate. The effects on the real exchange rate are 
dependent on the rate of inflation. In this new  context, the conclusion  
on the efficacy o f  policy instruments changes.
W e first analyze the situation where fiscal policy is designed to attain 
a sustainable current account. The central bank, in turn, pursues an in­
flation target (see annex, case 1). It can be shown that in the absence of 
surprises the governm ent and the central bank achieve their respective 
goals: Short-run equilibrium displays a current account consistent with  
medium-term sustainability, w ith  no inflation. As noted before, w hen­
ever the current account is in its sustainable medium-term path, equilib­
rium growth (y) is a weighted average o f y,j and yx and the equilibrium  
real exchange rate (e) evolves depending on the gap between yL{ and yx. 
W e label the sustainable equilibrium with no inflation as the “optimal 
case,” and that provides a benchmark against which w e compare all 
other situations.
The current account deficit is the sum of public plus private deficits. 
To achieve a sustainable current account, the fiscal stance must accom ­
m odate for excess private expenditure. The more exuberant the private 
sector, the thriftier the concom itant optim al fiscal policy; the more de­
pressed the private sector, the larger (that is, the more expansionary) the 
fiscal stance needed . 3 An optim al fiscal schedule thus derived implies
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that the private sector crowds out or crowds in the public sector in the 
short run, instead o f the other w ay around.
If the governm ent deviates from the optim al fiscal policy rule, equi­
librium changes. For instance, consider a situation in w hich the central 
bank continues targeting inflation but the fiscal stance is larger than  
optim al (see annex, case 2). In that case the effects w ould  be unam ­
biguously predictable. GNP growth w ould  be larger than optim al (y >  
y), the real exchange rate w ould  over-appreciate ((e — p) <  e), and the 
current account w ould deteriorate below  its sustainable level (C <  C). 
Likewise, if the fiscal stance is smaller (that is, less expansionary or 
m ore contractionary) than optim al, the final outcom e w ould  be the op ­
posite [y <  y, (e — p) >  e and C >  C]. If private sector confidence and 
the country risk premium accom m odate for deviations from the opti­
mal equilibrium, m isalignm ent o f real variables w ould  diminish but 
w ould not be eliminated.
The government may take advantage o f the previous outcom e and ad­
just fiscal policy to attain a short-run growth target. If the growth target 
is am bitious, the governm ent w ill succeed and attain excess growth in 
the short run, but at the expense o f an unsustainable current account 
path (external vulnerability) and exchange rate misalignment. The cen­
tral bank, in turn, w ould continue succeeding in its inflation target. 
These results do not depend on whether the policy instrument of the cen­
tral bank is the exchange rate or, alternatively, monetary policy with a 
floating currency. Fiscal policy w ould be effective on short-run growth, 
whatever the exchange rate regime.
Fiscal policy may also succeed when targeting other real variables. 
For instance, the governm ent may target a neutral fiscal stance (S =  0) 
to signal fiscal discipline. The authority w ould also succeed in this alter­
native target. But in this case fiscal policy w ould resign to com pensate 
for private sector exuberance. The final outcom e w ould deviate from the 
optim al equilibrium depending on private sector behavior. Private sec­
tor exuberance w ould  lead to excess grow th, excess appreciation, and 
an unsustainable current account. Depressed private sector confidence 
w ould lead to the opposite results. M oreover, such a fiscal policy exac­
erbates the cycles provoked by private sector behavior, turning itself into 
a pro-cyclical policy scheme.
Alternatively, fiscal policy may fo llow  a cycle-free rule. For instance, 
it may target a “structurally” neutral fiscal stance, setting its expendi­
tures at the level o f revenues consistent w ith sustainable growth. Again, 
cycles will be determined by private sector behavior, but these w ould not 
be amplified by fiscal policy.
Fiscal policy may also target a constant real exchange rate ((e — p) =  0), 
a special case to which w e w ill refer later. The governm ent will succeed 
again, but the side effects are less straightforward. In an econom y that is
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rapidly increasing its com petitiveness (that is, yx >  yj ) ,  the optim al real 
exchange rate should appreciate, as we noted in the first section above. 
If the government targets a constant real exchange rate and succeeds, it 
w ould reduce short-run growth to below  its optim al path (y <  y), and 
the current account w ould exhibit a larger than optim al surplus (C >  C). 
On the other hand, in an econom y where potential output grows faster 
than international com petitiveness (yj  >  yx), the optim al real exchange 
rate should depreciate. If fiscal policy forces a constant real exchange 
rate, the final equilibrium w ould be w ith excess growth and an unsus­
tainable current account.
In our previous conclusions, the efficacy o f  fiscal policy on real vari­
ables is independent o f the exchange rate regime. This outcom e is the re­
sult o f endogenous inflation. The standard M undell-Flem ing approach 
assumes that inflation is exogenous. As w e noted earlier, exchange rate 
floating in that context means real exchange rate floating. Likewise, 
monetary policy w ith exogenous inflation means real m oney supply 
management. W ith endogenous inflation, the policy instruments o f the 
central bank are nominal in nature: the nominal exchange rate or the nom ­
inal supply of money. Exchange rate floating is a rationale for the nominal 
and not for the real exchange rate. If the private sector responds exclu­
sively to the stimulus o f real variables— whether in actual or expected  
value— nom inal policy m anagement is ineffective if their changes are 
com pletely captured by inflation. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is a 
real policy instrument and has real effects.
An alternative explanation for the efficacy o f  fiscal policy could be 
the particular reaction function assumed so far for the central bank. Per­
haps fiscal policy may be ineffective per  se, and real effects may be the 
outcom e of the reaction o f the central bank. Our m odel rejects this al­
ternative hypothesis. H ow ever, w e can consider alternative reactions o f  
the central bank to the deviations provoked by a non-optim al fiscal pol­
icy. For instance, if the central bank follow s a preannounced monetary 
rule and lets the exchange rate float, all real variables— including growth  
and the real exchange rate— w ould continue to be determined by fiscal 
policy. Inflation is the sole variable that w ould  be affected by the m on­
etary rule. Alternatively, consider a situation in which fiscal policy is 
more expansionary than the optim al rule, generating excess growth, ex­
change rate misalignm ent, and an unsustainable current account. The 
central bank m ay try to restore a sustainable equilibrium by simultane­
ously targeting an optim al real exchange rate path {(e — p) =  e) and in ­
flation (p =  0). W hen such behavior on the part of the central bank is 
anticipated by the private sector, the new equilibrium w ill not affect real 
variables, but inflation w ould turn positive.
The straightforward conclusion is that a conventional central bank 
succeeds solely w hen targeting nom inal variables, such as inflation or
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the nom inal exchange rate, but fails w hen trying to  target real variables 
w hen fiscal policy is set. Even if the central bank cares about m isalign­
ment o f real variables, it is better off when m onitoring inflation only. 
The central bank, however, w ould be the effective institution to tackle 
unexpected shocks.
Because central bank intervention can only make things worse, it may 
refrain from any intervention at all and “dollarize” the econom y (or 
“euroize” or set a currency board), so that there is neither exchange rate 
policy nor monetary policy. N o t surprising at this stage, fiscal policy  
w ould maintain its efficacy on real variables. The sole main difference is 
that inflation w ould  replace the role o f the exchange rate with the op­
posite sign .4  Inflation w ould play the role o f a real depreciation and de­
flation o f a real appreciation. Because fiscal policy is effective on the real 
exchange rate, in this particular case it w ould be effective on inflation as 
well. Inflation targeting through fiscal policy for econom ies joining a 
currency area such as the Euro Area w ould  be equivalent to real ex ­
change rate targeting.
In fact, the sole situation in which the central bank may have a sys­
tematic influence on real variables is w hen inflation generates systematic 
real effects (for exam ple, by affecting private sector confidence and/or 
the country risk premium). It can be shown that an active central bank 
may generate whatever inflation rate it pursues. So it can use this p o­
tential and use the rate o f inflation as its policy instrument. This is a the­
oretical case that apparently has no practical significance and that we 
will not explore further.
Conventional central banks should pursue nom inal targets only, even 
in cases o f real variable misalignment. This conclusion has to do with  
h ow  a central bank should use its “hard” policy instruments, such as 
monetary and exchange rate policy. But central banks may also try 
“soft” policy interventions, using the Lucas critique in their favor. For 
instance, a reputable central bank may publicize its assessment of 
whether private markets are in an exuberant or a depressed situation. 
The idea is to guide market confidence and the country risk premium to  
internalize the consequences o f suboptimal short-run equilibria. Such 
types of soft interventions are difficult to measure and are strongly de­
pendent on the reputation of the spokesperson. If reputable enough, pri­
vate agents may internalize the risks and consequences o f the overall sit­
uation and change their behavior accordingly, but no private agent has 
any incentive to internalize the aggregate consequences o f his or her own  
behavior. As long as private agents do not have incentives to internalize 
externalities, private exuberance resembles traffic congestion. Following  
the guidance o f a reputable spokesperson may enable such agents to di­
minish the degree o f misalignment o f real variables, but they can never 
com pletely eliminate misalignment.
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In sum, in small econom ies open to free financial flow s, conventional 
fiscal policy is always effective on real variables in the short run. Con­
ventional central bank policies are effective to m onitor nom inal vari­
ables or to tackle unexpected shocks, but are ineffective in influencing 
real variables in a systematic way. Optimal fiscal policy should be de­
signed to com pensate for episodes of private exuberance or depressed 
confidence. Deviations from this rule may generate suboptim al short- 
run growth and exchange rate misalignment. Excess expenditure, excess 
grow th, or, m ore generally, econom ic overheating is better measured  
by current account sustainability  and real exchange rate m isalign­
m ent than by inflation. Inflation measures central bank inconsistency  
but is a poor measure o f econom ic overheating under an open capital 
account.
The larger role of fiscal policy under an open capital account com ­
pared with a closed capital account suggests that proper fiscal gover­
nance is a prerequisite for capital account opening.
Some U npleasan t Political Econom y A rgum ents
W e have argued that optim al fiscal policy should com pensate for excess 
private expenditure. Exuberant private behavior requires a negative fis­
cal stance, and a depressed private sector needs a positive fiscal stance. 
Fiscal policy should be such that viable overall domestic expenditure—  
private plus fiscal— is targeted, w ith public expenditure being the resid­
ual variable.
If such a rule implies a reduction of an existing fiscal deficit, our ar­
guments w ould end here. But increasing an already existing fiscal sur­
plus (resulting from increased excess spending of the private sector) may 
be m acroeconom ically advisable but politically unfeasible. The public 
sector does not have the institutional role o f com pensating for excess 
private expenditure.
Before getting into the argument in depth, w e provide som e empirical 
evidence o f private exuberance. Figure 6.1a presents the surplus ac­
counting for Chile 1 9 9 4 -2 0 0 1 .5 The nonfiscal surplus is a proxy o f “pri­
vate sector surplus.” The subperiod 1 9 9 4 -7  is the epilogue o f a lengthy 
cycle of accelerated growth. Years 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 1 , in turn, depict a subpe­
riod of adjustment and adverse external shocks. Figure 6.1b  exhibits the 
concom itant dynamics o f growth and the real exchange rate (RER ).6 
The period o f accelerated growth coincided w ith RER appreciation and 
current account deterioration, the symptoms w e have identified for a case 
of overheating. A lso, the source of excess domestic expenditure was pri­
vate sector behavior rather than fiscal policy, which exhibited a surplus 
during the overheating phase. Adjustment was initiated in 1998, with a
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Figure 6.1 F rom  Prosperity to  A djustm en t, C hile, 1 9 9 4 -2 0 0 1
a. Surplus Accounting 
(% of GDP)
2000 2001
' fiscal ■ nonfiscal ■ current account
b. GDP Growth and the Real Exchange Rate
~l 1 P r  I I r
1994 1995 1996 1957^1998 1999 2000 2001
1-85
■ GDP growth —  real exchange rate
Source: GDP growth: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) September 
2002; Mexico 1990-3, IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) Yearbook 
2001. Fiscal surplus and current account: Republic of Korea, Ireland, and the 
United States, WEO September 2002; Chile 1997-2001, IMF Public 
Information Notice (PIN) 02/78 (Central Government); 1994-6, IMF Country 
Report (CR) 00/104 (change w.r. to 1997). Indonesia, 1994-2000, estimated 
according to data published by IFS (various issues); 2001, CR 02/154 (change 
w.r. to 2000). Malaysia, 1996-2000, PIN 01/114; 1994-5, PIN 99/88 (change 
w.r. to 1996). Mexico, 1997-2001, PIN 02/109; 1996, PIN 00/24; 1990-5, 
estimated according to IFS. The Philippines, 1997-2001, PIN 02/41; 1994-6, 
estimated according to CR 99/93. Thailand 1997-2001, PIN 02/94; 1996,
(Source continues on the following page.)
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(continued)
PIN 00/5; 1994-5, estimated with data published by IFS. Real exchange rates: 
Chile, Malaysia, and the Philippines, IFS (various issues). Ireland and the 
United States, Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (Consumer Price Index 
based) from IFS world tables. Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Mexico, and 
Thailand, according to the same common procedure: Bilateral RER with the 
United States were estimated using series of nominal exchange rates against the 
U.S. dollar and GDP deflators. REF with the non-U.S. world estimated by 
multiplying the previous bilateral RER with the United States’ RER. The final 
RER is the simple average of the two previous measures.
Note: The nonfiscal surplus is the difference between the current account 
and the fiscal surplus. An increase in real exchange rates means depreciation.
steep deceleration o f growth and a correction o f private exuberance. The 
RER appreciated w hen gross domestic product (GDP) growth was high 
and depreciated w hen GDP growth decelerated, showing that fiscal 
management was not enough to com pensate for cycles in private sector 
expenditure.
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 depict a similar pattern o f excess private expen­
diture in eight econom ies chosen for being successful within the 1990s. 
We chose successful cases because, according to our arguments, the per­
ception o f success is closely linked to excess private expenditure . 7 W ith  
the exception o f Ireland, all these econom ies also suffered econom ic 
downturns, w ith varying degrees o f  severity.
The perception of success in the five Southeast Asian econom ies con­
sidered was founded on a dynamic growth profile for a long period, the 
same as in Chile. M exico did n ot display an im pressive dynam ism  prior 
to the “Tequila crisis” (1 9 9 4 -5 ), but the perception was that joining  
the N orth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) w ould radically 
improve prosperity. Ireland is the star case o f the Euro Area. Finally, w e  
also included the United States, which by no means is a small open econ­
om y to which our arguments may apply. H owever, it is also an interest­
ing case o f private exuberance w hile it was the staple case o f the “new  
econom y.”
Figures 6 .1 , 6 .2 , and 6.3 show  som e similarities am ong these nine 
econom ies prior to the initiation o f their adjustment processes:
1. W ith the exception o f Ireland, they exhibited sizable current ac­
count deficits (excess domestic expenditure) ranging from 3 .4  percent of  
GDP (Indonesia 1996) to 9 .5 percent (Malaysia 1995).
2. Strong fiscal policies were in place, ranging from a fiscal balance (Re­
public o f Korea 1996) to a surplus of 6.9 percent o f GDP (Malaysia 1997).
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3. As a natural counterpart, they all exhibited significant private 
deficits, which w e approximate as the difference between the fiscal and 
the current account surpluses. 8 The orders o f magnitude— ranging up to 
— 12.8 percent o f GDP (Malaysia 1997)— show  that the driving force of  
excess domestic expenditure was private sector behavior.
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4 . W ith the exception o f Ireland, all econom ies exhibited an over­
heating phase characterized by the com bination o f large current account 
deficits and an appreciating currency.
5. Finally, and again with the exception of Ireland, inflation (not shown) 
w as not a problem. On the contrary, som e o f these econom ies showed  
significant deceleration in their respective rates o f inflation (Chile and 
M exico).
In almost all other aspects these economies differed, with no hom o­
geneity in country size, per capita income, the exchange rate regime, export 
structure, quality o f financial regulation, term structure o f the foreign debt, 
and so forth. Obviously these elements also affected private sector behav­
ior and, especially, the intensity of their subsequent loss o f dynamism. We 
do not want to over-argue around the similarities stressed, nor say that 
all econom ies displaying these features may have acute recessions as in 
M exico and Southeast Asia. H owever, w ith obvious caveats, we do infer 
that excess private expenditure does have a com m on root, proper of 
econom ies perceived as successful by the local and international com m u­
nity, and that such behavior explains vulnerability and the losses in dy­
namism immediately after the respective boom s. In particular, w e want 
to stress that w hen private sector exuberance is not fully compensated for 
by increasing fiscal austerity, there are sym ptom s o f overheating not 
captured by inflation.
W e made an exception w ith Ireland on several occasions. This econ­
om y was capable o f applying an extremely disciplined fiscal policy  
throughout the 1990s, enough to com pensate for excess private expen­
diture. Fiscal rigor had more to do with controlling inflation— the only  
m acroeconom ic standard of the European Union not accom plished by 
Ireland— than w ith com pensating for excess private expenditure. As ar­
gued before, inflation is a measure of real appreciation in a small econ­
om y belonging to a com m on currency union. W ith a pegged nom inal 
exchange rate, inflation targeting is equivalent to real exchange rate tar­
geting. It is interesting to note, however, that the Irish fiscal stance has 
turned more expansionary recently, in spite o f a European Central Bank 
reprimand, a policy change that has coincided with real appreciation, 
and a mild deterioration o f the current account.
In the eight remaining cases, fiscal discipline was not enough to com ­
pensate for private deficits. They all displayed a com bination of current 
account deficits w ith real currency appreciation, a sym ptom  o f over­
heating according to our m odel. The eight econom ies ended up with  
episodes o f recession and com plicated situations o f excessive private 
debts (the natural counterpart of cumulative private deficits). W hen ac­
com panied by less than acceptable banking regulation (Southeast Asia 
and M exico prior to their respective downturns), acute financial crises
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am plified the econom ic contraction. W ith sound prudential regula­
tion  (the United States and Chile), the accom panying recession was 
m ilder and the financial sector responded solidly, but still faced a 
problem  o f excess household  and private business debt. In the aggre­
gate, private deficits distorted relative prices— especially the real e x ­
change rate— altering resource allocation  in a sort o f  financial D utch  
disease.
Our conclusion is that private deficits matter, and w hen they ap­
pear, policy makers should act prom ptly to  reduce vulnerability. Our 
m odel suggests that the optim al conventional policy to face private ex ­
uberance is to generate a fiscal surplus. But, as already m entioned, the 
political econom y o f increasing a fiscal surplus is com plicated. W hen a 
structural fiscal surplus is attained, it is not obvious that raising taxes 
and/or cutting public program s is optim al. A  skilled fiscal authority is 
n ot only the one able to  design a consistent technical solution to a 
m acroeconom ic problem . The fiscal authority m ust also construct ap­
pealing arguments for reasonable public op inion, the Congress, and its 
ow n governm ent and constituency to convince them to  perpetuate such 
a policy scheme. To garner support for the idea that econom ic success 
reduces  the degrees o f freedom  o f an already solvent public sector is 
difficult, to  say the least. This w ould  be tantam ount to  asking the p o ­
litical class to  convince their constituencies that, notw ithstanding a 
fiscal surplus, taxes should be raised and/or public program s should be 
reduced.
The sense o f prudent citizens is that a disciplined public sector is one 
that adjusts its expenditures to its legislated revenues. M oreover, their 
sense is that increasing fiscal surpluses should be returned to  society—  
where they belong— through lower taxes and/or improved supply of  
public goods and social program s . 9
The main underlying problem is that the public sector does not have 
the in stitu tional role o f  com pensating for private exuberance. Each 
o f the fiscal policy instruments, whether on the expenditure or on the 
revenue side, has a com plicated political econom y, which tends to be ex­
acerbated when trying to increase a surplus. The problem is that, as 
shown by our m odel, there are no conventional policy alternatives.
H etero d o x  Policy Instrum ents
A possible solution could be to explore unconventional policy instru­
ments. In this section we analyze the costs and benefits o f  tw o heterodox  
solutions to the policy dilemma introduced by private sector exuber­
ance, w hich are valid for fiscal surplus cases only. The first one is a
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trivial solution to enhance fiscal policy flexibility. The second alterna­
tive is less trivial and consists o f  providing additional policy instru­
ments to the central bank.
A  Flexible T a x
Analytically, this proposal is straightforward. Fiscal policy flexibility  
was our major proposal in the third section o f this chapter. W hether fis­
cal flexibility is on the revenue side or on the expenditure side does not 
m ake a major difference from  a formal perspective. But the triviality of 
the proposal ends there because there are com plex practical differences, 
especially political and institutional ones. The main political advantage 
o f institutionalizing a flexible tax is that its im plem entation requires 
congressional approval. Such approval, in turn, requires the acceptance 
o f an institutional reform in which the governm ent should have the ex­
plicit role o f com pensating for excess private expenditure, an issue that 
is neither explicit nor implicit in any state’s charter.
From a practical perspective, the design o f a flexible tax should allow  
the authority to manage the rate with som e discretion, w hile preventing 
moral hazard behavior. In particular, the flexible tax should be discon­
nected from the funding o f permanent government expenditure. It 
should also prevent time inconsistency. For instance, if a sizable fund is 
accumulated, it m ay encourage the political class to be creative in decid­
ing how  to use it, regardless o f m acroeconom ic considerations.
A possible starting point m ight include the follow ing ingredients:
1. The flexible tax rate should operate exclusively in situations where 
there is a structural fiscal surplus in order to ensure that government ex ­
penditures are being financed with permanent governm ent revenues. 
Changes in permanent governm ent expenditures and/or revenues lead­
ing to a structural fiscal deficit should imply the immediate removal o f  
the flexible tax.
2. The flexible revenue should have no other purpose or use than ac­
cumulation, and should not be recycled to finance further private deficits. 
This may require the creation o f an autonom ous institution w ith explicit 
property rights to the accumulated stabilization fund. The basic princi­
ple is that the government m ay manage the rate o f the flexible tax with  
discretion, but that it cannot m anage its revenues.
3. W ith this policy tool in place, the government should be account­
able for structural fiscal deficits and for econom ic situations of overall 
excess expenditure. W ith an extra policy instrument, the fiscal authority 
can pursue tw o independent targets.
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A possible arrangement could take the form o f the revenue from  
the flexible tax being transferred— w ith full property rights— to the 
(autonom ous) central bank (see annex, case 3 ) . 10  From an accounting  
perspective, such an arrangement w ould  leave the actual fiscal balance 
unchanged, but a quasi-fiscal surplus w ould  register at the central bank. 
The accounting identity of equation (6.9) w ould  be m odified in this 
way:
0 = C + S + H - Q ,  (6.10)
where Q represents the extra revenue o f the flexible tax— and a measure 
o f the change in the quasi-fiscal surplus— as a proportion o f  GNP.
By assum ption, the governm ent targets the structural fiscal surplus 
and overall excess expenditure (public and private). This means that the 
government should manage expenditures according to its structural rev­
enues, and use the flexible tax rate to target a sustainable current ac­
count. The central bank, in turn, continues targeting inflation. The final 
outcom e is relatively intuitive: an optim al equilibrium w ith zero infla­
tion and no real variable misalignment.
A flexible tax w ould still display various shortcomings difficult to 
tackle. Am ong other outcomes, the flexible tax should imply income 
effects only, w ith no distorting effects on resource allocation, a m ix not 
trivial to attain. Also, the solution still has severe political econom y prob­
lems. W ith the true problem being excess aggregate expenditure, the 
payers o f  the flexible tax w ould have a point when protesting their be­
ing designated to subsidize the system. The argument would be symmet­
rical to the one stressed by the beneficiaries o f public programs when fis­
cal flexibility is attained through the expenditure side. From a different 
perspective, the efficacy of the flexible tax may be lessened, given its tran­
sitory nature, by Ricardian equivalence effects or by intertemporal tax  
planning— issues that our formal model does not tackle. Finally, when the 
flexible tax is in place, time-inconsistent behavior cannot be ruled out (for 
example, the authority might reduce the flexible tax in an election year).
A  T a x  on Financial  Flows
In cases where the main driving force of vulnerability is the presence of 
private deficits, a tax on the funding o f those deficits w ould tackle the 
problem at its root . 11 In terms o f our m odel, such a tax w ould interfere 
in the arbitrage equation, affecting the cost o f external funding. Case 4 
o f the annex describes the algebra o f this situation, where w e assume 
that the tax on financial flow s generates no revenue (or it is reimbursed 
as a lump sum transfer to the private sector), so it acts as an efficiency 
tax rather than as a means o f  generating revenue.
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The case considers that the central bank manages the tax on financial 
flows, whereas the fiscal authority seeks a structurally neutral fiscal 
stance. With an extra degree of freedom given by its new independent pol­
icy instrument, the central bank can pursue tw o independent policy goals. 
In particular, we assume that the central bank becomes accountable for 
overheating episodes, in addition to inflation. So it targets inflation and 
a sustainable current account. The final outcom e of this case is also op­
timal in that the resulting equilibrium is with no inflation, no excess 
growth, no exchange rate misalignm ent, and w ith a sustainable current 
account.
As stated here, the tax on financial flow s would solve some of the prob­
lems displayed by the flexible tax. It has a nice political econom y ad­
vantage in that it taxes the true problem  (excess expenditure). It has no  
tim e-inconsistency problem s either, to  the extent that it is m anaged by 
an independent central bank. But it w ould  display other shortcom ings. 
First, there are adm inistration problem s that are not tackled here and 
are not sim ple to solve. Second, if there is no explicit m andate for the 
central bank to  rem ove the tax in the event o f structural fiscal deficits, 
then the governm ent m ay use the new  device to its advantage. In effect, 
an expansionary fiscal policy m ay induce the central bank to raise the 
tax rate in order to  achieve zero inflation and external sustainability. 
The central bank will continue to  achieve its ow n policy targets, but 
the private sector w ould  be crow ded out by fiscal activism .
Some of these problems may be overcom e with a proper design. For 
instance, the rules o f the game for which the central bank should be ac­
countable may include the follow ing item s12:
1. The tax on financial flow s should be removed in the event o f a 
structural fiscal deficit.
2. It may operate as an ad valorem  toll tax on  financial flow s, irre­
spective o f their volume and maturity. This facilitates its management, 
prevents discriminatory practices, and ensures that there will be no time- 
inconsistent attitudes on the part o f the authority.
3. The central bank should be subject to international surveillance to 
ensure that these criteria are met and that the tax is used exclusively for 
prudential m acroeconom ic purposes.
Final R em arks
M undell-Flem ing im plications on policy efficacy in small econom ies 
with perfect capital m obility need an exogenous inflation to be valid. 
W ith endogenous inflation, fiscal policy affects short-run growth, the
1 8 0 BEYOND REFORMS
real exchange rate, and the current account regardless o f  the policy  
regime. Central bank policies— namely, monetary and/or exchange rate 
policies— are effective to face unexpected shocks. But they have system ­
atic effects only when targeting nom inal variables, such as inflation or 
the nom inal exchange rate, and are ineffective on real variables.
The exchange rate regime is innocuous in terms o f altering the 
efficacy o f alternative policy instruments. Rather, the exchange rate 
regime is a form  o f organizing the signaling o f m acroeconom ic policy. 
Any exchange rate regime w ould  collapse w ith  an unsustainable fiscal 
policy.
In the absence o f  liquidity constraints, the private sector optimizes the 
net present value o f its future flows. In the short run it can display p os­
itive or negative excess expenditure. But overall excess expenditure in 
the short run— public plus private— generates exchange rate m isalign­
ment, excess growth, and an unsustainable current account. Sustainable 
short-run equilibria can be attained when fiscal policy compensates for 
excess private expenditure. Exuberant private behavior requires a con ­
tractionary fiscal stance, and depressed private behavior requires an ex ­
pansionary fiscal stance.
Inflation is a poor measure o f econom ic overheating, especially because 
inflation may be curbed in the short run by an appreciating currency. Un­
sustainable current account deficits along with an appreciating currency 
are clearer symptoms o f overheating. Fiscal policy is the sole conventional 
policy instrument able to tackle this problem systematically.
Economic success generates exuberant private behavior that, in turn, 
requires a contractionary fiscal stance. Economic success and improved 
econom ic prospects require increasing taxes and/or removing public pro­
grams, even in cases where a fiscal surplus is already in place. The public 
sector does not have the institutional role o f compensating for excess pri­
vate expenditure, thus im posing a policy dilemma with no conventional 
solution.
An alternative policy instrument could be the introduction of a flexi­
ble tax, depending on the state o f the econom ic cycle, which may restore 
a sustainable equilibrium path. Such a device w ould still display politi­
cal econom y shortcom ings, could be subject to time-inconsistent atti­
tudes, and could have a small potential if Ricardian equivalence effects 
or intertemporal tax planning were significant.
Finally, a tax on financial flow s may also restore sustainable equilib­
rium in the event of private exuberance. This device has a nice political 
econom y advantage because it taxes the true problem (the funding o f  ex ­
cess expenditure). It may also avoid time inconsistency if correctly m an­
aged by an independent central bank. But it displays administration 
challenges that would be difficult to overcom e.
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A nnex: T he F orm al M odel
The main assumptions o f the m odel are specified in the first section of 
the text. A lso, the first three equations are the ones developed in the text, 
w ith the same notation:
p  =  c0 e +  ( 1  -  c0) p*  +  a ( y  -  y d); 0  <  c0 <  1 ; d  >  0  (6 .1 )
C =  a x(yx +  d(e -  p)  -  y) +  C (6.5)
0 = C + S + H . (6.9)
The fiscal stance S corresponds to the change in public expenditures 
(g) minus public revenues (ty), both as a percentage of GNP:
S =  g  — ty; 0 <  t  <  1. (6.11)
In the absence o f liquidity constraints, the private sector spends ac­
cording to an intertemporal plan. In particular, private expenditure 
evolves, depending on the gap between its medium-term prospects (w ) 
and the real interest rate (i — p*).  Unexpected incom e is saved. Thus, the 
private sector deficit as a percentage o f GNP follow s this rule:
H  =  (1 -  i) (y * -  y) +  a0(w  -  (i -  p*)); a0 >  0. (6.12)
Equilibrium in the m oney market has a conventional form:
m -  p  =  b 0 y  ~  b t i; b0, b \  >  0, (6.13)
where m  is the rate of growth o f the nom inal supply o f m oney and i is 
the nom inal interest rate.
The interest rate follow s a conventional arbitrage rule:
/ =  ix +  e* +  u, (6.14)
where ix is the relevant international interest rate, e* is expected nom i­
nal depreciation, and u is the country-specific risk premium.
T o simplify the algebra, a number o f helpful assum ptions are intro­
duced. First, financial flow s are made in fixed interest rate bonds so  
that variations in ix do n ot generate contem poraneous changes in in­
terest payments. Second, to  avoid  strange outcom es w e assum e that a 
real depreciation expands aggregate dem and. A  sufficient condition  for 
an expansionary devaluation is that the current account effect o f  a real
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depreciation is larger than the financial effect o f an expected real depre­
ciation: a \ d  — ao >  0 . 13
Third, throughout m ost o f our analysis w e also assume that the risk 
premium u and private confidence w  are exogenous . 14
W ith these equations and assumptions, w e analyze various special 
cases. Unless otherwise stated, all cases consider the final equilibrium  
w ith no unanticipated shocks.
Case 1: O pen  C apital A ccou n t and E xternal Sustainability
All equations hold, including the price equation (6.1) and the arbitrage 
equation (6.14). This case depicts the situation in w hich the central bank 
pursues an inflation target (p  — 0 ), and fiscal policy targets a sustainable 
path o f domestic expenditure or, w hat is the same, a sustainable current 
account (C* =  C):
Lb =  p 2 central bank loss function (6.15)
L c  =  (C* — C )2  government loss function (6.16)
Case 1 is the basic situation around which the rest o f our analysis pivots 
because all the relevant equilibria are met. W e denote w ith “A” the out­
com e o f the consistent equilibrium:
y  =  y  =  Co yx +  c td  y d)/(c0 +  cxd) growth (6.17)
(e — p) =  e =  c\ (yd — yx)/(co +  C \ d )  real exchange rate (6.18)
C =  C current account (6.19)
p =  p*  =  0  inflation (6 .2 0 )
H  =  H  =  a0(w — ix — e — u) private deficit (6.21)
(i ~  p) =  i  =  ix +  e +  u real interest rate (6 .2 2 )
5 =  5 =  —(C +  H ) fiscal stance (6.23)
g  =  g =  t y  — (C +  H)  fiscal expenditure (6.24)
m  =  m =  boy — b\(ix +  e +  u) nom inal m oney supply (6.25)
The solution to this case does not depend on whether the central bank 
optimizes L b w ith respect to e or to m.  That is to say, the results w ould
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be the same whether the central bank’s policy instrument were the nom ­
inal exchange rate or nom inal monetary policy. The government and the 
central bank achieve their respective policy targets (equations [6.19] and 
[6.20]). Equilibrium growth (6.17) is a weighted average o f the external 
and internal constraints on growth (yx and yj) ,  whereas the real ex ­
change rate (6.18) depends exclusively on the gap ( yj  — yx). The private 
sector deficit is not constrained by fiscal policy (6.21). The international 
interest rate (ix), the equilibrium real depreciation (e), private sector con­
fidence (w),  and the country risk premium (u) become the driving forces 
o f the private deficit.
The main point to be stressed is related to fiscal policy: The fiscal 
stance S consistent with current account sustainability is the one that 
com pensates for excess private expenditure. In effect, the optim al fiscal 
stance (6 .2 2 ) is the one that com pensates for any private deficit in excess 
o f the slack provided by a sustainable current account. Exuberant pri­
vate behavior (H  >  — C) w ould require a negative fiscal stance (S <  0), 
whereas a depressed private sector (H <  — C) w ould require an active 
fiscal policy (S >  0). Perfect capital m obility implies that private behav­
ior crowds out optim al fiscal policy, instead o f  the other w ay around. 
Optimal fiscal policy is clearly countercyclical. 15
Case 2: O pen  C apital A ccou n t and Fiscal Efficacy
Case 2 explores the situation in which fiscal policy departs from the rule 
derived in (6.24) (g +  g).  To analyze this case, consider a positive fiscal 
expenditure bias 8 where
g  =  g + 8; 8 >  0 .16 (6.26)
The central bank continues to minimize inflation:
L b =  p 2 central bank loss function. (6.27)
In the absence o f surprises, the final outcom e w ould be
y  =  y  +  C()8/h  >  y  growth, (6.28)
where b =  c0t +  a\  (c0 +  c^d) — aoci >  0 . 17
(e — p)  =  e — C\8/h  <  e real exchange rate (6.29)
C =  C — fli(co +  C \ d ) 8 / h  <  C current account (6.30)
1 8 4 BEYOND REFORMS
p  =  p*  =  0  inflation  
H  =  H +  aoCi 0/h >  H  private deficit
(6.31)
(6.32)
i — p  =  z — c\ B/h <  1 real interest rate (6.33)
S — S +  (h — cot)6/h  >  S fiscal stance18 (6.34)
g  =  g  +  B >  g  fiscal expenditure (6.35)
So, larger-than-optimal fiscal expenditure expands GNP growth (6.28), 
over-appreciates the real exchange rate (6.29), and deteriorates the cur­
rent account below  its sustainable path (6.30). Likewise, smaller-than- 
optim al governm ent expenditure (6 <  0 ) generates the opposite results. 
An expansionary fiscal policy w ould also crowd in additional private 
deficit (6.32) through a low er real interest rate (6.33) that, in turn, is the 
result o f an over-appreciating currency. The central bank achieves its 
price stability target (6.31).
Active fiscal policy has an unam biguous short-run im pact on growth, 
the real exchange rate, and the current account . 19 The fiscal authority 
m ay take advantage o f  this result in the short run. For instance, the gov­
ernment might seek a growth target y target >  y- Then, according to (6.28), 
it should set
In the absence o f surprises, such a fiscal policy w ould  succeed in the 
short run (y =  y targ e t >  y) at the expense o f  an appreciating currency 
(e <  e) and an unsustainable current account (C <  C). The short-run 
efficacy o f fiscal policy is independent o f the exchange rate regime. 
W hether the central bank handles e or handles m  w ith a floating e, the 
outcom e remains: Fiscal policy is always effective.
This result contrasts with the M undell-Flem ing intuition, an outcom e 
that critically depends on the validity of the price equation (6.1). The in­
tuition has to  do w ith the fact that the central bank handles nom inal pol­
icy instruments, whereas the fiscal instrument is real government expen­
diture. Rational private agents care only about real variables, whether in 
actual or expected value, and are not sensitive to nom inal stimulus, ex ­
cept when unexpected.
Fiscal policy is effective and authorities m ay use this feature for good  
or for bad. To avoid noisy outcom es, the governm ent m ay stick to dif­
ferent fiscal rules, o f which w e analyze tw o possibilities. First, the au­
thority seeks a neutral fiscal stance (S =  0) and, second, the authority 
seeks a neutral fiscal stance in structural terms (g =  ty). From expres­
9 B y  ( y ta r g e t y ) ^ l ^ Q  ^  0. (6.36)
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sions (6.34) and (6.35) w e can derive the value for 8 o f  each case:
Rule 1: g  =  ty  => 6 =  8\ =  (C +  H) [h/{h — Coi)].
Rule 2: g  =  ty  =s- 8 =  82 =  (C  +  H).
In neither o f  these tw o cases does the government accom m odate ex ­
cess private expenditure. So the term (C +  H ), which w e use as an indi­
cator o f private exuberance, appears. (C +  H)  >  0 implies that both  
rules w ould  lead to  overall excess expenditure. Because [h/{h — cot)], 
rule 1  amplifies private sector exuberance by m ore than rule 2  and, thus, 
is more pro-cyclical.
Case 3: Flexible Tax
Analytically this case is trivial because tax flexibility is similar to public 
expenditure flexibility. T o formulate this case, w e consider that the rev­
enue o f the flexible tax is accum ulated in a stabilization fund that is 
separated from central governm ent. W e also assume that the flexible 
tax has incom e effects only, w ith no effects on resource allocation. W ith  
these assumptions we accom m odate equations (6.9) and (6.12) o f the 
initial model:
0 =  C +  S +  H +  Q  (6.37)
H  =  (Q* -  Q ) +  (1 -  t)(y* - y )  +  a0[w  -  (i -  p*)],  (6.38)
where Q  denotes the change in the revenue o f the flexible tax as a per­
centage of GNP. W e also assume that the fiscal authority handles tw o
independent policy instruments (g and Q)  seeking tw o targets: a balanced 
budget (S =  g  — t y  =  0) and a sustainable current account (C =  C):
L q  — S*2 +  (C*  — C ) 2 governm ent loss function. (6.39)
The central bank continues pursuing price stability (Lb =  p 2). In the 
absence of surprises, this setting ensures an optim al m acroeconom ic 
equilibrium. All variables w ould  coincide w ith optim al case 1 above, 
except for the following:
5 =  0 fiscal stance (6.40)
g  =  ty  fiscal expenditure (6.41)
Q  =  — (C +  H)  flexible tax (6.42)
N ote that Q  com pensates the effect of our measure o f private sector 
exuberance (C +  H).
Case 4: Tax on Financial Flows
Case 4 considers a tax on financial flow s (r) affecting the arbitrage equa­
tion (6.7). It also assumes that the revenue of the tax is returned to the 
private sector, w ith no incom e effects:
i =  ix +  e* +  u +  t. (6.43)
W e consider the case where the tax rate t  is handled by the central 
bank, which thus manages tw o independent policy instruments and pur­
sues tw o targets: price stability (p  =  0 ) and current account sustainabil­
ity (C =  C). The governm ent seeks a neutral fiscal stance (L c  =  S*2).
Lb — p 2 +  (C — C )2 central bank loss function (6.44)
Again, the final outcom e ensures an optim al m acroeconom ic equilib­
rium. All variables w ould coincide w ith optim al case 1, except for the 
following:
H  =  — C private deficit (6.45)
i — p  =  w  +  C/uo real interest rate (6.46)
5 =  0 fiscal stance (6.47)
g  =  ty  fiscal expenditure (6.48)
r =  (C +  H)/ao  financial tax rate (6.49)
The role o f t  is to tax any excess private expenditure. W e have used
(C +  H) as a measure o f private exuberance. A positive t is consistent
w ith a positive value of (C +  H).
In the four cases developed here, the algebra was simplified by as­
suming that the country risk premium (u) and private sector prospects 
(w)  are exogenous. Alternatively, it could be assumed that the risk pre­
mium and econom ic prospects deteriorate along w ith m acroeconom ic 
m isalignm ent20:
tv =  w  +  u>o(C — C) w o >  0 (6.50)
u =  u — u0(C — C) u q >  0. (6.51)
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In such a case, all the main conclusions remain, although orders of 
magnitude w ould vary. Only changes in the interest rate and the private 
deficit may have am biguous signs under certain circumstances.
Also, parameters ao, Wo, and u(, may be subject to the Lucas critique. 
That is to say, because they are behavioral parameters, rational agents 
may change their behavior (and thus the value of the parameters) if the 
authority tries to take advantage. In such a case, the orders o f magnitude 
o f the solutions may change, but not the signs or the main conclusions, 
except in the extreme case where [ao(wo +  « 0 )] ~ > °°-
Endnotes
1. Thus, the wage-push inflation would be given by expected inflation.
2. Notice that, in the special case of a closed economy, Co = 0 and, thus, p =  
p* +  c \(y  — yd). In this special case and under rational expectations, it is straight­
forward that expected growth and potential growth coincide (y*  =  yd*)- Actual 
inflation would deviate from expected inflation only to the extent that there are 
surprises.
3. The government successfully targets C = C. Then, from equation (6.9) it is 
straightforward that the optimal fiscal stance is S = —( H +  C), where H  is the pri­
vate deficit when all the relevant equilibria are met. The larger the value of H,  the 
smaller the value of S.
4. In the optimal equilibrium case, p  =  —e.
5. We used International Monetary Fund data, which do not necessarily co­
incide with the official Chilean figures.
6. A higher RER represents a depreciation.
7. We omitted cases of dynamic growth in economies closed to voluntary fi­
nancial flows, such as China and the Dominican Republic. We also omitted Singa­
pore because we do not know how to interpret the combination of high fiscal sur­
plus with a growing public debt. The peculiarities of the Singaporean pension 
system may be an explanation for this mix.
8. There are no data available to construct a precise measure for the private 
deficit. Our proxy is not strictly consistent from an accounting standpoint.
9. There are numerous practical examples in this respect. In the United States, 
before the economic downturn was initiated, the two main presidential candidates 
in the 2000 election proposed to use the fiscal surplus they were to inherit (either 
to reduce taxes or to tackle structural problems of the pension and health systems). 
In Chile in 1997, also with a fiscal surplus, Congress had to decide about a drop in 
the value added tax rate. The government coalition proposed an educational re­
form instead, whereas the opposition backed the tax cut (and a few wanted both). 
Nobody was in favor of maintaining the fiscal situation. Ireland, after reaching a 
sizable surplus, entered into “austerity fatigue” in fiscal year 2000/01 and moved 
to a more expansionary stance.
10. Alternatively, economies with fully funded pension schemes may consider 
introducing a flexible rate of contributions to the system. Singapore has had some 
episodes in which the contribution rate has been moved according to macroeco­
nomic considerations.
11. Under voluntary financial flows, excess expenditure is not necessarily pun­
ished by increased cost of funding. Even if the country risk premium rises with an
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unsustainable equilibrium, an over-appreciating exchange rate reduces the cost of 
external funding in the short run.
12. Most of these elements were present in the Chilean reserve requirements on 
capital inflows that were put in place in 1991.
13. From equation (6.5) a real depreciation improves the current account bal­
ance by a \d . Also, from equations (6.12) and (6.14) an expected real depreciation 
(e* — p*) reduces the private sector deficit by ao■ This assumption implies that 
wealth effects of changes in the real exchange rate are not dominant.
14. The consequences of this assumption are discussed at the end of the annex.
15. None of these conclusions depends on whether private confidence (w) 
and/or the risk premium (u ) are endogenous.
16. For 0 <  0, the conclusions are inversely symmetrical.
17. Parameter b is unambiguously positive when a td  -  a o >  0, the condition 
that ensures that a real depreciation is expansionary.
18. Notice that (h — cot) >  0 and that (h — cot)lh <  1.
19. If private confidence and the country risk premium (w  and u, respectively) 
deteriorate with an unsustainable current account, our main conclusions would 
still hold. The sole difference would be that the private deficit (H) and the interest 
rate (i) become ambiguous for 6 ¥= 0. Also, the “multiplier” h would be affected in 
terms of its size but not its sign.
20. (C — C) is sufficient as a measure of macroeconomic disequilibrium because 
(C -  C) (e -  e) (y -  y).
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External Debt, Growth, 
and Sustainability
Roberto Frenkel
In a previous essay (Frenkel 2001) w e analyzed the situation o f the Latin 
American countries in the context of financial globalization in the late 
1990s. This chapter sets out a more formal analytical approach to this 
subject. In particular, w e exam ine the dynamics o f external debt from a 
balance o f payments perspective, using the concept o f sustainability . 1
External debt m ay be described as sustainable w hen there are no fore­
seeable major difficulties in m eeting contracts in a timely and proper 
manner. Obviously, this does not actually guarantee that those contracts 
will be met. Sustainability is a judgment with respect to uncertain future 
events, based on present inform ation and probable conjectures. The con­
ditions o f sustainability exam ined in this chapter are reasonable a priori.
The country’s interest rate, which is determined by the international 
rate and the country risk premium, plays an im portant role in our analy­
sis. The m odel w e set forth reflects certain features of the “emerging 
market” economies; that is to say, developing econom ies that were in­
volved in three aspects o f the financial globalization process: the opening 
o f the local financial market and its integration with the international 
market, the absorption of net capital flows, and the resulting accumula­
tion o f  a significant stock o f external obligations. Let us assume that the
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countries w e are exam ining have issued a certain am ount o f  sovereign  
debt denom inated in foreign currency (dollars) that has been placed  
on the international financial market and the local market. Information  
about the prices o f bonds is freely available and any local or foreign 
agent can acquire sovereign bonds at market prices.
Based on the above-mentioned hypotheses, the chapter presents a 
m odel intended to define and discuss the sustainability o f  external debt 
in emerging markets. The first sustainability condition is the existence of 
a m axim um  in the debt-output ratio. Using som e simple behavior hy­
potheses, w e show  that sustainability depends on the initial debt-export 
ratio, the rate o f export growth, and the country risk premium. An en­
dogenous country risk premium leaves room  for m ultiple equilibria. The 
m odel allow s for the discussion o f  vulnerability relative to financial 
shocks and the propensity o f the econom y to  jump to unsustainable 
paths. The first sustainability condition is not a stringent one. W e thus 
add tw o additional and more restrictive sustainability conditions: a pos­
itive rate o f growth and a minimum in the dom estic absorption-output 
(or absorption-incom e) ratio.
Segm ented In teg ra tion , the R eal In terest R ate, 
and  the C oun try  R isk Prem ium
Interest rates display significant differences between developed and 
emerging econom ies, despite the integration2  that exists am ong financial 
markets. Here w e w ill consider h ow  interest rates are determined in an 
emerging market.
W e have said that the country issued dollar-denominated sovereign 
bonds, which were traded on the secondary markets. The price of those 
bonds determines their yield, which we w ill call i. Yield is convention­
ally broken dow n into tw o terms:
i = r *  +  k,  (7.1)
where r* is the yield on a U.S. sovereign bond with the same maturity 
and identical characteristics, and k is the country risk premium.
First, i represents the opportunity cost o f any foreign investment in 
the country, to the extent that the asset in question, real or financial, is 
subject to country risk. So, the cost o f international credit to local banks 
or to other private agents w ill generally have to be equal to or greater 
than i.
To facilitate a discussion o f how  the real interest rate is determined 
w ithout losing generality, let us assume that the national financial system  
is partially dollarized. This means that assets and liabilities denominated
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in dollars are issued by the financial system together with assets and 
liabilities in local curtency.
Because local banks can acquire sovereign bonds yielding i, this rate 
is the opportunity cost o f local bank lending in dollars. Consequently, i 
is the floor price o f dollar bank loans, even if the credit has not been 
funded in the international market. The interest rate on dollar loans 
m ust be equal to or greater than i. Let us assume that it is equal to i.
T o determine the rate in local currency, w e need to take into account 
the expected evolution of the exchange rate:
/ =  i +  E(e) +  7t, where 77 >  0 , (7.2)
where / is the nom inal rate o f interest in local currency, E(e) is the ex­
pected rate o f nominal devaluation, and 77 represents the exchange risk 
premium.
Let p  and p*  be the rates o f local and international inflation, respec­
tively. W e can subtract p  from  both sides o f  equation (7.2) and add and 
subtract p *  on the right-hand side:
j  - p  =  ( i -  p*)  +  [E(e) -  p  +  p*]  +  77. (7.3)
This gives an expression in w hich j  — p i s  the real interest rate in local 
currency and E(e) — p +  p*  is the expected rate o f real devaluation. It is 
easy to see that the real interest rate in local currency m ust be greater 
than or equal to i — p  *, except in the case o f an expected real apprecia­
tion trend strong enough to offset the exchange risk premium 77 . W e will 
disregard this case, however. W e will therefore assume that
/  — p  a  i — p*.  (7.4)
For the sake o f simplicity, let us assume that p *  =  0 (which is equiv­
alent to considering p  as the difference between local and international 
inflation) and that (7.4) holds as an equality
r =  j  — p =  i =  r* +  k. (7.5)
E xternal Financing
The country has received capital incom e that generates an am ount D{t)  
o f external debt. The capital inflows result from a bond issue w ith a ma­
turity L, which yields an international interest rate r* and w hose capital 
m ust be redeemed in full at maturity.
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The current account balance (CC) is
CC =  X  -  M  -  r*D,  (7.6)
where X  represents exports, M  imports, and r*D  is the interest accrued 
on external debt.
W e w ill assume a zero variation in reserves and w e will assume (for 
the time being and for the sake o f the presentation) that the current ac­
count is in deficit. Financing needs (NF) are
N F  =  - C C  +  A D  =  - X  +  M  +  r*D +  AD, (7.7)
where A =  1/L is the portion o f  the debt that matures at t.
Because the bonds are issued at a rate under par (k S: 0), to obtain N F  
am ount o f  financing, a volum e Z  o f new  debt must be issued, so that 
Z e r*L =  NF e(rt+k)L and therefore
Z  =  NF ekL. (7.8)
The variation in debt is therefore d D  =  ^  =  Z  — AD.
If we replace with (7.7) and (7.8) and regroup, w e obtain:
d D  =  [ekLr* +  \ ( e kL -  1)] D  -  ekL X  +  ekLM.  (7.9)
W e calculate
8 =  ekL, 8 s  1 because k s  0 , (7.10)
y  =  5j-* +  A(S — 1), y  >  r* >  0 because S & 1, (7.11)
and equation (7.8) is expressed as
d D  =  y  D  -  8 (X  -  M).  (7.12)
The variation in debt can be broken down into a purely financial
term, which depends on the am ount of debt and a term that depends on  
the trade balance. The first term represents the cost o f financing the sum  
o f the interest accrued on existing debt plus refinancing o f capital m atu­
rities. If there is a trade deficit (X  <  M ), the second term represents the 
cost o f  financing it. In both terms, the factor 8 appears as a multiplier. 
The higher the country risk premium and— consequently— the higher 
the interest rate the country must com m it to  paying in order to secure
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financing, the higher this factor. N otice that equation (7.12) is also valid 
in the case o f a trade surplus (X >  M). In this case the proceeds o f the 
trade balance are used to finance the interest and maturing capital o f ex ­
isting debt, which is equivalent to assuming that the trade balance is 
used to buy debt bonds at market prices. If the trade surplus is large 
enough, the absolute value o f the second term may be larger than the 
first and the debt contracts. It can therefore be seen that the current ac­
count deficit w e assumed above for the purposes o f the presentation is 
not necessary, because equation (7.12) is valid in either case. If the risk 
premium is nil, equation (7.12) is reduced to
d D  =  r * D - X  +  M ; (7.13)
that is, the variation in debt is the same as the current account balance
w ith the opposing sign.
Division o f equation (7.12) by D  gives the growth rate o f the debt:
d D  - „ X  -  M
—  =  D  =  y - S — - — . (7.14)
Let Y be output and y  its rate o f growth. The rate o f variation o f the 
debt-output ratio is
d (D / Y) f.  X  — Ai— —  =  D  -  y  =  y  -  y  -  8 — — , (7.15)
w hich, m ultiplied and divided by Y in the final term, can be expressed
as
d{D/Y)  n  o / ' X - M W D
The rate o f variation o f the debt-output ratio in equation (7.16) is 
expressed as a function o f  com m only used m acroeconom ic ratios. For 
exam ple, if L =  10 years, r* =  5 percent, and the country risk premium  
k =  0.03 (300 basis points), then y  =  0 .1025 . W ith trade in balance, the 
growth rate o f the debt-output ratio is zero only if output grows at an 
annual rate o f  10 .25 percent. If the econom y is grow ing at a rate o f  
7 percent and the debt-output ratio is 50  percent (D / Y  =  0 .5), a trade 
surplus o f 1 . 2  percent o f output is needed to  stabilize the debt-output 
ratio.
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G ro w th  R ates o f O u tp u t and  Im ports
W e shall com plete the m odel by making endogenous the growth rates of  
output and imports. W e will assume that the rate o f growth of exports 
is exogenous. The influence o f the country risk premium on the real 
econom y is incorporated into the m odel by means of the real interest 
rate. W e will opt for the simplest form, assuming that the econom y’s 
growth rate is a function o f the interest rate:
y =  y(r ) =  y  +  pr =  y +  pr* +  pk,  w ith p <  0 , (7.17)
where p  is the interest rate elasticity of output.
W e shall also make endogenous the growth rate o f imports, assuming 
that this rate is a function o f the output growth rate:
m  =  m(y)  =  puy, w ith pi >  0 , (7.18)
where pi is the import elasticity o f output.
T he D ynam ics o f D ebt
To resolve differential equation (7.12) and obtain debt trajectory D(t),  
w e m ust specify the trajectories o f exports and imports:
X  =  X 0 ext (7.19)
M  =  M 0 emt, (7.20)
where x  and m  are the growth rates of exports and imports, respectively.
W ith this specification, equation (7.12) becomes
d D  =  y D  -  S(X0 ext -  M 0 emt).  (7.21)
In the general case that x  +  y  and m ¥= y,  the solution to the differ­
ential equation is
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O bviously, the w ay the debt behaves depends on the financial pa­
rameters m entioned earlier, on the growth rates o f exports and imports, 
and on the conditions o f trade deficit or surplus at t  =  0 .
W e will focus our analysis o f the problem o f debt sustainability on the 
debt-output ratio. The trajectory of output is
Y =  Y0 e yt. (7.23)
Consequently, using (7.22), the debt-output ratio follow s the trajectory
—  =  e ( y-y ) t  _  2 ^ 2 ----^----  r (x -y ) t  _  e (y-y)t-\
Y Yo Y0 x  -  y  L J
+  —  — - —  -  e l y - y }t 1. (7.24)
Y0 m — y
The evolution o f the debt-output ratio, like debt itself, depends on  
the initial position  of the trade balance. W e w ant to  rem ove this ele­
ment to focus the analysis on the parameters. In order to do this, w e  
w ill assume henceforth that the starting point is a trade balance. W e 
w ill therefore m ake Mo =  Xo and substitute ~  5% in (7 .24),









----------e ( x - y ) t ---------
x  — y  rn
x  — y  
8
(7.25)
This expression clearly shows the initial conditions that influence the 
evolution of the debt-output ratio: the degree o f openness o f the econ­
om y (X 0 /Y0) and the debt-export ratio (D 0 /X 0). The first o f these is a 
scale factor that does not alter the characteristics o f the debt-output tra­
jectory. This trajectory depends essentially on the initial debt-export 
ratio. A devaluation, for exam ple, brings about an increase in the rela­
tive price o f tradable goods, which increases the degree o f openness of  
the econom y and therefore multiplies the w hole curve o f the debt-output 
ratio by this factor. This same devaluation does not affect the debt- 
export ratio, however, which therefore does not alter the form and char­
acteristics o f  the debt-output ratio trajectory. The devaluation affects the 
shape of this curve only through its real effects; that is, through its in­
fluence on the rates of exports and imports.
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The introduction o f the hypotheses for the real econom y (7.17) and
(7.18) defines a m odel w hose operation can be explained by observa­
tion o f  equation (7 .25). An increase in the country risk prem ium  tends 
to raise the debt-output ratio on  the financial side because parameters 
5 and y  increase. The incorporation o f the recessionary effect o f a rise 
in the interest rate adds another elem ent on the real side: An increase 
in the country risk prem ium  tends to  low er the output grow th rate and, 
as a result, tends to  raise the debt-output ratio. But a downturn in the 
grow th rate o f the econom y causes a dip in the growth rate o f  imports. 
W ith an export growth rate unaltered, the trade surplus expands (or 
the deficit contracts) and this effect tends to low er the debt-output 
ratio.
Financial D eficit and  T rade  Surplus
In order to analyze the evolution o f the debt-output ratio, w e w ill es­
tablish a number o f restrictions on the m odel parameters. The best way  
to do this is to start with equation (7.15) and rewrite it, assuming initial 
conditions o f trade in balance (Mo =  Xo).
„ x t  _  „ m (k ) t
D  -  y =  y(k)  - y ( k ) -  8(k) X 0   --------. (7.26)
Equation (7.26) expresses the growth rate of the debt-output ratio. In 
this equation we have specified the parameters that depend on the coun­
try risk premium. Let us imagine that in t  <  0 the econom y experiences a 
country risk premium (which w e will call ko) such that the rate o f growth  
(yo) is equal to the cost o f refinancing interest and capital maturities on ex­
ternal debt (yo)- W ith this growth rate, the rate o f expansion in imports 
(m0) is equal to the rate of expansion of exports (xo), so that the econom y  
grows with trade in balance. In t  <  0, equation (7.26) w ould give
D  -  y  =  7 0 - 7 0  =  0 .  (7.27)
The rate o f growth o f the debt-output ratio is nil and the econom y is 
on a sustainable debt trajectory w ith a constant debt-output ratio.
Let us now  imagine that a contagion effect pushes up the country risk 
premium in t  ^  0 (k >  ko). In consequence, y  rises, and at the same time 
the rate o f growth y declines (y >  y0, y <  yo ) so that y  >  y. The growth  
rate o f the debt-output ratio w ill turn positive through this effect. But 
the downturn in the rate o f econom ic growth brings about a fall in the 
growth rate o f  im ports (m <  m 0), and therefore x  >  m  w hen t  s  0. In
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addition, note with equation (7.26) that in t  =  0  the growth rate o f the 
debt-output ratio is positive:
D  — y  =  y  — y.  (7.28)
The effect o f  the increase in the country risk premium is an upward 
trend in the debt-output ratio. But from a zero value w hen t  =  0, the sur­
plus begins to expand w hen t  >  0. In w hat circumstances can a growing  
trade surplus offset the financial effect o f a rise in the country risk pre­
mium and make external debt sustainable?
In general terms, this problem implies the follow ing restrictions on 
the parameters:
y  >  y; x  >  m.  (7.29)
Let us analyze the dynamics o f the debt-output ratio with these as­
sumptions. Independent o f the problem that justifies them, the restric­
tions we are assuming appear to be the only ones o f interest for analysing 
debt sustainability. If y  >  y  and the econom y is not generating a trade 
surplus, the debt-output ratio is explosive and the debt is unquestionably  
unsustainable. If y a  y, w e could discuss, for exam ple, how  much o f a 
trade deficit the debt trend can tolerate w ithout becom ing explosive, but 
this avenue o f enquiry does not appear to be particularly interesting.
First Condition of Sustainability
The first condition of sustainability is that the debt-output ratio must 
not becom e explosive. The curve expressed by equation (7.22) must 
have a m aximum . The first order condition is
dt Y0 I \ X 0 x  -  y  m  —
=  0.
8 8
 (x -  y)e(x~y) t -------------- (m -  y)e(m~y)t
— y  m — y
(7.30)
The second order condition is 
* D' Ï >
dl2 Y0 I \ X 0 x  -  y  m
8 8
(x -  y)2e{x~y) t --------------(m -  y)2e{m- y)t
x  — y  m  — y
<  0 . 
(7.31 ) 3
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From (7.30) it is clear that the debt-export ratio is the only initial con­
dition relevant for the existence o f a m aximum . Because X q/ Y q >  0, the 
expression within the square brackets m ust cancel itself out to verify
(7.30), and this depends exclusively on the initial condition D 0/ X 0-
The existence o f a m axim um  (of a value t >  0 , w hich satisfies [7.30]) 
depends, first o f all, on the growth rate o f exports. If x  >  y, there will 
always be a m axim um  and the debt w ill be sustainable whatever the val­
ues o f the growth rates o f output and imports (with the restrictions we 
have already m entioned, y  >  y; x  >  m). The annex to this chapter con­
tains a dem onstration o f this. In terms o f the problem set out above, an 
econom y w ould experience an increase in its risk premium such that 
y  >  y >  y0, but the value o f y  w ould still be lower than the growth rate 
o f exports (y <  Xq). In this case the debt-output ratio w ould tend to 
grow  because o f the rise, but w ould  reach a m axim um  point.
If x  <  y, the condition to verify (7.30) and (7.31) when t >  0 is
8(x — m) Dn
 5---------- ------>  — . (7.32)
(x -  y ){m  -  y) X 0
This is demonstrated in the annex. In terms o f our problem , a rise in 
the risk premium makes the new  value o f y  higher than the growth rate 
of exports. In this case, the debt w ould be sustainable only if (7.32) were 
verified. Otherwise, the debt-output ratio w ould grow explosively.
Given L and r*, an export growth rate x, and elasticities p  and p., the 
left-hand member o f (7.22) is a decreasing function o f the country risk 
premium:
8 (k) [x — m(k)]m ) = 7-----  MnrTm TTvT' <7‘33>[x -  y(k)][m(k)  -  y{k)}
Curve H  is illustrated on the left panel o f figure 7.1. The debt-output 
ratio has a m aximum  only if the value o f H  corresponding to a given k 
is greater than D 0/ X 0. The intersection of curve H  w ith straight line 
D 0/X o determines the critical risk premium kc, such that the debt-output 
ratio becomes explosive for any k & kc.
The tw o panels o f figure 7.1 illustrate the above problem  in the case 
that the rise in the risk premium determines a value y  >  x 0- W hen t  <  0, 
the country risk premium was k 0 and the growth o f the econom y was 
equal to the growth rate o f the debt. If the country risk premium  
were to rise by k i — k 0, such that H ( k i) >  D 0/X o, the debt-output ratio 
w ould tend to grow , but it w ould  reach a m axim um , as shown in the 
right-hand panel o f figure 7.1. By contrast, if the rise in the country risk 
premium is k2 — ko, it w ould  be large enough for H ( k 2) <  D 0/ X 0, and
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Figure 7.1 Stable and U n stab le  D yn am ics o f  the  
D eb t-O u tp u t R atio
a. b.
the debt-output ratio w ould tend to grow  explosively, as is also shown  
in the right-hand panel.
W e are now  in a position to sum up the conclusions w e have drawn 
and express them in terms o f the problem set out above. In the event of 
an increase in the country risk premium, debt sustainability depends first 
o f all on the growth rate o f exports. If the econom y is growing w ith bal­
anced trade, but increasing trade openness, the debt is sustainable, pro­
vided that y  is still lower than the growth rate of exports after the rise in 
the risk premium. In a different scenario (for exam ple, if the econom y is 
growing w ith constant external trade/output coefficients), debt susta­
inability depends on the debt-export ratio. The lower the debt-export 
ratio, the larger a rise in the risk premium the debt-output ratio can bear 
w ithout becom ing explosive.
Let us n ow  consider tw o countries that have the same initial condi­
tions and behavior parameters, except for their degree of trade openness 
and, consequently, their debt-export ratios. Both have the same initial 
debt-output ratio, but the first econom y has a significantly lower export- 
output ratio (and therefore im port-output ratio) than the second. We 
w ill call the first econom y Chilmex and the second Brasarg. Both have 
the same curve H(k),  as show n in figure 7.2. Let us assume that both  
experience an identical variation in country risk premium k\  — ko (such 
that the new  value of y  is higher than the growth rate of exports) 
caused, say, by an across-the-board drop in the prices o f emerging 
market bonds. W ith the new  country risk premium, the debt-output 
ratio grows explosively in Brasarg, w hile in Chilm ex the debt remains 
sustainable .4
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Figure 7.2 Effects of Capital Account Shocks, Given 
Different Debt-Export Ratios
M ultip le  E quilibria an d  Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
Let us imagine that international investors include the debt-export ratio 
in their country risk assessment. Ceteris paribus,  the higher the debt- 
export ratio, the higher the country risk premium, because a higher 
debt-export ratio makes the country more likely to enter into an explo­
sive debt trajectory in the event o f a slump in the price o f its bonds. The 
reasoning behind this assessment o f risk is capable o f allow ing for eco­
nom ic policy reactions. In the event o f a change in international finan­
cial conditions that threatens the sustainability o f external debt, the 
country’s governm ent can implement measures to increase the growth  
rate o f exports and thus ensure sustainability. As can be seen in equation  
(7 .32), however, the higher the debt-export ratio, the larger the needed 
increase in exports.
The m odel consisting o f the condition o f sustainability and the func­
tion o f  the risk premium,
k =  k[H(k) -  D 0/ X o] k' <  0, (7.34)
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Figure 7.3 Multiple Equilibria
can have multiple equilibria, as shown in figure 7.3. Curves H (k) and 
k (H , Do/Xo) intersect at several points. In other words, the function is 
satisfied by different risk premiums, which determine certain debt-output 
ratio trajectories. Ceteris paribus, the debt is sustainable with a small 
country risk premium. By contrast, the debt is unsustainable for country 
risk premiums in which H (k) £  D 0/X 0.
Figure 7.4 uses Chilmex and Brasarg to show the model in which 
countries that are similar but have different external debt-export ratios 
perform with different country risk premiums. In the figure, Chilmex’s 
premium kch is lower than Brasarg’s premium kg because Brasarg has a 
significantly higher debt-export ratio than Chilmex. However, this as­
sessment by the international financial market has pushed Brasarg’s 
country risk premium close to the critical value that would make its 
debt unsustainable. As a result, Brasarg is more vulnerable to alter­
ations in international financial conditions than Chilmex, because an 
increase of equal magnitude in the two countries’ risk premiums makes 
Brasarg’s debt unsustainable, while that of Chilmex continues to be 
sustainable.
For the same reason, Brasarg’s sustainability is more prone to self- 
fulfilling prophecies. When the risk premium is such that the value of 
H(k) comes close to the debt-export ratio (as is the case of Brasarg in 
figure 7.4), we may reasonably assume that international investors 
will become more prone to sudden changes of opinion in response to
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Figure 7.4 Combined Effect of Debt-Export Ratio 
and Country Risk Premiums
domestic or international signals, which can easily lead to increases in 
the risk premium that make the country’s debt unsustainable.
Complementary Conditions of Sustainability
The existence of a maximum in the debt-output ratio is not a particu­
larly demanding condition. As well as nonexplosiveness, debt sustain­
ability ought to satisfy other conditions, such as those set forth below.
Positive G rowth Rate
The first additional condition we will consider is the requirement for the 
economy to maintain a positive growth rate.
In the event of an increase in the country risk premium, the debt may 
be sustainable in the sense that it is not explosive; even so, this condition 
may be verified in the context of a downturn in output. If the nonex­
plosive trajectory is based on a prolonged contraction in output and im­
ports, sooner or later it will become impossible for the country to meet 
its contractual obligations.
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In consequence, this condition of sustainability is y >  0, which in 
terms of our problem can be expressed as
y  = yo + p(k ~ k0) >  0 , (7.35)
where p <  0 is the interest rate elasticity of output and (k — k (>) is the in­
crease in the country risk premium. From (7.35) it follows that
k — k0 < — —  or k < k0 — — . (7.36)
P P
Restriction (7.36) is binding for a country risk premium that is lower 
than that which would make the debt unsustainable from the point of 
view of nonexplosiveness. Figure 7.5 illustrates this possibility. The 
lower panel of the figure shows two curves y(r* + k), which express the 
growth rates as a function of the interest rate. Curve Y2 cuts straight line 
y = 0 at k = k2, a higher risk premium than that which makes the debt- 
output ratio explosive. In this case, condition (7.36) is not relevant: 
When the risk premium rises, the debt becomes explosive, even when 
economic growth rates are positive. On the other hand, if the economy 
demonstrates curve Yj, which cuts straight line y =  0 at k =  k\, a lower 
risk premium than would make the debt-output ratio explosive, the
binding sustainability condition is the one that requires a positive
growth rate. In this case, the growth rate turns negative for country risk 
premiums with which the debt would still be sustainable from the point 
of view of nonexplosiveness.
Low er Lim it to the A bsorption-O utput Ratio
Another condition of sustainability can be derived from the existence of 
an upper limit on the proportion of output that must be transferred out 
of the country to meet debt commitments.
Let us assume that there is an increase in the country risk premium, 
which is sustainable from the perspective of nonexplosiveness. In the 
process that generates the rise in the risk premium, the trade surplus 
trends steadily upward as a proportion of output. As a result, the ab­
sorption-output ratio declines continuously. At the same time, the debt- 
output ratio increases until it reaches a maximum at a given point in 
time. From then on, providing there is no alteration in the parameters, 
the surplus will continue to increase as a proportion of output and the 
debt-output ratio will trend downward.
It may be assumed that, once the debt-output ratio has reached its max­
imum level, economic policy will be directed at increasing the economy’s
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Figure 7.5  D em onstration o f D ebt Sustainability C onditions
a.
b.
growth rate (and hence the rate of growth of imports), preserving sustain­
ability, stabilizing or reducing the downward trend in the debt-output ra­
tio, and balancing or mitigating the contraction in the absorption-output 
ratio.
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This process could not come about if the absorption-output ratio 
were to bottom out before the debt-output ratio reached its maximum 
point. This would make the debt unsustainable.
The limit on the contraction of absorption is determined essentially 
by the existence of an admissible level in the economy’s consumption 
rate, because the investment rate cannot drop below a certain floor level 
without affecting the output growth rate and imports.5
We can approach this condition of sustainability in a formal manner 
using expression (7.16):
d (D /Y ) A /  X  -  M \  / D
= D —y = y — y — o
D /Y  '  ' '  V Y  )  /  Y




Let s be the maximum admissible value of the trade surplus-output 
ratio (the absorption-output ratio is therefore 1 — s). Substituting in 
(7.38), the condition of sustainability may be expressed as
Condition (7.39) specifies the ceiling that the economy’s debt-output 
ratio may reach without exceeding the maximum admissible outward 
transfer. For a given country risk premium, which determines a nonex­
plosive debt trajectory, the debt becomes unsustainable if the debt- 
output ratio violates condition (7.39).6
Let us note that by defining a maximum flow of admissible external 
transfer, we arrive at a determination of a ceiling on the debt-output 
ratio. The condition is formally analogous to the condition that arises 
from directly assuming that the country is facing an external financing 
squeeze (in proportion to its level of gross domestic product).7 Clearly, 
in (7.39) the restriction is not a mechanical one, but depends on the
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Figure 7.6  Effects o f Lower Limits to the 
A bsorption-O utput Ratio
international interest rate and the country risk premium. The higher 
the country risk premium, the lower the ceiling on the debt-output 
ratio.
Figure 7.6 illustrates this condition of sustainability. The figure 
shows the trajectory of the debt-output ratio for a determined risk pre­
mium k. The trajectory satisfies the nonexplosiveness condition. If the 
maximum admissible proportion of outward transfer is Si, the condition 
is not binding and the debt is sustainable. With a lower maximum ad­
missible external transfer, sz, the straight line of the restriction cuts the 
trajectory of the debt-output ratio before it reaches its maximum point. 
In this case, the debt is unsustainable.
Multiple Equilibria (II)
Each of the conditions of sustainability we have considered raises the 
possibility of multiple equilibria when we take into account the risk as­
sessment conducted by international investors. Such a possibility arises 
if we assume, for example, that the closer to each of the restrictions 
imposed by the conditions, the higher the risk premium. This can be
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formally expressed by assuming that the risk premium is determined by 
the following function:
k = K H(k) -  D o /X 0; y;
8s
y -  y
Ki < 0; K2 ^ 0; K3 < 0. (7.40)
This means of determining risk premium can be used to extrapolate 
each of the conditions of sustainability from the arguments set out in the 
earlier section on multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling prophecies.
Annex
The first order condition is the equation (7.30): 
d ( D /Y )  x 0 f , . , . . . . j D n  8 8
dt x  — y m — y
8 8
(x -  y)e{x~y)t -  —---- ~{m -  y)e(m- y)t
x  — y m — y
= 0.
Because y“ >  0, the expression in square brackets must be cancelled 
out. Division of the expression between square brackets by 8{y + y)e{y ~ yH 
gives
1 Do _______
8 X 0 x  -  y m -  y
1 x -  y 
x  — y y — y
1 m — y 
m — y y  — y
=  0.
(7.41)
The problem is how to show that there exists a t > 0 that satisfies 
equation (7.28) with the parameters x  > m and y > y.
Let us take
1 x  — y . 1 m — y
A = --------------------and B = ---------------------- ,
x  — y y — y m — y y — y
( 7 . 4 2 )
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Expression (7.41) may thus be written as
F(t) = Ae(x- y)t +  Belm~y)t -  (A -  B) =  (7.43)
o X q
f f l  —  V
where A — B =  --------    . Note that F (0) = 0 and F'(t) >  0.
[x -  y)[m -  y)
Let us consider three cases:
1. x  > y A  m > y
2. x  > y A m  < y
3. x  > y (=> m < y).
In cases 1 and 2, F(t) —> oo . There is always a value o f t > 0, such that
In case 3, F(t) —> — (A — B ) . Thus, there is only one value of t >  0, 
such that F(t) =  ^ ,  if £ <  ~(A -  B) =  (x y). In conse­
quence, the condition is
Do S ix  — m)
—  < ------ '---------   . (7.44
X 0 (x -  y)(m -  y)
Endnotes
1. See Simonsen (1985) and Bhaduri (2001).
2. On “ segmented integration,” see Frenkel (2001).
3. In fact, verification o f the second order condition is redundant because we 
know  that ¡ ^ ( 0 )  >  0 , so that if (7.30) has a point o f inflexion, it m ust be a m ax­
imum.
4. Let us consider a  numerical exam ple. We will assum e that Chilm ex and 
Brasarg have the same debt-output ratio, Dg/Yo =  50 percent. Let us also assum e 
that Chilmex has an export-output ratio o f 33 percent, and Brasarg has an export- 
output ratio o f 10 percent. The debt-export ratio is thus D q/X 0 =  1.5 in Chilm ex, 
and Dg/Xo  =  5 in Brasarg. Let us assum e that in both economies r*  =  5 percent, 
k0 =  2 0 0  hundredths o f a percentage point, y0 =  8 percent, x0 =  10 percent, 
mo =  10 percent, p =  — 1, and p  =  1.25. It can be seen that these conditions rep­
resent an exceptionally good performance. With these param eters, B rasarg’s debt 
becomes unsustainable for risk prem ium s above 800 hundredths o f a percentage 
point, whereas Chilm ex’s debt is sustainable with risk prem ium s o f up to 2 ,000  
hundredths o f  a percentage point.
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5. This argum ent w as com m only used in the second half o f the 1980s, when the 
adjustm ent o f the Latin Am erican economies to postcrisis conditions w as on the 
agenda.
6. With L  =  10 years, r *  =  5 percent, k =  500 hundredths o f a percentage 
point, and a  m axim um  outward transfer rate s  =  3 percent o f output, the debt-output 
ratio could not rise above 51 percent.
7. The restriction is analogous to the existence o f  a limit on the debt-net worth 
ratio in the case o f corporate financing. Bacha (1986) used this argument as a basis 
for an “ external financing restriction” that limits the growth o f an economy.
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Divergence and Growth 
Collapses: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence
Jaime Ros
O v e r  t h e  p a s t  15 y e a r s ,  t h e  inability of traditional growth theory to 
account for the stylized facts of post-World War II (WWII) economic 
growth has prompted modern growth economics to take approaches 
that range from extending the traditional neoclassical model to moving 
radically away from it. The present chapter evaluates these recent at­
tempts and considers the alternative offered by the classical development 
approach.1 More precisely, the chapter focuses on two stylized facts that 
do not fit neatly into modern growth economics: the processes of diver­
gence in income levels between rich and poor countries and within the 
group of developing countries, and the growth collapses observed in 
low- and middle-income countries.
The three-part argument presented here can be described schemati­
cally as follows. The first section shows that the processes of divergence 
observed in the data are inconsistent with the neoclassical model and its 
different extensions and variants. The second section argues that classi­
cal development theory seems to offer a better explanation of divergence 
processes than do the new endogenous growth theories. The main rea­
son is that according to the classical model, when an economy reaches 
the middle-income level its growth speeds up, exceeding the long-run
The author is currently Professor of Economics at the University of Notre Dame and 
Faculty Fellow at the Helen Kellogg Institute of International Studies. I am grateful to 
José Antonio Ocampo and two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier 
version of this chapter. The responsibility for any error is, of course, exclusively my own.
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equilibrium growth rate, and is therefore compatible with convergence 
processes at high- and middle-income levels. However, classical theory 
is consistent with the growth collapses observed in low- and middle- 
income countries only if the poverty traps predicted by the model are 
attributable to vicious circles of low profitability generated by the inter­
action between increasing returns to scale and an elastic labor supply. 
The last section looks at empirical evidence suggesting that many more 
factors come into play in the processes that cause growth to stall or 
collapse. The factors that appear to affect the propensity to growth col­
lapses include the potentially negative influence of inequality on growth, 
the role of the pattern of trade specialization, and the interaction be­
tween those two factors. In the work of Prebisch, these issues play a 
significant role in explaining economic development processes in Latin 
America.
The Evidence for Divergence and 
the Neoclassical Growth Models
Table 8.1 shows the observed levels of output per worker in 1965 and 
1997 and the growth rate of that variable between those two years in a 
group of 73 countries divided into five income groups.2 The table illus­
trates the processes of divergence in per capita income levels that occurred 
over that period between rich and poor countries and among developing 
countries. The income gaps between rich and poor countries are not only 
huge—on the order of 23 to 1 between groups 1 and 5— but also in­
creasing: In 1965 the difference in income between groups 1 and 5 was on 
the order of 12 to 1. The gaps between middle- and low-income countries 
have also been widening, from a difference of 3.7 to 1 in 1965 to a dif­
ference of about 6 to 1 in 1997 between groups 3 and 5. These divergence 
processes clearly reflect the fact that the economies of the high- and middle- 
income countries grew faster (by 2.1 percent and 1.5 percent a year in 
groups 1 and 3, respectively) than those of the lower-income countries 
(the rate for group 5 was 0.2 percent).
Similar divergence processes have been well documented for other 
periods and samples of countries and regions. Pritchett (1997) showed 
that the ratio of the richest country’s per capita GDP to that of the 
poorest country increased from 8.7 in 1870 to 51.6 in 1985, whereas 
the standard deviation of the logarithm of per capita income, which had 
been between 0.513 and 0.636 in 1870, rose to 1.025 in 1985 (see also 
DeLong 1997; Jones 1997; and Maddison 1995). A study by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1997) esti­
mated that the ratio of the income of the richest developing countries to 
that of the poorest has almost doubled over the past four decades. A
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Table 8.1 International Differences in Income Levels and 
Growth Rates
(A verage fo r grou ps o f  countries)
Factor G ro u p  1 G ro u p  2 G ro u p  3 G ro u p  4 G ro u p  5
G D P per w ork er (1 9 9 7 )a 4 6 ,6 9 3 2 6 ,4 8 8 1 1 ,7 7 5 4 ,9 9 5 1 ,9 8 8
G D P  per w ork er (1 9 6 5 )a 2 3 ,3 5 8 1 7 ,4 7 1 7 ,3 7 8 4 ,3 5 8 1 ,973
A n n ual grow th  rates
(1 9 6 5 -9 7 )
G D P 3 .5 3 .4 4 .5 3.1 2 .6
G D P  per w orker 2 .1 1.3 1.5 0 .5 0 .2
N u m b er o f  countries 18 14 13 15 13
Source: Ros, 2000, tables 7 and 8.
Note: Group 1: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Hong Kong (China), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Group 2: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Greece, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Republic of Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Group 3: Algeria,
Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, Guatemala, 
Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia. Group 4: Cameroon, El 
Salvador, Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Cote d ’Ivoire, Jam aica, Mauritania, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Togo, Zimbabwe. Group 5: Bangladesh, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia. GDP =  gross domestic product.
a. Figures in 1997 international dollars.
number of studies have verified the growth spurt at middle-income 
levels that causes the divergence between middle- and low-income 
countries.3 Ades and Glaeser (1999) found that growth rates were pos­
itively correlated with initial development levels among developing 
countries in the 20th century and among states of the United States in 
the 19th century.
Can neoclassical growth models account for these trends? The evidence 
for divergence in absolute income levels is not conclusive in this respect, 
because neoclassical theory predicts only conditional convergence, or 
convergence at each country’s long-term income level. Table 8.2 presents 
the long-term income levels and growth rates predicted by three variants 
of neoclassical theory: the traditional Solow (1956) model, with physi­
cal capital and labor; the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) model, 
which includes human capital in the production function; and the model 
estimated by Islam (1995), which takes into account the existence of 
technology gaps between countries.4
None of the three models manages to reproduce the divergence 
processes observed in the data. The growth rates predicted for the low- 
income countries (groups 4 and 5) are systematically higher than the
Table 8.2 Long-Term Income and Growth Rates Predicted by Three Neoclassical Models
(A verage fo r grou ps o f countries)
F actors a n d  M odels G ro u p  1 G ro u p  2 G ro u p  3 G ro u p  4 G ro u p  5
Investm ent rate  (% )a 2 3 .2 2 1 .4 2 4 .9 2 1 .4 1 9 .4
G row th  o f  the lab o r forceb 1.4 2 .2 3 .0 2 .7 2 .4
R ate  o f  investm ent in education 0 9 .5 7 .2 6 .7 5 .0 2 .2
T ech n ological leveld 1.0 0 .58 0 .3 5 0 .1 8 e 0 .1 0 f
M o d el with ph y sica l cap ita l a n d  lab or  
Incom e as percentage o f g ro u p  1 (1997) 100 5 6 .7 2 5 .2 1 0 .7 4 .3
Long-term  incom e as percentage o f  group  1 (predicted) 100 90 .5 9 2 .7 8 7 .6 8 5 .0
A nnual G D P grow th  (1 9 6 5 -9 7 ) 
O bserved 3 .5 3 .4 4 .5 3.1 2 .6
Predicted 3 .5 4 .7 7 .9 9.1 1 0 .2
N u m b er o f  countries 18 14 13 15 13
M o d el with hum an cap ital 
Incom e as percentage o f  g rou p  1 (1985) 100 4 9 .5 2 7 .9 1 5 .6 7 .1
Long-term  incom e a s  percentage o f  grou p  1 (predicted) 100 63 .9 3 7 .9 2 6 .4 18 .1
A nnual G D P grow th  (1 9 6 0 -8 5 ) 
O bserved 4 .2 4 .3 5 .5 4 .6 3 .3
Predicted 4 .2 5 .2 6 .6 6 .5 6 .5
N u m b er o f  countries 18 16 14 14 13
M o d el with tech no lo gy  gaps
Incom e a s  percentage o f  grou p  1 (1 9 9 7 ) 100 5 6 .7 2 5 .2 10 .7 4 .3
Lon g-term  incom e a s  percentage o f g rou p  1 (predicted) 
A n n ual G D P  grow th  (1 9 6 5 -9 7 )
100 5 2 .6 32 .8 16.1 8 .4
O bserved 3 .5 3 .4 4 .5 3.1 2 .6
Predicted 3 .5 3 .4 5 .2 4 .4 4 .5
N u m b er o f  countries 18 14 13 15 13
Source: Ros 2000, chapter 2, tables 7, 8, 9, and 10.
a. Gross investment as a fraction of GDP (average 1965-97).
b. Trend growth rate of the labor force (1965-97) (annual percentage).
c. Percentage of working-age population attending secondary school. Average 1960-85. See Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
d. Estimates from Islam (1995).
e. Average excludes Indonesia.
f. Average excludes Burkina Faso.
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rates actually observed, and higher than the growth rates of high- and 
middle-income countries (groups 1 and 2, although they are not higher 
than those of group 3 in the models that include human capital and 
technology gaps).5 In other words, the models predict not only condi­
tional convergence but also absolute convergence. The reasons for this 
are different in each model. The Solow model predicts very small dif­
ferences in long-term income (15 percent between groups 1 and 5). The 
gaps between initial income and predicted long-term income are thus 
very wide for the low-income countries and as a result their predicted 
growth rates are very high (the highest of all the groups). In the other 
two models, the consideration of investment in education (Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil 1992) or of differences in technology (Islam 1995) 
tends to widen the predicted gaps in long-term income.6 This is because 
each of these models assumes that there are huge differences between 
countries in terms of their supply of human capital or level of technol­
ogy. Accordingly, the gap between the low-income countries’ initial and 
long-term income is much smaller than in the traditional neoclassical 
model, and thus the growth rates predicted for these countries are lower 
than in that model. Even so, these rates are higher than the ones actu­
ally observed and the ones posted by the high-income groups, implying 
the existence of absolute convergence. The trend toward conditional 
convergence implied by the assumption of diminishing returns to capi­
tal counteracts the effect of these smaller gaps between initial and long­
term income.7
Divergence, Endogenous Growth, and 
Classical Development Theory
If the limitations of neoclassical models stem from the assumption of di­
minishing returns to capital, the presence of divergence would seem to 
imply the existence of increasing or constant returns to capital in the ag­
gregate production function. This is precisely the assumption made in a 
number of endogenous growth theories, including the original Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988) models, as well as the AK model with constant 
returns to capital (Barro 1990; Rebelo 1991). Adopting a very-long-term 
perspective, Romer (1986, 1991) found attractive the assumption that 
the external effects o f capital accumulation are so great that they gener­
ate increasing returns to capital, as this premise is consistent with the in­
crease in the productivity growth rates of technology leaders through the 
centuries. However, when an attempt is made to use this analytical 
framework to explain the differences in growth rates between countries, 
a number of problems arise.
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The major problem is that these models seem to imply an excessive 
degree of divergence. In the first place, the models imply growing gaps 
in per capita income at all income levels, not only between poor and rich 
countries or between low- and middle-income countries.8 Thus, they fail 
to explain the tendency toward convergence between high- and middle- 
income countries or among regions within a country. These convergence 
processes have been extensively documented in the case of the Organi­
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
in the post-WWII period, the states of the United States between 1880 
and 1980, and the prefectures of Japan between 1955 and 1990 (see 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Baumol and W olff 1988; Maddison 1991; 
and Ros 2000).
Second, these models imply that not only gaps in per capita income, 
but also differences in growth rates themselves should increase over 
time. N o one, to my knowledge, has suggested that this is happening. Al­
though this particular difficulty does not arise in endogenous growth 
models that limit the capital coefficient to 1 in the aggregate production 
function (AK model), thus generating steady growth at a constant rather 
than a rising rate, the properties of those models also fail to explain the 
convergence processes that have occurred at middle- and high-income 
levels. In addition, these models’ distinctive properties are critically 
dependent on the assumption that returns to capital are exactly con­
stant, thus limiting still further the assumptions made on technology, 
even though there is no clear empirical support for this.9
What is needed is a model in which increasing returns to capital pre­
vail at low- and middle-income levels, while at high-income levels the 
aggregate production function exhibits diminishing returns to capital. 
This is precisely what happens in models of classical development the­
ory in which increasing returns to capital at low-income levels result not 
from technology but from the interaction between increasing returns to 
scale and an elastic labor supply. This point can be illustrated by a sim­
ple example in which increasing returns to scale are generated by tech­
nological externalities.
Consider an economy with two sectors (S and M) that produce the 
same good (or basket of goods). Sector S uses traditional production tech­
niques that are labor-intensive (or, more generally, with low-productivity 
owing to the limited use of capital). The other sector (M) uses a mass 
production technology subject to increasing returns to scale. The corre­
sponding production functions are
S = L s (8.1)
M  — (Kfl)KaL M1 a /r >  0, a + ¡i <  1, (8.2 )
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where S and M  are the levels of production in the two sectors, L s and 
Ljvi are the labor inputs in each sector, K  is the capital stock, and re­
flects the existence of technological externalities associated with the 
capital stock accumulated in the past. A positive value of parameter ¡x 
guarantees that the capitalist technology exhibits increasing returns to 
scale. The restriction a + ¡x <  1 implies the assumption of diminishing 
returns to capital in the production function of the capital-intensive 
sector.
Let us also assume that both sectors operate in competitive condi­
tions. The assumption that the capitalist sector is profit maximizing 
generates the following labor demand function:
L m = [(1 -  a)K»/wM]V“ K . (8.3)
In addition, assuming that workers who do not find employment in 
the capitalist sector are employed in the traditional sector and that 
wages in the two sectors are equal owing to labor market competition, 
we have
L  = L s + L m  (8.4)
wu  = 1, (8.5)
where L is the total labor force and wM is the wage in sector M. We have 
chosen units so that ws = 1, and because Ws = wm , we have wM = 1.
Using the production functions of the two sectors— (8.1) and (8.2)—  
total output (Y =  S +  M) can be written as Y  = L s  + K a+fL L Ml a■ Using 
(8.4) to eliminate L $from this expression and (8.3) to eliminate L m  (and 
using equation [8.5]) gives the following equation:
Y  = L  + a {l -  a){1- a)/a K 1+^ a. (8.6)
Equation (8.6) shows that even though the capitalist sector’s technol­
ogy is subject to diminishing returns to capital (a + ¡x<  1), the aggregate 
production function shows increasing returns to capital (1 + ¡x/a > 1). 
This is so, of course, provided that the two sectors coexist (because [8.6] 
is derived from the assumption ws = wm  =1 ) -  Otherwise, if the tradi­
tional sector disappears, the aggregate production function is the same 
as that of the capital-intensive sector.
Increasing returns to capital during the phase in which the two sec­
tors coexist are the result of interactions between an elastic labor supply 
for the capital-intensive sector (wm  — 1) and increasing returns to scale
>  0). Increasing returns to scale strengthen the effects of capital ac­
cumulation on productivity, whereas the elastic labor supply weakens
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the effects of capital accumulation on real wages. The rates of profit and 
capital accumulation may thus be increasing functions of the capital 
stock. This has two implications. The first is that at very low income 
levels, the profit rate may be so low that the rate of accumulation falls 
below the depreciation rate and the capital stock contracts instead of ex­
panding. The economy is then in a profitability trap in which the elastic 
labor supply and increasing returns interact negatively to block the ex­
pansion of the modern sector: The elastic labor supply sets a floor on the 
real wages that the modern sector has to pay and this, combined with the 
initial conditions of low productivity, prevents the profitable use of 
capital-intensive technologies with increasing returns.
The second implication is that the dynamics of growth are very dif­
ferent from the transition to long-term equilibrium in neoclassical mod­
els and from accumulation processes in endogenous growth models. In 
contrast to what happens in neoclassical models (and in line with what 
happens in endogenous growth models with increasing returns) at low- 
income levels, but beyond the profitability trap, the interactions between 
increasing returns to scale and an elastic labor supply are positive and 
counteract the influence of diminishing returns to capital in the technol­
ogy of the capital-intensive sector. As a result, the growth rate may in­
crease over a long period, generating a trend toward divergence in income 
levels. In contrast to what happens in endogenous growth models (and 
in line with what happens in neoclassical models), a reduction in the elas­
ticity of the labor supply at higher income levels, as the ratio of capital to 
labor increases and the traditional sector disappears, tends to reduce the 
rates of profit and growth and, therefore, to generate convergence. Thus, 
the model implies transitional dynamics characterized by a pattern of 
conditional divergence followed by convergence, in which the highest 
rates of accumulation are found in the intermediate rather than the ini­
tial stages of the transition, as occurs in the neoclassical model, or in 
more advanced stages, as in models with increasing returns to capital.
This pattern of divergence/convergence may be summed up in a 
schematic and approximate way as a quadratic equation in which the 
rate of income growth (gy) is related to the initial income level and the 
square of initial income (yo  and y o 2)'
gy =  a0 +  a\ yo  +  a 2 yo2 ai >  0, a2 <  0 . ( 8 . 7 )
The growth rate then reaches a maximum at an income level equal to
yM = ~ a i/ la 2, ( 8 . 8 )
provided that a2 is negative (the condition for a maximum) and a\ is pos­
itive (so that y  is positive). The corresponding maximum growth rate
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is g M  = ao  ~ a12/4a2- The equation also implies a convergence thresh­
old, or the income level at which the growth rate equals that of higher- 
income countries (g*), at
yc = yM + [*i2 -  4a2(a0 -  g*)]1/2/2a2, (8.9)
which is less than yM, because a2 is negative.
The results of estimates from quadratic equations generally support 
the pattern of divergence/convergence (see Ros 2000, ch. 4). The signs 
of the coefficients are systematically favorable to the hypothesis and sur­
vive the inclusion of human capital variables and other possible deter­
minants of long-term equilibrium. The results of the estimates tend to 
confirm that, after taking into account differences in investment rates, 
education, and political risk factors, the economies of poorer countries 
have tended to grow more slowly than those of middle- and high-income 
countries, and only after a threshold was passed did a process of conver­
gence begin. Needless to say, these results call into question the conclu­
sion that, “given the human-capital variables, subsequent growth is 
substantially negatively related to the initial level of per capita GDP” 
(Barro 1991, p. 409). The positive coefficient of initial income implies 
the presence of significant forces for divergence that are countered only 
at middle- and high-income levels.10 With respect to the positive rate of 
convergence estimated in neoclassical models in the manner of Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992), a comment made by Lucas (2002) is relevant 
and consistent with the quadratic equations: “The annual income con­
vergence rate of about .02 that Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) estimated 
from postwar data is an average of a few much higher rates with a lot 
of zeros” (p. 9) and, it might be added, quite a few negative rates. It is in­
teresting to note that in his most recent research, Barro himself included 
a quadratic term for initial income, together with other growth determi­
nants, with results that support the pattern of divergence/con vergence 
(see Barro 1999).
Growth Collapses, Inequality, 
and Trade Specialization
The classical approach can be used to explain the pattern of initial diver­
gence followed by convergence at middle- and high-income levels. A 
careful reading of the post-WWII experience, however, reveals that the 
acceleration of growth at middle-income levels has been accompanied by 
cases in which growth slows down or even becomes negative. These 
growth collapses have affected many middle-income countries and low- 
income countries that, after having apparently taken off, slipped back to
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Table 8.3 Incidence o f Growth Collapse at Different Income Levels
(Percentage)
Growth Collapse Total Sustained
Initial Income Level Catastrophic Severe Collapses Growth
H igh 0 0 0 100
M idd le
H igh 1 3 .6 2 2 .7 3 6 .4 6 3 .6
L o w 2 7 .3 31 .8 59 .1 4 0 .9
L ow 35 .3 2 3 .5 5 8 .8 4 1 .2
Source: Based on Perala 2002, table 3.4.
Note: High income =  more than US$890. Upper middle income =  between 
US$340 and US$890. Lower middle income =  between US$170 and US$300. 
Low income =  US$170 or less. All amounts figured in 1960 dollars.
income levels they had reached years or even decades earlier. Table 8.3, 
based on Perala (2002), shows the incidence of growth collapses—defined 
as the experience of economies that achieved their current levels of real 
per capita income in or before the 1960s (catastrophic collapses) or in the 
1970s or 1980s (severe collapses)—in different categories of countries 
grouped according to their per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 
1960. The table confirms that the incidence of collapse is highest in lower- 
middle- and low-income countries and falls quickly in higher-income 
groups, dropping to zero among the high-income countries. Cases of sus­
tained growth, defined as the remaining subset,11 are thus more numerous 
among the upper-middle- and high-income countries.
The transition matrices estimated by Quah (1993) for the period 
1962-84 illustrate the same phenomenon. These matrices divide the 
world economy into five groups, based on per capita income level in re­
lation to the world average, and show the likelihood that a country in a 
particular group will still be in the same group the following year or will 
move from that group to a higher- or lower-income group. The countries 
most likely to stay in the same group are those with the highest and low ­
est incomes. The countries least likely to stay in the same group, and thus 
most likely to move to a higher- or lower-income group, are those in the 
middle- and low-middle-income groups. It is noteworthy that in these 
groups downward mobility is as common as upward mobility, which 
suggests that collapses are as frequent as growth spurts in those coun­
tries. (On the greater mobility of relative income at the middle levels of 
the international income distribution, see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 
1996.)
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Table 8.4 Cases of Growth Collapse
B E Y O N D  R E F O R M S
C atastrop h ic  C o llap se Severe C o llap se
Burundi Som alia C am eroon Paragu ay
C en tral A frican South  A frica C o n go , Dem . Peru
R epublic T o go R ep. o f T rin id ad  and
C h ad Z am b ia K enya T o b a g o
C on go , D em . Bolivia M alaw i Iran , Islam ic
R ep. o f H aiti M ali R ep. o f
C ôte d ’Ivoire Ja m a ic a M au ritan ia Jo rd a n
G h an a N icaragu a N igeria Saudi A rab ia
L iberia V enezuela, Z im b abw e Philippines
M a d ag asc a r R . B. de E cu ad o r
N iger El Sa lv ad or
R w an d a G u atem ala
Senegal G u y an a
Sierra Leone H o n d u ras
Source: Based on Perala 2002, table 3.5.
The cases of collapse are shown in table 8.4. Catastrophic collapses 
are concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa (16 cases) and Latin America 
(5 cases). Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, and 
South America have the highest incidence of severe collapses (8 cases 
in each region), followed by the Middle East (3 cases) and East Asia 
(1 case). It is possible that in some cases these processes of stagnation or 
decline are attributable to classic underdevelopment traps, characteristic 
of economies that have not yet managed to create the conditions for sus­
tained growth. But in many other cases the classical approach seems 
insufficient or even irrelevant for explaining these processes. According 
to that approach, a growth spurt—that is, the opposite of a collapse—  
would be expected at middle- and low-middle-income levels.
The question, then, is whether there are other factors that can explain 
these processes of stagnation or collapse. The recent literature on the 
comparative analysis of growth has emphasized the role of the follow­
ing factors:
1. Size o f the economy. Auty (2001) and Perala (2002) presented em­
pirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the highest incidence of 
collapse occurs in small economies. Auty attributed this to the fact that 
small economies’ export structures are more concentrated in a few prod­
ucts and their domestic economic activity is less diversified, whereas 
their greater openness to external trade makes them more vulnerable to 
external shocks.
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2. Abundance o f natural resources. Ranis (1991, cited by Auty 1997) 
sums up the mechanisms whereby an abundance of natural resources 
may be inimical to growth:
a. Income from natural resources causes the State and society 
to neglect the development of human resources and the process of 
wealth creation, allows import-substitution processes to continue 
even after they no longer contribute to development, and generates 
conditions that encourage rent-seeking on the part of interest groups. 
This last hypothesis was recently formalized and investigated by Tornell 
and Lane (1999).
b. Natural resource booms may give rise to “Dutch disease,” mean­
ing they may have destructive effects that persist even after the boom  
is over, on tradable (non-natural-resource-intensive) goods sectors 
(see Corden and Neary 1982; Rodriguez and Sachs 1999; and Sachs 
and Warner 1997, 2001).
c. International trade in natural-resource-intensive goods may 
worsen income distribution and lead society to identify trade with the 
interests of the rich.
d. Commodity prices are more volatile than manufactures prices, 
paving the way for growth collapses in the absence of export diversi­
fication.
M ost of these mechanisms concern the adverse effects that an abundance 
of natural resources may have on the growth rate (that is, the explana­
tion of why some economies grow more slowly than others), but if we 
add to this the downward trend in relative commodity prices (the fa­
mous Prebisch-Singer thesis, which is timely and relevant to develop­
ments in the past two decades), we come closer to an explanation of 
these collapses.12
3. Type o f natural resources. The distinction between the perform­
ance of mineral- and oil-exporting economies and that of economies rich 
in agricultural resources dates back to the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean literature of the 1950s and 1960s and 
to Hirschman (1981). Economies in the first category seem to be partic­
ularly prone to growth collapses, to the extent that they are usually “en­
clave economies” with weak internal linkages that hinder the economy’s 
diversification and significant fiscal linkages that lead governments to 
carry out tasks that are intrinsically more difficult than those taken on 
by the private sector (Hirschman 1981). Auty (2001) added that capital­
intensiveness and the concentration of ownership in mineral resource 
sectors generate a high degree of inequality that has adverse effects on 
growth. Gelb (1988, ch. 2), in turn, pointed out that mineral prices and 
export earnings are more volatile than those of agricultural products. 
The resulting economic instability acts as a drag on growth, given the 
consequent asymmetries in the economy’s adjustment to fluctuations in
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demand (which reduce the average level of use of productive capacity) 
and volatility in government revenues and public investment.
4. Unequal income distribution. The recent literature on this subject 
identifies two types of mechanisms whereby higher levels of inequality 
may hinder growth. Economic mechanisms include the adverse effects 
of inequality on market size for industries with increasing returns to 
scale (present in the structuralist literature of the 1960s; see also the 
more recent formalization by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [1989]) or 
on aggregate demand and the use of productive capacity (with negative 
effects on investment [Dutt 1984]), as well as the links between income 
distribution and investment in education (in the presence of imperfect 
credit markets, lower levels of inequality ease the budgetary constraints 
of the poor and allow more investment in education [Birdsall, Ross, and 
Sabot 1995; Galor and Zeira 1993]) and the lower fertility and popula­
tion growth rates that result from less inequality (Perotti 1996). Sociopo­
litical mechanisms include the fiscal effects (such as taxes on capital) of the 
redistributive pressures that result from income concentration (Alesina 
and Rodrik 1994) and the effects of inequality on political instability 
and social conflict (Alesina and Perotti 1994) and on the polarization 
that undermines consensus on economic policies (Keefer and Knack 
1999) and makes external shocks harder to manage (Rodrik 1998).
Tables 8.5 to 8.7 present empirical evidence for each of these hypothe­
ses using three samples of countries.13 Table 8.5 shows the incidence of 
collapses in different types of economies grouped by size, abundance of 
natural resources, and type of natural resources. The table illustrates 
three stylized facts concerning growth collapses. First, the incidence of 
collapses is higher in small economies than in large ones (67 percent op­
posed to 25 percent). The influence of size is even more apparent in the 
fact that small economies in all three categories (poor, rich in agricul­
tural resources, and rich in minerals and oil) are more prone to col­
lapses. The significance of size, which is confirmed by the findings of 
Auty and of Perala, probably reflects the vulnerability to external 
shocks that arises from a high degree of openness and specialization in 
foreign trade, and suggests that poverty traps related to increasing re­
turns to scale play a role in explaining the collapses. Second, consistent 
with the recent literature on the relationship between natural resource 
abundance and growth, collapses are more frequent in economies rich in 
natural resources than in resource-poor economies (30 percent com­
pared with 17 percent among large economies and 70 percent compared 
with 55 percent among small ones). Third, economies rich in mineral re­
sources and oil seem more prone to collapses than economies rich in 
agricultural resources (67 percent compared with 14 percent among 
large economies and 78 percent compared with 64 percent among small
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Table 8.5  Incidence o f Collapse in Different Types o f Economy
(Developing countries)
Number of Number of Incidence of
Type o f Economy Countries Collapses Collapse (%)
L arge 16 4 25
R esou rce-poo r3 6 1 17
R esource-rich 10 3 30
A gricu ltural11 7 1 14
M in era ls an d  o ilc 3 2 6 7
Sm all 54 36 6 7
R eso u rce-poo rd 11 6 55
R esource-rich 43 30 70
A gricu ltural6 25 16 64
M in era ls an d  o ilf 18 14 78
T o ta l 70 4 0 5 7
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Auty (1997) and Perala (2002).
Note: Type of economy: size, abundance of natural resources and type of natural 
resources. Large economies: 1970 GDP higher than US$6.99 billion. Resource-poor 
economies: less than 0.3 hectares of arable land per inhabitant. In the notes below, 
growth collapses are indicated by*.
a. Bangladesh, Colombia, Arab Republic o f Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines*, and 
Republic of Korea.
b. Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa*, and Turkey.
c. Chile, N igeria*, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela*.
d. El Salvador*, H aiti*, Hong Kong (China), Jordan*, Kenya*, M auritania*, M au­
ritius, Nepal, Singapore, Som alia*, and Sri Lanka.
e. Burundi*, Cam eroon*, Chad*, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire*, Ghana*,
Guatemala*, Guyana*, Honduras*, Lesotho, M adagascar*, M alaw i*, Malaysia, 
M ali*, Morocco, N icaragua*, Panama, Paraguay*, Rw anda*, Senegal*, Sudan, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe*.
f. Bolivia*, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic*, the Democratic 
Republic of C ongo*, the Republic of Congo*, Dominican Republic, Ecuador*, 
Jam aica*, Liberia*, N iger*, Peru*, Saudi Arabia*, Sierra Leone*, Syrian Arab 
Republic, T o go*, Trinidad and Tobago*, and Zam bia*.
ones), supporting the hypotheses of Hirschman, Auty, and Gelb on the 
role played by the type of natural resources. It is worthwhile noting 
the significance of the interaction between size, abundance of natural 
resources, and trade specialization in minerals and oil: The highest in­
cidence of collapses occurs in economies that are small and rich in nat­
ural resources (70 percent), particularly those that specialize in mineral 
and oil exports (78 percent).
Table 8.6 illustrates the influence of inequality on the incidence of col­
lapses. There have been no collapses in the group of countries with a low
Table 8.6  Inequality and Incidence o f Collapse
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(Developed and developing countries)
Number of Number of Incidence of
Degree o f Inequality Countries Collapses Collapse (%)
H igh 3 21 11 52
M o d e ra te 3 20 11 55
L o w c 21 0 0
T o ta l 62 2 2 35
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Perala (2002) and Ros (2000).
Note: In the following groups of countries, growth collapses are indicated by*.
a. Gini higher than 0.45. Includes Brazil, Central African Republic*, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala*, Honduras*, Kenya*, Lesotho, Malawi*, 
Malaysia, Mexico, N icaragua*, Panama, the Philippines*, Senegal*, South Africa*, 
Thailand, República Bolivariana de Venezuela*, and Zimbabwe *.
b. Gini lower than or equal to 0.45 and higher than or equal to 0.36. Includes 
Australia, Bolivia*, Cote d ’Ivoire*, Ghana*, Guyana*, Hong Kong (China), Jam aica*, 
Jordan*, M adagascar*, M auritania*, Mauritius, Morocco, New Zealand, N iger*, 
N igeria*, Portugal, Singapore, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zam bia*.
c. Gini lower than 0.36. Includes Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Finland, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, and United States.
level of inequality, whereas the incidence of collapses is over 50 percent in 
the groups with moderate and high levels of inequality. Table 8.7 shows 
the incidence of collapses in different types of economy classified by de­
gree of inequality and abundance and type of natural resources. The evi­
dence presented in the table is consistent with the influence of the pattern 
of trade specialization on the incidence of collapses: Economies rich in 
natural resources, especially those that export minerals and oil, are clearly 
the most prone to growth collapses. The data are also consistent with the 
influence of inequality: The incidence of collapse is higher in resource- 
poor economies with a high level of inequality than in resource-poor 
economies with a low level of inequality, and also higher in economies 
with abundant agricultural resources and a high level of inequality than in 
economies of the same type with a low level of inequality. Because 
economies rich in natural resources have a higher level of inequality than 
poor economies, the evidence seems to agree with the two main hypothe­
ses in the recent literature: Growth collapses seem to be produced by a 
combination of highly unequal income distribution and a pattern of trade 
specialization determined by an abundance of natural resources.
On the other hand, Auty’s (2001) conjecture that mineral- and oil- 
exporting countries have a higher level of inequality than economies 
with abundant agricultural resources is not supported by our sample of
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Table 8.7 Type of Economy, Inequality, and Growth Collapse
(Developing countries)
Type of Economy Number o f Number o f Incidence of Average Gini
and Inequality Countries Collapses Collapse (%) Coefficient
R esou rce-poor 13 4 31 0 .4 0
L o w  inequality3 7 0 0
H igh  inequality13 6 4 6 7
E con om ies rich in 23 11 48 0 .48
agricu ltu ral resources 
L o w  inequality0 12 4 33
H igh  inequality4 11 7 64
E con om ies rich in 
m inerals an d  oil 9 7 78 0 .4 7
L o w  inequality0 5 5 100
H igh  inequality1 4 2 50
T o ta l 45 2 2 49
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Auty (1997), Perala (2002), and Ros (2000).
Note: In the following groups of countries, growth collapses are indicated by*.
a. Bangladesh, Arab Republic of Egypt, Indonesia, Mauritius, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Sri Lanka.
b. Colombia, Hong Kong (China), Jordan*, Kenya*, M auritania*, and the 
Philippines*.
c. Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire*, Ghana*, Guyana*, India, M adagascar*, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey.
d. Brazil, Guatemala*, Honduras*, Lesotho, M alaw i*, Mexico, N icaragua*, 
Panama, Senegal*, South Africa*, and Zimbabwe*.
e. Bolivia*, Jam aica*, N iger*, N igeria*, and Zam bia*.
f. Central African Republic*, Chile, Dominican Republic, and República Bolivari- 
ana de Venezuela*.
countries (the average Gini coefficient for mineral- and oil-exporting 
countries is indistinguishable from that of economies with abundant 
agricultural resources). In addition, the interaction between abundance 
of minerals and oil and a high level of inequality does not increase the 
number of collapses. Within the group of economies rich in minerals and 
oil, it is those with a lower level of inequality (although their degree of 
inequality is high by the standards of poor economies) that have the 
highest incidence of collapses.14 These last two observations suggest that 
although economies rich in mineral resources and oil are more prone to 
collapses than economies rich in agricultural resources, this is not be­
cause they have more unequal income distribution. The higher incidence 
of collapse must result from factors other than the pattern of income 
distribution in this type of economy. Mention has already been made of 
these economies’ low level of diversification (associated with a lack of
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forward and backward links), the high volatility of international mineral 
prices, and the importance of the fiscal linkage, all of which may accen­
tuate the destabilizing effects of external shocks on the country’s macro- 
economic performance.
Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the processes of divergence in income levels 
between rich and poor countries and the ability of growth economics to 
explain these processes. Behind these processes of divergence we find 
growth collapses in low- and middle-income countries, especially in Sub- 
Saharan Africa and Latin America. Neither neoclassical growth models, 
which predict convergence, nor classical development theory, which pre­
dicts an acceleration of growth at middle-income levels, can adequately 
explain these economic setbacks. The chapter has argued that these 
processes of growth collapse reflect the combined influence of unequal 
income distribution and the pattern of specialization, as determined by 
the abundance of natural resources and the size of the economy.
Endnotes
1. Here I refer to the approach taken by the pioneers o f development eco­
nomics, especially Rosenstein-Rodan, N urkse, Prebisch, and Hirschm an.
2. The inform ation used is presented in detail in R os (2000). The five income 
categories were selected in order to minimize the dispersion o f income around the 
mean and to have approxim ately 15 countries in each group. For exam ple, group 1 
comprises 18 high-income countries (most o f them O EC D  members) and group 5 
comprises 13 low-income countries, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
3. See Abram ovitz (1986), Baum ol (1986), Baum ol and W olff (1988), Chen- 
ery and Syrquin (1975), Kristensen (1974), Lucas (1988), and Syrquin (1986).
4. The exercise consists o f estimating the long-run equilibrium level o f income 
of country groups 2 to 5 as percentages o f group 1, using the inform ation available 
for each m odel’s param eters, such as rates o f investment and growth o f  the labor 
force in the case o f the Solow  model. The model estimated by Islam  (1995), based 
on panel data and country-specific fixed effects, is used for the variant that adjusts 
the neoclassical m odel to allow  for technology gaps between countries. Once the 
long-term steady-state level o f income has been estim ated, the grow th rates pre­
dicted by each m odel can be obtained from  the gap  between initial income and 
long-term income. The existence o f diminishing returns to capital implies that the 
growth rate predicted is an increasing function o f this gap. See R os (2000, ch. 2) 
for a  detailed presentation o f the m ethodology used.
5. The differences in rates o f growth of the labor force are not large enough to 
have a qualitative effect on the com parisons in terms o f growth o f GDP per worker.
6. Other studies accounting for differences am ong countries in GDP per 
w orker show results similar to those o f Islam. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997b) found that differences in total factor productivity account for m ore than
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half o f the differences in GD P per w orker for a sam ple o f  98 countries, using 1985 
figures. H all and Jones (1999) estimated that in developing countries, differences 
in the residual (the contribution o f productivity) are the m ost im portant factor in 
explaining the gaps in GDP per w orker with respect to developed countries. E ast­
erly and Levine (2001) found that total factor productivity accounts for m ost o f 
the differences am ong countries in levels o f per capita income. An exception to 
these findings is Kum ar and Russell (2002), which will be discussed later.
7. It m ay be argued that the growth rates observed in poor countries w ould be 
better reproduced by a blend o f the m odels that include hum an capital and tech­
nology gaps (such as the one in Jones 1998). R os (2000) presented an analysis on 
the subject. The m ain difficulty with this “ solution” is that once technology gaps 
are introduced (especially gaps o f  the size required to bring the m odel in line with 
the data), it is im possible to m aintain the assum ption o f uniform technical progress 
am ong countries. The natural hypothesis, which goes back to Gerschenkron (1962), 
is that the bigger the technology gap, the faster the rate o f technical progress, be­
cause profit opportunities and potential technological leaps are greater. Depending 
on the function relating the rate o f technical progress to the technology gap, the re­
sulting m odel m ay  agree with the data m ore or less closely than the traditional 
neoclassical m odel. How ever, to the extent that technology gaps are proportional 
to income gaps (as they are in the estim ates o f Islam  and others; see note 6), this 
model, like Solow ’s model, will show that, for countries with similar characteris­
tics (similar long-term income levels), growth rates should increase as we consider 
lower income levels.
8. See Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997a) and R os (2000) for a m ore ex­
tensive analysis. These m odels are not easy to evaluate. One reason is that m ost re­
cent empirical research has concentrated on testing the neoclassical growth model 
and its revisions and extensions rather than on exam ining the em pirical im plica­
tions o f endogenous growth m odels. Also, as K lenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997a) 
observed, the literature has not included m ethods for distinguishing empirically 
between different models o f endogenous growth, so that the latter have not proved 
very useful for understanding the differences in growth rates between countries.
9. The evidence for increasing returns and V erdoorn’s law, and research on 
the external effects o f capital accum ulation, suggest the presence o f increasing re­
turns to scale and diminishing returns to capital, especially in the case o f the ag­
gregate production function (see R os 2000).
10. Other studies support this conclusion. Jones (1997) showed that in the pe­
riod 19 6 0 -8 8 , convergence took place in the upper half o f the international income 
distribution and divergence took place in the lower half. The sensitivity analysis of 
cross-country growth regressions carried out by Levine and Renelt (1992) shows 
that the finding o f conditional convergence (a negative coefficient at the starting 
level o f  per capita income) is not robust for the period 1974-89 , or when the O ECD  
countries are excluded (see Levine and Renelt 1992, p. 958). The exclusion o f the 
group of O EC D  countries— which largely coincides with the group o f  high-income 
countries— leaves the sample with (for the m ost part) middle- and low-income coun­
tries. The result is thus consistent with classical theory, according to which condi­
tional convergence w ould not be expected in such a sample.
11. Perala identified an intermediate category o f recent collapses, defined as 
those economies whose per capita income levels were lower in 1999 than in 1990. 
I include the countries in this category as cases o f sustained growth. The incidence 
o f recent collapse is less than 20  percent in all the groups except the low-income 
group (35.3 percent).
12. It is worth noting that these hypotheses are challenged by the literature on the 
so-called “ staples thesis,” which considers the positive effects that an abundance of 
natural resources may have on growth. (See R os 2000, for a review of this literature.)
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13. Table 8.5 refers to developing countries grouped by type o f  economy. The 
sam ple o f countries is the intersection between the sam ples considered by Auty 
(1997, 2001) and Perala (2002); that is, it includes, out o f the countries considered 
by Perala in her analysis o f  growth collapses, those countries for which Auty pro­
vided inform ation on the type o f econom y (size, abundance o f natural resources, 
and type o f natural resources). Table 8.6 refers to a  sample o f developed and de­
veloping countries considered by Perala (2002) for which R os (2000) provided in­
form ation on income concentration. Table 8.7 refers to a sam ple o f developing 
countries for which Auty (1997, 2001) provided inform ation on the abundance 
and type o f natural resources and R os (2000) presented inform ation on income dis­
tribution.
14. In apparent contradiction with this finding, Perala (2002) showed that the 
interaction between abundance o f minerals and oil and a lack o f social cohesive­
ness has an adverse effect on growth. H er indicator o f  the lack o f social cohesive­
ness is not, however, the degree o f inequality o f income distribution, but an index 
of ethnolinguistic fragm entation.
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